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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE:
A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THREAT ENVIRONMENT
AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE LEVELS

Although largely overlooked in much of the previous research on political
tolerance, I argue that contextual factors, specifically state-level features, play a
significant role in influencing individual tolerance judgments. Drawing from extant
theories of public opinion, international conflict, and political institutions, I seek to
further our understanding of the determinants of political tolerance by trying to answer
the following question: What accounts for the significant differences in political
tolerance levels across countries? While models using individual-level predictors
account for some of the disparity in tolerance levels, a substantial amount remains
unexplained. I assert that several macro-level theoretical frameworks offer compelling
explanations for the marked difference in tolerance levels across countries. Specifically,
I examine the effect of state-level external threats, internal threats, and the role of
domestic political institutions in shaping individual attitudes towards unpopular groups.
To test my propositions, I use data from the 1995-1997 World Values survey as well as
multi-level statistical modeling to estimate the aggregate effects of state-level factors on
political tolerance levels across 33 countries while also controlling for individual-level
predictors.
This dissertation demonstrates that elevated objective threats to the state, whether
international disputes or incidents of civil conflict, serve to dampen overall tolerance
levels. In doing so, this study also highlights that not all types of external threat resonate

equally amongst the public. Individuals in countries involved in territorial disputes or
countries targeted in international disputes are generally less tolerant overall than those in
countries involved in disputes over other issues. In terms of domestic political
institutions, I find that electoral rules designed to build consensus and ameliorate societal
tensions among groups may actually serve to foster intolerance in countries under certain
conditions. Finally, my analyses reveal that the effect of democratic longevity on
political tolerance levels is actually conditional based on the type of political institutions
that exist in a country. Overall, the findings discovered here underscore the importance
of contextual factors in shaping political tolerance levels across countries and stresses the
need for this type of analysis in future studies of political tolerance.
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Democratic Longevity
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Importance of Political Tolerance
Political tolerance has long been viewed by scholars as a crucial element
underpinning democracy. This identification of political tolerance as an “endorphin of
the democratic body politic” stems largely from its importance in reinforcing the core
tenets of democratic theory, namely, open political competition and the unrestricted
marketplace of ideas to inform that competition (Gibson and Gouws 2003: 6). Due to
this esteemed position within classic democratic theory as a safeguard against the tyranny
of the majority and the guarantor of political competition, the study of political tolerance
has emerged as an expansive body of research dedicated to examining both its causes and
effects.
Over the last 50 years, studies have succeeded in debunking the myth held by
earlier democratic theorists that citizens generally embrace the democratic values by
empirically demonstrating a fundamental disconnect between the abstract support for
democratic rights and the concrete extension of these rights to nonconformist or
unpopular groups. Beginning with Stouffer’s (1955) classic study, this scholarship has
experienced its fair share of development and has provided researchers with a relatively
thorough understanding of the micro-level foundations of political tolerance by
identifying robust individual-level predictors of tolerant citizens. Yet, given the reliance
on single-country studies, this area of research also suffers from a number of
shortcomings which, to date, prevent a more complete understanding of all the sources of
political tolerance. Most notably, the literature is largely silent on what, if any, effect
contextual factors have in influencing individual tolerance judgments. The relative
dearth of studies examining the role of national context in shaping political tolerance is
surprising given that earlier comparative studies showed substantial differences in the
levels of tolerance across countries. In these studies, little attention was paid to explicitly
examining particular macro-level factors as possible sources of cross-country variation in
tolerance levels (see Sullivan et al 1985; Sullivan et al 1993). This lacuna presents
scholars with a golden opportunity to conduct worthwhile research in this area and
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increase our overall understanding of this complex attitude. Furthermore, because
political tolerance represents an important asset for the smooth functioning of a
democracy, it is essential to identify what, if any, country-level characteristics that either
facilitate or stymie mass political tolerance.
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of contextual factors on political
tolerance. Specifically, I study the role that state threat environment and domestic
political institutions play in shaping individual tolerance attitudes. My general argument
is that objective threats, in the form of international and civil conflicts, dampen
individuals’ willingness to extend basic civil liberties to those whose ideas they strongly
oppose or dislike. Although the notion that threats to the state would negatively
influence tolerance levels is not exactly a groundbreaking insight, this relationship
between objective threat and intolerance is has rarely been empirically demonstrated and
never tested systematically using cross-national survey data.
With regards domestic political institutions, the research on electoral systems
offers competing hypotheses as to what influence different institutions should have on
overall tolerance levels. In comparing consensus institutions to majoritarian systems,
conventional wisdom, as derived from the work of Lijphart (1968, 1984, 1999) and his
colleagues, suggests that tolerance should thrive under consensus institutions, while
majoritarian institutions should exacerbate social tensions, thereby, fostering intolerance.
On the other hand, the actual incentives created by these systems for the political actors
would seem to predict exactly the opposite effects occurring over time. I test these
conflicting hypotheses and demonstrate that electoral systems, in conjunction with
democratic longevity, produce variegated aggregate effects on overall tolerance levels.
In general, the political tolerance literature has largely shied away from not only
assessing what contextual factors affect overall tolerance levels, but also how they
influence these individual attitudes. Thus, this dissertation offers a unique approach to
understanding the determinants of political tolerance.
Defining Political Tolerance
Political tolerance is most often understood as “a willingness to permit the
expression of ideas or interests one opposes” (Sullivan et al 1982: 2). As Gibson (2006)
points out, this definition implies that individuals exercise forbearance by stifling the
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desire to curtail the rights of those whose ideas and/or principles they strongly dislike
(also see Gibson and Gouws 2003). Indeed, how can one “tolerate” ideas or principles
that one already shares or sympathizes with? However, one problem with this definition
is that while it connotes broad meaning, ambiguous concepts, like ‘willingness’ and
‘opposition’, lead to differing opinions relating to the identification and measurement of
political tolerance.
In everyday parlance, political tolerance is often misidentified as social tolerance
or, more accurately, prejudice is commonly mistaken for political intolerance. Although
similar in that both are shaped by group stereotypes and negative affect toward target
groups, social and political intolerance are conceptually different. Social tolerance refers
to whether or not an individual likes a particular group. Political tolerance, on the other
hand, assumes dislike towards a particular group and asks whether individuals would
deny basic civil liberties to the groups they dislike.
Furthermore, social and political intolerance also differ in their impact. In this
respect, the pernicious consequences of political intolerance invariably strike at the heart
of democratic principles. That is, while rampant prejudice produces negative social
consequences, widespread political intolerance, especially when translated into repressive
public policy, specifically seeks to strip those targets of their civil liberties. Thus, as its
name implies, political tolerance is innately ‘political’ in that it relates to political rights
and democratic principles. Prejudice is inherently ‘social’ in that it relates to biased
judgments towards individuals based on their membership in a particular group. This is
not to imply that prejudice does not inform political tolerance decisions; rather that, while
political and social tolerance are not mutually exclusive, they are clearly distinct.1
In my dissertation, I use a more narrow definition of political tolerance taken from
the work of Gibson and others that closely mirrors the way in which it is commonly
measured in the extant literature (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Gibson 2004, 2006).
According to their conceptualization, political tolerance must satisfy two basic
1

For instance, the United States has seen a number of instances of mass prejudice
translating into mass political intolerance such as the systematic restriction of democratic
rights to African-Americans during the Jim Crow era. Yet, the United States also
experienced periods in which mass prejudice has not translated into large restrictions of
political rights such as during the post-civil rights era.
3

requirements. First, the individual must strongly disagree with or dislike the views,
principles, or behavior of the group in question.2 Second, the individual must indicate that
members of the objectionable group should be allowed to exercise their basic democratic
rights. Scholars generally accede to the objection precondition component of political
tolerance but disagree over what rights should be considered ‘basic’. This debate
essentially boils down to differing viewpoints over what constitutes a ‘tolerant response’
and stems from different interpretations of fundamental principles of representative
democracy. In this respect, I choose to emulate Gibson who employs Dahl’s (1971)
minimalist criteria for a functioning democracy in evaluating what constitutes political
tolerance (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Gibson 2006). Dahl argued that a functional
democracy must allow for both open political competition and the freedom to express
ideas so as to ensure that citizens are free to form their own preferences. Under this
concept of democracy, the two most fundamental democratic rights are the ability to
compete for political office and freedom of expression. According to this definition, if an
individual feels that either of those rights should be withheld from those whose
viewpoints they strongly object to, then that individual is politically intolerant.3 This
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Gibson and Gouws (2003) label this requirement the “objection precondition”.
Throughout much of the previous literature, individuals are often described as being
either tolerant or intolerant, thereby, implying that political tolerance is essentially a zerosum dichotomous response. Political tolerance, however, is most often measured using
continuous variables indicating degrees of tolerance; a practice that persists even across
different survey batteries, such as the General Social Science Survey (GSS) (see Bobo
and Licari 1989 or Nie et al 1996 for example) and the ‘content-controlled’ measures
(see Sullivan et al 1983 or Marcus et al 1995 for example). In their longitudinal study
examining tolerance levels in the United States using the GSS, Mondak and Sanders
(2003) argue that the use of continuous measures actually tells us little about aggregate
changes in tolerance levels and also obfuscates changes in which type of groups and
activities are not being tolerated (also see Mondak and Sanders 2005). To avoid these
problems, they argue simply that political tolerance should be considered a binary choice
– either an individual is tolerant with no exceptions or not - and measurement of
tolerance should reflect this dichotomy. Gibson (2005) rejects this conceptualization by
arguing that it oversimplifies a relatively complex attitude. He posits that “Mondak and
Sanders have erred by elevating a relatively simple and common measurement deficiency
in the GSS to a major theoretical principle of tolerance. More specifically, the
respondents Mondak and Sanders identify as ‘‘uniquely tolerant’’ are most likely neither
tolerant nor unique. Instead, these are simply people for whom valid tolerance questions
were not asked” (2005: 314). His argument echoes the findings of earlier studies
3

4

conceptualization is preferred in that it stays within the broad meaning of tolerance while
maintaining minimalist criteria to specify the ambiguous concepts of ‘willingness’ and
‘opposition’.
Plan for the Dissertation
Questions on tolerance have long had a rich research tradition across a wide array
of disciplines. Studies on tolerance can be found in fields of political science,
psychology, history, and sociology. In Chapter Two, I provide an overview of one
spectrum of this research tradition focusing primarily on studies conducted by political
scientists and psychologists. Drawing from the evidence collected from various singlecountry surveys, I describe the individual-level characteristics and predispositions that
inform political tolerance decisions. I also discuss the central role that threat plays in
shaping tolerance. Finally, I examine the few comparative tolerance studies and identify
state-level factors most likely to influence political tolerance levels across countries.
In Chapter Three, I present a theoretical case for why state threat environment and
domestic political institutions should influence political tolerance levels and generate a
number of hypotheses regarding their overall influence on tolerance. Drawing from the
international conflict literature, I contend that only a few state-level threats are generally
salient enough to impact mass attitudes. One category of threats is militarized interstate
disputes with other countries over issues of territory. Another state-level threat deemed
especially dangerous to both elites and the public is internal violence propagated by
insurgent or terrorist groups within a country. I argue that individuals living in countries
with an elevated threat environment are less likely, on average, to extend civil liberties to
nonconformist or unpopular groups. In short, I expect high objective threats to the state
to have an overall dampening effect on tolerance levels. I also propose that the domestic
political institutions of a country should affect overall tolerance levels as different
examining value trade-offs. This research strongly suggests that the decision to tolerate
is not necessarily a binary choice (see Gibson 1996, 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003;
Sniderman et al 1996; Peffley et al 2001) and that tolerance may be a matter of degree
(see Sniderman et al 1989). While this dissertation does not contribute to the larger
philosophical discourse as to the nature of political tolerance, throughout the course of
this dissertation, I conceptualize and measure tolerance as a matter of degree as opposed
to the more restrictive interpretation forwarded by Mondak and Sanders (2003, 2005).
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institutions expose individuals to a diverse set of norms and behaviors toward political
and social opponents, especially over time. I discuss how a competing sets of logical
assumptions lead to conflicting expectations regarding the effects of certain types of
institution on tolerance.
In Chapter Four, I begin by discussing overall research design as well as the
benefits and drawbacks of the cross-national approach that I adopt for this study. I then
describe the World Values Survey data, the sample of 33 countries, the measurement of
both the individual-level and state-level variables, and the primary statistical modeling
technique used for the multi-level analyses that follow. I close this chapter by conducting
some cursory analysis of the individual-level model of tolerance across the entire sample
and for each individual country.
In Chapters Five, I test my hypotheses regarding the impact of state threat
environment on overall tolerance. Using multi-level modeling techniques, I begin by
examining how different types of international threats, or militarized threats originating
from other countries, have variegated effects on overall tolerance across countries. Next,
I focus my attention on what influence internal threats have on tolerance. Adopting an
instrumental variables approach to ameliorate concerns over reverse causality, I attempt
to assess the independent impact of organized internal violence on overall tolerance
levels across countries. Finally, I incorporate both the external and internal threats into a
comprehensive evaluation of the aggregate effect of state threat environment on overall
tolerance.
In Chapter Six, I conduct a comparative theory test relating to the conflicting
expectations regarding how majoritarian and consensus political institutions shape
political tolerance levels. Not only do I evaluate the unconditional influence of these
institutions, but I also incorporate their interactive relationship with democratic longevity
in the models to assess their conditional effects on tolerance levels.
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I bring summarize the findings and incorporate their
substantive importance within the broader political science literature. Specifically, I
focus on how this study offers important insights into the public opinion, international
conflict, and comparative institutions literatures. I also discuss some of the unanswered
questions in this study and suggest avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Understanding Political Tolerance
From Democratic Theory to a General Model of Political Tolerance
Today, explanations of tolerance most often rely on micro-level approaches that
focus on individual-level variables, such as socioeconomic characteristics, (Stouffer
1955; Protho and Grigg 1960; McCloskey 1964; Nunn et al 1978), political attitudes
(Sullivan et al 1982; Gibson 1998; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson 1992a), or
psychological attributes (Sullivan et al 1982; Sniderman et al 2000) to understand when
democratic citizens are more likely to tolerate unpopular groups. Mostly relying on
single-country surveys, these studies observe seemingly incongruent empirical
regularities. Democratic citizenries are highly supportive of abstract democratic norms,
like political tolerance, but often fail to apply these norms to concrete situations and
objectionable groups (Stouffer 1955; Sniderman 1975; Sullivan et al 1982; Duch and
Gibson 1992; Gibson and Duch 1993; Marcus et al 1995; Rohrschneider 1996; Peffley
and Rohrschneider 2003). The strong conclusion from the political tolerance literature is
that large segments of the citizenry are politically intolerant despite high levels of overall
support for democratic values.4 This general conclusion from the political tolerance
literature is the product of over 50 years of research and has culminated in a relatively
robust explanatory model of political tolerance based on individual-level characteristics.
However, neither our understanding nor a general model of political tolerance would
have been possible were it not for a series of major innovations and developments in the
study of political tolerance over the years.
In this chapter, I examine the progress made by previous researchers in
identifying the underlying process by which tolerance judgments are produced. This
discussion is not only critical to understanding how individual-level determinants of
tolerance work within different contexts, but more generally illustrates how incorporating
macro-level approaches with the established micro-level framework can generate a more
4

Gibson (1992b) suggests that the reason why political tolerance levels appear so low
throughout the world is that the ‘least-liked’ measure of tolerance overly depresses
tolerant responses. He asserts that other measures used to gauge political tolerance reveal
significantly higher political tolerance levels than the ‘least-liked’ technique.
7

general, differentiated understanding of political tolerance. I begin by examining the
individual-level foundations of tolerance before moving into a discussion of the
unanswered question in the extant literature and the promise of comparative studies.
Early Studies on Political Tolerance in the United States
In the first study of political tolerance, Stouffer (1955) observed very low levels
of tolerance toward communists and their fellow travelers (socialists and atheists) in the
United States during the McCarthy “Red Scare” era of the 1950s. His key finding was
that U.S. citizens were generally politically intolerant, challenging the normative
expectations of democratic theory. Additionally, this study highlighted the ability of
specific groups to engender an intolerant response. Stouffer asked his respondents
whether they would extend basic democratic political rights to communists, socialists,
and atheists, who were perceived by many at the time as dangerous and subversive
threats to the American system.5 Stouffer’s results are curious because it also revealed
that U.S. citizens were generally supportive of abstract democratic values and principles.
According to Stouffer, citizens needed to give the question of whether to tolerate
offensive groups a “sober second thought” to engage their support for civil liberties and
overcome their initial willingness to deny liberties to groups they find offensive.6
While Stouffer believed that the democratic citizenry could learn political
tolerance over time with increased levels of education, Sniderman (1975) concluded that
political intolerance might be a citizen’s “natural state” (also see McCloskey and Brill
1983). More recent studies echo this sentiment by noting the difficulty that individuals
face in developing tolerant views (e.g., Marcus et al. 1995).7 In fact, researchers find that
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Subsequent studies would reveal the importance of group choice in explaining
differences in response levels (Gibson 1992b, 2006).
6
Although this finding is still regarded as a classic within the tolerance literature, his
study is difficult to extrapolate because he only examined one country over one time
period (the 1950’s).
7
This idea that democratic citizenries must meet a certain tolerance level minimum
suffers from a normative bias derived from democratic theories, which contend that
political tolerance is a necessary condition for a properly functioning democracy
(McClosky 1964; Dahl 1991). Prothro and Grigg (1960), on the other hand, argued that
political tolerance is not a necessary condition for consolidated democracy. They
asserted democracy can survive an intolerant citizenry if the institutions reflected tolerant
norms.
8

individuals are more willing to switch from a tolerant response to an intolerant response
when presented with counterarguments than individuals whose initial response is one of
intolerance (see Gibson and Bingham 1985; Marcus et al 1995; Sniderman et al 1996;
Gibson 1987, 1998; Peffley et al 2001; Davis and Silver 2004).
With respect to political tolerance levels over time, different measures have
yielded various conclusions regarding the general trends. While early research revealed
disturbing levels of intolerance in the United States (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McCloskey
1964), later studies using the General Social Survey (GSS), which used Stouffer’s
political tolerance battery until 1978, found that political tolerance toward communists,
socialists and atheists increased (Davis 1975; Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Nunn et al
1978). These studies appeared to confirm Stouffer’s contention that tolerance should
increase as education levels increase. However, as Sullivan et al (1982) pointed out in
their influential study, these studies failed to account for the decreasing salience and level
of threat posed by the particular target groups (communists, socialists, and atheists) used
in the GSS measures. Using their alternate, ‘least-liked’ measure of political tolerance in
which respondents were allowed to first select the group they found objectionable before
being asked about their political tolerance toward the group, Sullivan et al (1982) showed
that levels of intolerance were not appreciably higher than those uncovered by Stouffer
(though see Mueller 1988).
Sullivan et al’s (1982) study marked a major development in tolerance research.
Not only did they develop a comprehensive model of political tolerance incorporating
various socioeconomic, attitudinal, and psychological variables, but their ‘least-liked’
measure of political tolerance became the standard throughout the literature. In general,
tolerance measures ask respondents whether or not democratic rights should be extended
to a particular unpopular group. In the GSS studies using Stouffer’s battery, the group(s)
was chosen by the analyst, whereas in Sullivan et al’s measure, the respondent first
selects the group they like the least from a list of six choices (with some provision for
substituting a group not on the list).8 Respondents are then asked in a series of questions
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For instance, in Stouffer’s study, the least-liked group was “communists, atheists, and
socialists”. As a result, his research and those studies that followed were assessments of
tolerance of left-wing groups rather than political tolerance more generally (Sullivan et al
9

whether they would extend civil liberties (e.g. allow the group to public demonstrate,
hold office, etc.) to the group in question. Thus, consistent with the conceptualization of
political tolerance as “a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one
opposes” , Sullivan et al’s measure of tolerance taps the willingness of respondents to
grant basic democratic rights and freedoms to their least-liked group (1982: 2).
The Individual-level Sources of Political Tolerance
Previous research not only clarified how political tolerance should be
conceptualized and measured, but also identified the critical determinants of a microlevel model of tolerance. Since the earliest studies, researchers focused on a multitude of
individual-level characteristics thought to influence a person’s support for the extension
of basic civil liberties to nonconformist groups. As a result, we now know that the
decision to tolerate is largely shaped by that individual’s socioeconomic characteristics,
personality attributes, and overall commitment to democratic principles. Based in large
part on Sullivan et al’s (1982) causal model, the individual-level characteristics
comprising the general micro-level model predicts what types of individuals are more
likely to tolerate unpopular or nonconformist groups. A closer look at these
characteristics reveals a complex set of interrelated factors that are largely interdependent
with one another, with the notable exception of threat perception.9
The micro-level foundations of political tolerance are based on an individual’s
socioeconomic characteristics, which not only directly impact political tolerance
decisions but also translate into other attitudinal and personality predispositions (Sullivan
et al 1982; Zaller 1992; Marcus et al 1995). Beginning with Stouffer’s (1955) initial
study, researchers have found that age and gender both influence an individual’s
propensity to tolerate. A person’s age is negatively correlated with tolerance as

1982; Mondak and Sanders 2003). Sullivan et al (1982) felt that measuring political
tolerance only using one group introduced significant bias into the model and, thereby,
developed their “content-controlled” measure of political tolerance.
9
Indeed, the causal model developed by Sullivan et al (1982) assumed that demographic
characteristics shape political attitudes, which in turn influence the individual decision to
extend basic democratic freedoms to their least-liked group. While they revealed that
many of these individual factors were interconnected, perceived threat from the group
was found to be largely uncorrelated with the other individual-level characteristics and
attitudes.
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individuals tend to become more conservative with age, while females are less likely to
extend basic civil liberties to nonconformist groups than men (also see Sullivan et al
1982; Marcus et al 1995). The effect of education on political tolerance has also long
been a focus of inquiry beginning with Stouffer’s seminal study. Although most studies
dealing with U.S. citizens find education to be directly and positively associated with
tolerance, education also indirectly influences tolerance levels through attitudinal
variables, particularly those relating to democratic ideals.10 However, it is worth noting
that Duch and Gibson (1992) observe extensive variation in the effect of education on
tolerance across European countries. In discussing those findings, Zaller (1992) observes
that this variation may be the result of differences in socialization, rather than cognitive
capacity, as is often implied in U.S.-based studies.
Attitudinal characteristics also influence an individual’s propensity to tolerate.
The attitudes that most strongly correlate with political tolerance are those relating to
democratic ideals.11 Unsurprisingly, individuals who strongly support democratic ideals
in the abstract are more likely to tolerate their least-liked group. And while early studies
found little evidence supporting this relationship (see Protho and Grigg 1960; McCloskey
1964), better specification in later models established a positive link between support for
democratic ideals and tolerance (see Sullivan et al 1982; Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson
1996, 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Marcus et al 1995; Peffley and Rohrschneider
2003). Generally, support for democratic ideals is expressed through attitudes on
democracy as a political system (e.g., whether democracy is the best form of government)
as well as the importance of free speech and other civil liberties (e.g., how much priority
10

The role of education in shaping political tolerance levels is directly examined in many
studies, particularly those based in the United States. In fact, the development of the
‘least-liked’ method by Sullivan et al (1979, 1982) was driven in part by findings
depicting the United States becoming increasing tolerant over time attributed to rising
aggregate education levels (Davis 1975; Nunn et al 1978). The role of education in
moderating tolerance is also the central focus of the work by Golebiowska (1995, 1996).
11
Political orientation is also often cited as a strong predictor of tolerance levels.
Political orientation is also considered an attitudinal variable. The general expectation is
that self-identified liberals are more likely to tolerate than are self-identified
conservatives. Although still included in almost all tolerance studies, this variable
generally produces mixed or no results (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). However,
this discrepancy is most likely due to the fact that respondents select their own least-liked
group from a list containing both liberal and conservative groups.
11

is given to the right to free speech over other values). The strong conclusion from this
research is that individuals who strongly believe in the value of democracy as a political
system are more likely to tolerate non-conformist groups, though such support is by no
means a sufficient condition for tolerance, as evidenced by the large slippage between
support in the abstract and tolerance toward specific groups.
Related to attitudes on democratic ideals, Stouffer (1955) and others draw from
the writings of J.S. Mill (1859) to postulate that political engagement should increase
tolerance over time.12 By increasing the exposure and understanding to other societal
interests, individual political engagement should lead to higher levels of tolerance
throughout society (Sullivan et al 1982).13 Empirically, researchers have found mixed
support for the contention that politically engaged individuals are generally more likely to
respect and extend civil liberties to others (Stouffer 1955; McCloskey 1964; Sullivan et al
1982; McCloskey and Brill 1983; Gibson 1987; Marcus et al 1995; Peffley and
Rohrschneider 2003).
Much of the ambiguity regarding the empirical findings most likely stems from
how political engagement has been conceptualized across different tolerance studies. For
example, researchers often use an individual’s level of political interest as an indicator of
overall political engagement. Yet, despite the strong theoretical expectations, in those
studies that examine the effect of individual political interest on political tolerance levels,
the empirical evidence is mixed at best. While Stouffer’s (1955) study reveals a positive
correlation between political interest and overall tolerance, Sullivan et al (1982) found no
significant relationship between political interested individuals and higher tolerance
levels in the United States. In fact, Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) recent crossnational study offers the strongest empirical findings supporting political interest as a
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Mill (1859) contends that liberty and tolerance for others fosters human progress
through the promotion of intelligent thought and rationality. For a more detailed
exposition on the importance of political tolerance in democratic theory, please refer to
Sullivan et al (1982) and Gibson and Gouws (2003).
13
Mill (1859) does caution that increased political engagement would negatively
influence overall tolerance in the short term as individual’s with low political competence
would initially engage in class struggles resulting in less tolerance overall. However, he
argued that over time the increased exposure to differing societal interests would foster
increased tolerance for others and produce long-term societal goods.
12

key predictor of individual tolerance to date as they show a strong, positive relationship
between political interest and overall tolerance levels.
Similarly, studies focusing on political participation as an indicator of political
engagement find only modest support for Mill’s hypothesis. The strong theoretical
expectation is that political participation positively impacts individual political tolerance
because it exposes them to different points of view and political compromise, which
results in more value being placed on civil liberties (Mill 1859). However, the empirical
evidence support this contention is mixed. Although Stouffer (1955) found that
politically involved individuals were more tolerant, other past studies revealed only a
weak relationship between political involvement and tolerance at best (Nunn et al 1978;
Sullivan et al 1982). More recently, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) argue that this
ambiguity may be the result of focusing on conventional forms of participation, such as
voting and campaigning for candidates. Drawing from Pateman’s (1970) participatory
theory of democracy, Peffley and Rohrschneider assert that unconventional forms of
participation, “in which citizens actually use civil liberties designed to voice dissent from
majority policies,” should have a greater positive impact on tolerance than more
traditional, symbolic forms of participation, such as voting (2003: 246). They find that
these distinct forms of participation have a strong, positive relationship with political
tolerance. Given the theoretical expectations and strong empirical findings in recent
studies, it seems clear that an individual’s level of political engagement influences their
tolerance judgments and must be accounted for any model trying to account for the
individual-level sources of political tolerance.
Other critical individual-level characteristics shaping political tolerance attitudes
are personality traits, such as authoritarianism, dogmatism, and so forth. Broadly
conceived, personality underlies many important attitudinal and behavioral dispositions
(Zaller 1992; Marcus et al 1995). One of the most consistent findings in the literature is
that authoritarian personality traits (i.e. obedience, conformity, aggression toward
outgroups) are linked to political and social intolerance (Adorno et al 1950, Stouffer
1955, Sullivan et al 1982, McCloskey and Brill 1983; Altemeyer 1988, Peffley and
Sigelman 1990, Marcus et al 1995; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Peffley and
Rohrschneider 2003; Feldman 2003, 2005). Feldman (2003, 2005) argues that social
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conformity is a key disposition that underlies the connection between authoritarianism
and political intolerance. Political intolerance signals a desire to limit the potential
societal effects of the beliefs and activity of those groups that challenge societal and
political norms (Feldman 2005). The strong conclusion from this type of research is that
when societal or political order is threatened, conformity is likely to be strongly related to
political and social intolerance (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003, 2005). In
both the studies concerned with directly examining the relationships between personality
traits and tolerance and those concerned in which the effects of personality are merely
controlled for, the empirical evidence clearly shows that certain personality traits are
important individual-level predispositions directly influencing political tolerance.
However, the relationship between personality and political tolerance is more complex
than just simple direct effects. The impact of individual personality traits, particularly
authoritarianism and dogmatism, are significantly moderated by the most critical element
shaping tolerance judgments: threat.
The Critical Role of Threat in Shaping Tolerance Judgments
A common thread throughout the political tolerance literature stresses the
importance of threat in shaping tolerance judgments of unpopular groups. Although
other factors (i.e. socioeconomic characteristics, personality attributes, and political
orientation) shape tolerance, threat typically has the strongest impact. Indeed, perceived
threat has been consistently identified as the most reliable predictor of politically tolerant
responses (Sullivan et al 1982; Shamir 1991; Duch and Gibson 1992; Sullivan et al 1993;
Gibson and Duch 1993; Marcus et al 1995; Gibson 1996, 1998; Feldman and Stenner
1997; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Davis and Silver 2004; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).
In these studies, researchers measure individuals’ perceptions of the selected target group
on various dimensions, such as their political strength, trustworthiness, and hostility and
threat to democracy or American values. Although the exact measure differs from study
to study, a common finding is that perceptions of distrust and hostility are powerful
predictors of intolerance. An equally important finding is that threat perceptions are not
predicted by other demographic or attitudinal variables in the model. Put simply, threat is
often considered an exogenous variable within micro-level models of tolerance because it
“is an unexplained variable in nearly all studies of intolerance” (Gibson 2006: 22). As
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mentioned earlier, most other predictors of tolerance are interdependent with one another,
yet threat perception is largely unexplained.
The inability to account for threat perception using other individual-levels factors
is why threat perception is often treated as an exogenous variable in most tolerance
studies (Gibson 2006). However, one reason why individual threat perception is
uncorrelated with other individual-level factors may be that it is largely driven by larger
social concerns rather than individual interests.14 Previous findings suggest that the
social dimension of threat perception and political tolerance are intrinsically linked.
Gibson (2006) posits that the standard measures of threat perception are actually
capturing three different dimensions: the social, individual, and perceived power of the
group, of which the social dimension, or sociotropic threat perception, is most important
because of the linkage to group dynamics (also see Gibson and Gouws 2003; Davis and
Silver 2004). According to Gibson (2006: 25), “intolerance increases not necessarily
when people feel their own security is at risk, but rather when they perceive a threat to
the larger system or group (or normative community) of which they are a part.” Thus,
sociotropic threat perception is the most important factor in an individual’s calculus to
tolerate groups they oppose. That threat perception is largely uncorrelated with other
individual-level characteristics may be because it is highly tied to individual evaluations
of the group rather than the disposition of the individual.
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An alternate explanation is that this is a methodological artifact. Because tolerance is
most commonly measured using the ‘least-liked’ methodology, individuals are able to
choose their ‘least-liked’ group from a diverse pool of unpopular, nonconformist
candidates. Given that individuals can select any group from such a wide range of
political and social groups, the individual-level factors contributing to their perception of
threat for each group is most likely lost when examining aggregate data. Consider the
following scenario. Self-identified ‘liberals’ may feel more threatened by right-wing
groups and, thus, more likely to select them as their ‘least-liked’ group. Conversely,
‘conservatives’ may feel threatened by left-wings groups and engage in the same
decision-making process. Yet, when all of the responses are pooled together, any attempt
at discerning a linear relationship between political ideology and threat perception is
diffused because of the ability to choose across a wide range of groups. Thus, trying to
assess how other individual-level factors contribute to threat perception is severely
compromised due to the survey instrument (i.e. the ability to select from so many
different groups).
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Most important to this study, however, is the general consensus in the literature
that threats perceived as dangerous to the social and political order significantly dampen
tolerance. Analyses using single-country survey data not only corroborate with the
contention that sociotropic threat perception is a powerful predictor of individual
tolerance but also the strength of this relationship can be moderated by situational
triggers. Using experimental survey data from the United States, Marcus et al (1995: 19)
examine the interaction between “long-term predispositions and short-term
environmental influences” in shaping individual tolerance judgments. Focusing on how
threat perception depresses tolerance, they differentiate between several types of threat.15
Particularly interesting are their findings demonstrating that changes how nonconformist
groups are portrayed can have a significant impact on an individual’s threat perception
toward a certain group. They show that when groups are portrayed as violating societal
norms of orderly behavior or belligerent, individuals are less likely to tolerate that group.
Their results stress the importance of the link between societal threat perception and
political tolerance over other factors, such as evaluations of the political strength of a
group which was unimportant in predicting tolerance in their study (also see Gibson and
Gouws 2003).
Results from other studies are also consistent with this contention. For example,
in their cross-national study, Sullivan et al (1993) observe that Israelis respond far more
negatively to groups perceived as realistic threats to their country’s democratic norms. In
this study, both political elites (members of the Knesset) and the public were particularly
intolerant of Kach, a right-wing group led by Rabbi Meir Kahane “perceived by many as
a serious threat not only to Arabs but to Israeli democracy more broadly” (Sullivan et al
1993: 66). Similarly, Gibson and Gouws (2003) report a large majority (over 60%) of
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Specifically, Marcus et al (1995) distinguish three types of threat. The first type of
threat is conceptualized as a general predisposition of how threatening the individual
views the world. The second type of threat is a standing decision regarding the
individual’s “attitudes about the belligerence and untrustworthiness of their least-liked
group and other similarly situated groups” (107). The third type of threat is
conceptualized as contemporary information or “a sense of threat with reference to the
interaction between a specific group and a context that is available from the immediate
environment” (107). Overall, however, they find only modest support directly linking
threat perception and political tolerance.
16

South Africans perceive their least-liked group as a danger to the society, as uncommitted
to democracy as a system of government in South African democracy, and as unwilling
to follow democratic rules.16 Clearly, all of these threat perceptions contain a sociotropic
element and are consistent with Marcus et al (1995) in that perceived group power has
little substantive impact on either threat perception or tolerance. Furthermore, Gibson
and Gouws (2003) find that the strongest predictor of intolerance is whether an individual
perceives their least-liked group as dangerous to society.
Although studies of political tolerance focus on the direct impact of threat
perceptions on tolerance, research in the area of political psychology suggests that threat
perception may also have an interactive effect with certain personality traits. According
to this interactive hypothesis, perceived threat activates authoritarian tendencies, which
become much more important under conditions of threat (Feldman and Stenner 1997;
Feldman 2003, 2005). Overall, personality-based models of political tolerance strongly
suggest conditional relationship between authoritarian personality traits, threat
perception, and political tolerance. The research conducted by Feldman and other
examines how personality traits, particularly social conformity, interact with situational
characteristics, such as threat perception, to influence individual attitudes and behavior.
Across a series of studies, Feldman finds that perceived threat moderates (i.e. activates)
authoritarian predispositions which, in turn, affect an individual’s propensity to tolerate
(Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003, 2005). Thus, threat perception acts as a
situational trigger - not unlike how Marcus et al (1995) conceptualize threat as a standing
decision in their study. Feldman and Stenner (1997) report that if that individual has
authoritarian tendencies, then increased threat will foster intolerance. Feldman (2003,
2005) expands on these findings by showing that the degree to which individuals
prioritize social conformity over personal autonomy plays an important role in shaping
individual decisions to tolerate. He reports that “Intolerance among those who value
conformity over autonomy is a function of the degree of perceived threat to common
norms” (2005: 13). Conversely, for those individuals who prioritize personal autonomy
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Similar to the Israeli polity, Gibson and Gouws (2003) find that over 38% of South
Africans select an extreme right-wing group, Afrikaner Resistance Movement, as their
least-liked group.
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over conformity, they may not tolerate only those groups that directly threaten the life or
freedom of others. He concludes that while individuals who prioritize social conformity
may be predisposed to intolerance, they may not be intolerant without a situational trigger
(i.e. threat).
Sniderman et al (1996) offer an alternate explanation for how threat affects
tolerance levels. They assert that the ‘error’ hypothesis – in which political intolerance is
attributed to an individual’s ‘failure’ to understand and apply democratic values to
concrete applications – oversimplifies and mischaracterizes a more complex process.
They contend that some democratic values conflict with not only other values (liberty vs.
security) but with each other (liberty vs. equality), and this type of value conflict scenario
provides a more accurate depiction of the tolerance decision-making process (see also
Peffley et al 2001). In fact, they argue that democratic values are inherently contestable
and individuals often struggle at resolving these value conflicts. According to the
‘contestability’ hypothesis, political intolerance is often the result of individuals choosing
to support some values over others (e.g., civil liberties over security).17 This depiction of
the judgment process suggests that, during periods of elevated threat to national security,
individuals may be more likely to choose security over liberty, leading to lower aggregate
tolerance levels. This suggests a clear link between objective threat levels and political
tolerance levels. Recent empirical work on post-9/11 attitudes in the United States
appears to support this hypothesis by showing how elevated levels of external threat
prompted individuals to shift their value priorities in favor of security over civil liberties
(Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al 2005).18
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Sniderman et al (1996) also point out several important implications stemming from
these different conceptualizations of the tolerance decision-making process. The
proponents of the ‘error’ hypothesis argue that education is key to achieving the desired
normative outcome (increased tolerance) because education will help individual’s avoid
failing to connect the abstract values with concrete situations. Whereas, the
‘contestability’ hypothesis implies that education may have little to no effect in resolving
the dilemma as these values will inevitably conflict.
18
Admittedly, while the objective threat presented by international terrorists contributed
to this shift in value priorities, perceptions of threat amongst the citizenry is the key
linkage. If you consider that the true objective threat presented by the international
terrorist organizations to the United States did not change inexorably after 9/11, then the
key change was heightened perception of the threat triggered by the attacks.
18

Although most studies focus on external threat as the shocks to the system that
prompt elevated intolerance among citizens, recent research also demonstrates the
negative impact of state internal threats on tolerance levels. Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter’s
(2006) examination of the Intifada’s impact on Israeli tolerance levels reveal strong links
between internal conflict, threat perceptions, and political intolerance. Using longitudinal
data, they find threat perception serves as an intervening variable connecting internal
conflict and intolerance. They show that not only does internal conflict increase threat
perceptions among Israeli respondents but also strengthens the impact of threat
perceptions on tolerance levels.19 While this study offers some insight into the
relationship between threat perception and political tolerance, the most important
contribution is demonstrating a direct link between objective levels of conflict and
tolerance levels.
In sum, these studies suggest that an individual’s threat perception is moderated
by characteristics unique to the state. In fact, it is likely that contextual factors such as
institutions, culture, international disputes, or domestic conflict affect tolerance levels.
For instance, a state with a strong military may assuage the perceived threat posed by
external enemies. Conversely, a weak military could lead to an exaggeration of the
perceived threat from external sources. Unfortunately, our understanding of whether
these characteristics affect political tolerance levels is extremely limited because the
relationship between threat and political tolerance has rarely been examined
systematically at the macro-level. However, the previous literature strongly suggests that
‘threat’, whether perceived or objectively real, matters in shaping individual tolerance
Furthermore, perceptions of threat toward international terrorist organizations and other
‘threats’ (i.e. Iraq) were actually likely overexaggerated to provide more support for the
administration’s foreign policy agenda.
19
While Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter find a link between internal conflict and political
intolerance, the simple conflict measure they use in the study may actually underestimate
its impact. In their test, they rely on a dichotomous measure to indicate whether or not a
survey was conducted before or after the start of the second Intifada. This measure
assumes the same level of violence preceding each of the survey conducted during the
Intifada. Given that there is noticeable variation in the dependent variables across these
surveys, it is plausible that these changes may be linked to variation in violence levels. A
better conflict measure, such as the number of attacks in time between surveys, may yield
stronger results linking conflict with tolerance levels as well as offer new insights into the
relationship between objective threats and political tolerance.
19

judgments. While the relationship between perceived threat and political tolerance at the
individual-level has dominated the previous research, earlier studies suggest that a
relationship exists between objective threat levels and political tolerance.
The link between objective threat levels and political tolerance is evident dating
back to Stouffer’s (1955) original study. As discussed above, while Stouffer’s (1955)
study is most often noted for its role in shaping our understanding of the sources of
tolerance, his results were shaped, in large part, by the climate of internal and
international threat at the time of his study. It is not a coincidence that Stouffer observed
low levels of political tolerance in the United States during the McCarthy “Red Scare”
era of the 1950’s. His study not only highlighted some of the individual-level predictors
of tolerance, but also the ability of specific groups (i.e. communists, socialists, and
atheists), linked to a salient objective threat at the time, to engender mass intolerance.
Stouffer’s choice of targets obviously captured the impact of a seemingly grave external
threat; groups, through their perceived link to an outside enemy, which respondents
thought had the ability to undermine state institutions. So while researchers attributed the
increase in tolerance toward these groups over time to rising education levels in the
United States (Davis 1975; Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Nunn et al 1978), these studies
failed to account for the decreasing salience of the objective threat posed by the groups
over time.
More recently, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006) also demonstrate how a group,
in this case Arab-Israelis, linked to a grave objective threat can engender focused and
pluralistic intolerance in Israel.20 Using longitudinal data to capture attitudes before and
after the second Intifada (2000-2002, they report a 22% increase in the selection of ArabIsraelis as their least-liked group (from 23% in 2000 to 45% in 2002) and an 11%
increase in intolerance toward that group as the Intifada intensified. They also show that
perceived threat toward Arab-Israelis increased across two important issues: threat
toward security (6% increase) and threat toward democracy (9% increase). These
findings clearly demonstrate rising intolerance and threat perception focused on one
20

Focused intolerance refers to a general consensus that one or two specific groups are
threatening and should be denied basic civil liberties. Pluralistic intolerance is when the
distribution of least-liked groups is widely distributed in numbers and across the political
spectrum (Sullivan et al 1982).
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group. Yet, their study also shows that generalized, or pluralistic, intolerance increased
by 7% over that same time period as well.
Both of these studies suggest an interesting dynamic that has not yet been studied
in great detail in the extant literature: the impact of a country’s object threat environment
on tolerance judgments. A plausible conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is
that perceived threat is not completely determined by individuals’ attitudes. Certainly,
variance in perceived threat levels across groups is determined in large part by the
characteristics of the individuals. However, as the previous research suggests, certain
predispositions make individuals more likely to be prompted by situational triggers to
focus on particular types and degrees of threat. By conceptualizing salient objective
threats as a type of situational trigger that makes certain individuals feel more threatened
than others, I contend in this dissertation that the threat environment of a country
dampens overall political tolerance levels.21 I further outline this process in the following
chapter.
One reason the relationship between objective threat environment and political
tolerance is often overlooked in the previous literature is due to data limitations. Most of
the survey data examining attitudes of tolerance, particularly those using the least-liked
methodology, are cross-sectional studies limited to one or two countries. This restricts
the type of inferences that can be drawn from the data. In trying to assess the impact of
contextual factors, such as threat environment, on individual attitudes, either longitudinal
or cross-national data is needed to parse out how changes in these factors over time or
differences in these factors across countries are translated into attitudes or behavior.
Fortunately, such data is becoming increasingly available over time allowing for this type
of research.
The Promise of Comparative Studies in Political Tolerance
Another strong conclusion from this literature is that the individual-level model of
tolerance seems to transport/export rather well to other countries despite, in some cases,
21

In Stouffer’s (1955) study, the Soviet external threat elevated the perception of threat
toward communists, socialists, and atheists ultimately resulting in mass intolerance.
Similarly, in Israel, the threat posed by the Intifada also raised threat perceptions toward
Arab-Israelis which produced not only focused intolerance toward those groups but also
pluralistic intolerance as well.
21

sharp differences in cultural and institutional backgrounds. As several comparative
studies on political tolerance report, a predominately politically intolerant citizenry is not
limited to the United States alone. In fact, these single-country studies reveal a similar
pattern of intolerance in both advanced democratic states and newly democratizing states.
For instance, in Rohrschneider’s (1996) study of institutional learning effects and value
diffusion among elites following the unification of Germany, he finds low political
tolerance levels among both Western and Eastern German elites. Shamir (1991) observes
both lower political tolerance levels among both the elites and the general public in Israel
as well as a smaller gap in tolerance levels between them as compared to other countries
such as the United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand (also see Sullivan et al 1993).
And Gibson and Duch (1993) note high support for abstract democratic norms but low
levels of political tolerance in newly democratizing Russia (also see Gibson 1996, 1998).
Additionally, Gibson and Gouws (2003) find a low degree of political tolerance in newly
democratized South Africa (also see Gibson 2004).
The single-country survey data suggest an empirical regularity of political
intolerance across democracies, both old and new.22 Although the few cross-national
studies also reveal this empirical pattern of political intolerance, they note significant
variation across democratic states (Sullivan et al 1985; Sullivan et al 1993).
Unfortunately, although these studies look at more than one country, most of the analysis
is still conducted from a single-country perspective.23 More specifically, these studies
use the same micro-level model and apply it multiple countries, without systematically
examining macro-level sources of variation in tolerance levels. Rather, analysts are
forced to speculate about state-level characteristics that might explain aggregate levels of
tolerance (e.g. Sullivan et al 1985; Sullivan et al 1993).
22

Gibson (1992b) suggests that the reason why political tolerance levels appear so low
throughout the world is that the ‘least-liked’ measure of tolerance overly depresses
tolerant responses. He asserts that other measures used to gauge political tolerance reveal
significantly higher political tolerance levels than the ‘least-liked’ technique.
23
Sullivan et al (1985) look at political tolerance in the United States, New Zealand, and
Israel, while Sullivan et al (1993) examine the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand,
and Israel. In both works, the authors compare both the levels of tolerance and discuss
the common predictors of tolerant attitudes. Yet, in neither case do the authors integrate
the different surveys into a unified analysis capable of testing any macro-level
explanations for the cross-national variation.
22

One study, in particular, reveals the limitations of such an approach while, at the
same time, demonstrating the need for more detailed macro-level approaches to study of
political tolerance. In a four country study comparing the tolerance levels between elites
and the public, Sullivan et al (1993) find that, as a whole, Israel is much less tolerant than
the other democracies in the analysis (United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand).24
Using only individual-level predictors, their results reaffirm the validity of previous
micro-level theories of political tolerance. However, the differential impact of
individual-level predictors only accounts for a small portion of the substantial variation in
the aggregate tolerance levels across the countries. Not only does Israel differ
significantly in aggregate tolerance level from the other countries, the gap between the
elite and public tolerance levels is significantly smaller. This is indicative of limitations
associated with micro-level models in that substantial portions of cross-national variation
are not examined and individual-level explanations only account for a small portion of
the inter-nation variation in tolerance.25 Yet, this study represents the norm in crossnational studies of political tolerance, as only a few studies use an approach focused on
differences in contextual factors, such as threat environment or domestic political
institutions, to systematically explain this variation in tolerance levels.26
An early attempt by Duch and Gibson (1992) to examine country-level factors
that influence inter-country variation in tolerance levels demonstrates the promise of
24

However, they do show that elites are significantly more politically tolerant than the
general population in each of the sampled countries.
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An alternate explanation, as King et al (2003) suggest in their critique of cross-national
survey measurement, is that the cross-national variation is itself a methodological artifact
of systematic measurement error. They argue that such surveys suffer problems
stemming from the incomparability of responses across different social contexts (also
referred to as differential item functioning, or DIF). This problem is especially acute in
those surveys in which the respondents are asked to provide self-assessments of their
level of abstract, complex concepts, such as freedom, trust, or political efficacy.
Undoubtedly, problems relating to inequivalence are also relevant to this study. In
Chapter Four, I discuss how inequivalence may affect the type of inferences I make in
later analyses.
26
Sullivan et al (1985) also reveal substantial cross-national variation across Israel, New
Zealand, and the United States while using micro-level models to test the validity of
Sullivan et al’s (1982) content-controlled approach to the study of political tolerance.
Additionally, Gibson (1998) points out significant variation in aggregate tolerance levels
across European nations.
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investigating macro-level factors, although their study is not without its own limitations.
Focusing on aggregate political tolerance levels across 12 Western European countries,
where countries are the unit of analysis, the authors find that years of continuous
democracy (democratic longevity) is negatively associated with political tolerance in
Europe. In other words, citizens in older, more advanced democracies in Western Europe
are less politically tolerant than citizens in the newly democratizing Central European
states, such as Greece and Portugal. They argue that citizens emerging from authoritarian
regimes are more likely to embrace and apply democratic values than citizens in more
mature democracies who are more likely to take their civil liberties for granted. This
finding contradicts the ‘democratic learning’ hypothesis, which states that tolerance
increases as individuals’ exposure to democracy increases and is largely based on the
writings of J.S. Mill (1859). However, it has been pointed out that since the authors’
measure of tolerance only asks about fascists, it is likely that they are only assessing
intolerance for right-wing groups rather than groups across the full political spectrum – a
criticism similar to Sullivan et al’s (1982) critique of Stouffer’s (1955) study who only
assessed tolerance for left-wing groups (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003).27
Most importantly, however, this study represents the first serious attempt to
systematically examine institutional sources of political tolerance. Duch and Gibson
claim their results lend some support to the hypothesis that democratic norms foster
political tolerance. This conclusion is problematic, however, given that their tests do not
account for the multi-level nature of the data used in the study. While they show that
democratic longevity is correlated with aggregate tolerance levels, they do not control for
any state-level variables nor do they combine the individual-level and the state-level data
in a multi-level framework. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, by not
controlling for other state-level variables, such as economic development or societal
fractionalization, the study risks significant bias as other state-level factors may be
attributing the differences in tolerance levels across countries. Second, conducting a
macro-level model of tolerance may suffer ecological inference problems – deriving
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Aside from controlling for democratic longevity, Duch and Gibson (1992) draw from
the work of Powell (1982, 1986) and Lijphart (1968) and find that strong party-group
linkages and political extremism are associated with higher levels of political tolerance.
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conclusions about individual-level behavior from aggregate data – as the result of
aggregation bias.
These methodological problems are resolved in another notable macro-level study
of political tolerance in which the democratic learning model is fully tested across a
wider sample of countries. Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) multi-level comparative
study of seventeen democracies represents the most extensive investigation of political
tolerance to date. Using data from the 1995-1997 World Values Survey, they question
Duch and Gibson’s findings on democratic longevity and argue that democratic learning
best explains variation in cross-national political tolerance levels. Controlling for
individual-level variables previously associated with political tolerance levels, their
model reveals that the best macro-level predictor of tolerance levels is the number of
continuous years that the state experiences a democratic regime, or democratic duration.28
They also find that federalist systems are associated with increased tolerance levels. This
study is a significant improvement over Duch and Gibson (1992) in that it relies on
Sullivan et al’s (1982) content-controlled measure of political tolerance, uses a wider
sample of democracies, and, most importantly, models both micro-level and macro-level
predictors simultaneously.
The fact that these two studies represent the bulk of the research systematically
examining the institutional sources of political tolerance underscores a major
shortcoming in this field of research: there is a serious need for further investigation of
how institutions influence mass tolerance across countries with very different institutional
settings. Given the findings in similar areas of research concerning political attitudes and
behavior (most notably, voting behavior and policy choices), cross-national differences in
political institutions is likely to contribute to variation in tolerance levels across
countries. To take just one example from the voting behavior literature, Norris (2004)
28

At first glance, it appears that their model may suffer from endogeneity problems
stemming from the assumption that democratization fosters political tolerance. Indeed,
democratization scholars often theorize causal arrow points in the opposite direction political tolerance begets democratization (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Bollen 1979;
Inglehart 1997). However, to date, there is no empirical evidence supporting the theory
that political tolerance fosters democratization (Mueller 1988; Gibson 1992a). Therefore,
I am fairly confident that their study does not suffer from endogeneity problems caused
by the political tolerance and democratization relationship.
25

links differences in electoral rules to variation in voting behavior in European
democracies. Her results support the rational institutionalism argument that electoral
rules alter the strategic incentives that confront political parties, leaders, and voters. Both
the Duch and Gibson (1992) study and the Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) study
indicate that some political institutions, certain types of electoral rules (Duch and Gibson
1992) or federalism (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), are better at fostering political
tolerance than others.. More recently, Weldon (2006) reports lower tolerance levels in
European countries with citizenship laws designed to limit ethnic minority citizenship.29
Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that political institutions are important
contextual factors influencing tolerance levels across countries and that variation in the
type of institutions are associated with cross-national differences in tolerance levels.
Yet, research on the relationship between political institutions and political tolerance is
still in its nascent stage of development within the broader tolerance literature.
Unanswered Questions in Political Tolerance Research
To summarize, the previous tolerance literature has been most adept at
demonstrating how individual-level factors, such as education, political engagement,
authoritarian personality traits, and support for democratic ideals, influence political
tolerance levels among mass publics. This knowledge has been generated predominantly
from single-country cross-sectional survey studies in the United States and a handful of
other countries. Yet, as prior comparative studies demonstrate, there are lots of reasons
to think that social and political context in different countries influences tolerance and
moderates the impact of individual-level factors. Indeed, as the surveys measuring
political tolerance increased in both number and scope, researchers discovered substantial
differences in tolerance levels across countries. Unfortunately, only a few macro-level
studies were in a position to do much more than engage in speculation about the macrolevel sources of differing tolerance levels across countries. The emergence of crossnational survey data across a wider range of countries and the advancement of multi-level
estimation methods offers researchers a valuable opportunity to test several compelling
29

In this study, Weldon (2006) focuses on citizen regime type as the principal
institutional distinction between countries, which he defines as the “institutions relating
to the acquisition and expression of citizenship” (2006: 333).
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macro-level explanations for political tolerance. Given this opportunity, the critical
question now becomes: what theoretical perspectives are likely to be most fruitful in
identifying important contextual factors shaping individual tolerance? Judging from the
extant tolerance literature, two contextual factors seem most likely to exert significant
influence over tolerance levels in a country: threat environment and domestic political
institutions.
With regard to threat environment, the previous literature clearly demonstrates a
complex relationship between threat and political tolerance. While nearly all of the
studies focus on the role threat perception plays in influencing tolerance, what I propose
in this study is altogether different. Instead of individual threat perception, I try to
determine whether differences in countries’ threat environment (i.e. the level of salient
objective threats facing the state) are systematically associated with overall tolerance
levels. As I discuss earlier, a handful of single-country studies indicate that a generalized
relationship between objective threats to the state and aggregate tolerance levels (e.g.
Stouffer 1955; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006) may exist. The challenge then is
identifying those state-level threats salient enough to actually impact individual attitudes
overall. Therefore, in the following chapter, I draw insights from the international
conflict literature to determine those objective threats found to be most salient to state
elites and their respective publics. My general hypothesis is that salient threats to the state
dampen overall tolerance levels.
The second contextual factor most likely to influence overall tolerance levels is
domestic political institutions. Like threat environment, the previous tolerance literature
strongly suggests that differences in domestic political institutions are associated with
overall tolerance levels (e.g. Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003;
Weldon 2006). However, this relationship remains understudied in tolerance research.
Indeed, given the well-documented success of using such an approach to explain other
political phenomena (e.g., Norris 2004) and suggestive findings of others (e.g., Duch and
Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Weldon 2006), the general lack of
research linking certain institutional configurations or electoral rules to mass tolerance
levels is curious. Drawing from the rich theoretical literature on political institutions, I
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highlight and discuss some conflicting expectations as to how certain types of political
institutions should affect political tolerance levels.
In the next chapter, I link together these seemingly disparate literatures to create a
macro-level model of political tolerance. In addition to discussing how each contextual
factor relates to political tolerance levels, I generate several testable hypotheses detailing
the specific relationships I expect to find in the analyses that follow the discussion.
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Chapter 3
Identifying Contextual Factors Affecting Political Tolerance
Early research on political tolerance largely focused on determining how
individual-level factors such as demographic characteristics, attitudinal dispositions, and
personality traits, influenced tolerance judgments. These efforts assumed that the
attributes and their attendant effects were largely stable over time and consistent across
different situations (e.g., Sullivan et al 1982). However, more recent empirical evidence
strongly suggests that this assumption is not always met. These studies reveal that the
impact of these attributes on tolerance judgments are conditional in several respects,
based on a whole host of factors (e.g., Marcus et al 1995). That is, some predispositions
are more likely to be activated under certain environmental conditions. The strong
conclusion from this literature is that tolerance judgments are manifestations of both
individual predispositions and environment pressures working in concert.
Yet, the study of political tolerance and its antecedents are incomplete because
while the previous literature has predominately focused on the individual predispositions,
questions regarding the effects of broad state-level factors, such as threat environment
and institutions have been left largely unanswered.30 To be fair, this negligence in
evaluating the state-level factors affecting political tolerance is largely due to insufficient
data and the absence of appropriate methodological tools. Fortunately, with emergence
of extensive, cross-national data over the last ten years and new statistical tools,
researchers are now able to conduct comprehensive analyses of the macro-level elements
affecting political tolerance decisions. As I mentioned above, in this chapter, I outline
two main families of contextual factors, or environmental pressures, if you will, at the
state-level that I believe significantly influence a country’s aggregate tolerance level: the
threat environment and domestic political institutions. This study improves on previous
work by explaining differences in tolerance using both macro- and micro-level
30

This is not to say that previous research on political tolerance has completely ignored
contextual factors. Certainly, the work on the situational determinants or triggers of
tolerance (e.g., Marcus et al 1995) takes questions of context seriously. However, the
primary focus has been on within-country contextual factors rather than across-country
factors and, therefore, limits the ability to explain cross-national differences in tolerance
levels.
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approaches in a comprehensive framework. In combination with the traditional
individual-level approaches to political tolerance, these perspectives offer a more
complete picture of the antecedents of tolerance.
The Link between Contextual Factors and Political Tolerance
One of the key unanswered questions in the political tolerance literature is: what
contextual factors affect individual tolerance judgments? In light of the previous
literature, I identify two factors, state threat environment and domestic political
institutions, most likely to impact tolerance in the previous chapter. Having identified
two likely candidates, the critical question now becomes: how do these factors affect
tolerance? That is, what are the processes by which these two variables help shape
tolerance levels? Below I assert that these state-level factors generate two distinct
effects, an aggregate effect and an individual-level effect, each of which independently
influence overall tolerance in a country.
The previous research on political tolerance reports that, in the aggregate, some
countries tend to be more tolerant than others (or intolerant if you prefer) (see Sullivan et
al 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Sullivan et al 1993; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003;
Weldon 2006). At the very least, these differences across countries reveal that the
tolerance mean changes as the context being examined changes. Yet, previous attempts
to account for these differences using individual-level models have failed to offer much
in the way of an explanation for these differences. In these studies, researchers compare
the differences in individual-level characteristics and attitudes to account for the disparity
across countries only to find that they only explain a small amount of the variation.
This suggests that certain contextual factors are having an aggregate effect on
tolerance levels. Or to put it another way, some factor, or combination of factors, is
systematically contributing to cross-national difference in tolerance levels. Indeed, the
few studies that try to account for these differences by incorporating macro-level
approaches have performed much better in accounting for these cross-national differences
in tolerance levels (see Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Weldon
2006). These findings clearly show that differences in the types of environmental
pressures generate various aggregate effects that can serve to raise or lower the mean
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tolerance level in a given country. In this study, I focus primarily on demonstrating how
these contextual factors affect cross-national differences in overall tolerance.
Aside from producing aggregate effects on overall tolerance, interaction between
contextual factors and individual characteristics and predispositions also generate
individual-level effects. The previous research on situational triggers and dispositional
tendencies highlight the different relationships between environmental conditions,
individual predispositions, and political tolerance (e.g., Marcus et al 1995; Sniderman et
al 1996; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003, 2005). In essence, these studies
suggest that although contextual factors may generate an aggregate effect on tolerance
across countries, certain characteristics cause individuals to respond differently to these
environmental influences. That is, some contextual factors will affect some individuals
more than others because they activate different individual characteristics, such as
personality traits and attitudes. The important thing to keep in mind is that environmental
factors may have a stronger (or weaker) influence on some individuals than others
because of these traits.31 In short, these individual-level effects are really just interactive
effects between contextual factors and individual characteristics.
As I discuss in the previous chapter, the work on threat perception offers a great
example of how situational triggers influence individual tolerance by activating certain
predispositions; in these cases, authoritarian traits. Generally speaking, researchers,
31

Examples of this phenomenon from the previous literature are relatively common. For
example, Marcus et al (1995), who conceptualize these situational triggers as
contemporary information, demonstrate how changes in context are translated into
different tolerance outcomes. They show that individuals who threat sensitive (i.e.
generally view the world as dangerous) are more likely to incorporate contemporary
information into their decision to tolerate a group – whether the information is
threatening or reassuring. Conversely, the impact of contemporary information is less
likely to affect those individuals who are less threat sensitive. Another example of how
the effect of contextual factors is moderated by individual characteristics comes from
Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) research on authoritarianism and perceived threat. They
find that the relationship between threat perception and tolerance is conditional based on
the authoritarian tendencies of an individual. In their study, they find that high levels of
perceived societal threat actually polarizes the population by making those with strong
authoritarian characteristics more conservative in terms of policy attitudes, while actually
making individuals with weaker authoritarian predispositions more liberal (1997: 761762).
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particularly the work of Marcus et al (1995) and Feldman and his colleagues (Feldman
2003, 2005; Feldman and Stenner 1997), have paid close attention to how different
relationships between environmental conditions, objective threat and perceived threat
generate various individual-effects with regard to tolerance attitudes. Most relevant to
this study is the work by Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006) because they demonstrate
how a contextual factor (threat environment) activates certain individual-level
characteristics, thereby, increasing the negative effect of threat perception on tolerance
attitudes. They find that elevated levels of state-level threat not only increased perceived
threat toward all nonconformist groups, but also that elevated levels of objective threat
are associated with lower aggregate tolerance levels.
While data limitations may have curtailed the ability of researchers to examine the
aggregate effects of state-level variables using cross-national samples, single-country
surveys lent themselves to analysis assessing the influence of these individual-level
effects. As a result, we have only begun to identify and examine these aggregate effects
on tolerance. The opportunity offered in this study is that I have the ability to parse out
these aggregate effects using a large cross-national sample and incorporate them into our
overall understanding of political tolerance. Thus, in this dissertation, my primary
concern with examining what aggregate effects that state threat environment and
domestic political institutions have on political tolerance levels; leaving most questions
of the individual-level effects produced by interactions between contextual factors and
individual predispositions for future study.
Threat and Political Intolerance
Throughout much of the previous literature, perceived threat of unpopular groups
has been viewed as a primary individual-level factor shaping tolerance. The general
relationship between threat and tolerance is supported by a preponderance of empirical
findings in the extant literature. Given the strong connection between threat and political
tolerance at the individual-level, I examine how salient state-level threats, originating
both externally and internally, generate a dampening effect on political tolerance levels
across countries. Individual-level studies suggest that there exists a strong linkage
between objective threat levels and political tolerance (e.g., Feldman and Stenner 1997;
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Sniderman 2000; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).32 In general, objective threats to the
state create a threatening environment rendering citizens less likely to tolerate unpopular
groups.33
While most previous political tolerance studies are limited to examinations of
micro-level sources of tolerance, comparisons across studies that employ similar survey
methodology suggest that states face elevated levels of objective threat tend to be less
tolerant. For example, Gibson and Gouws (2003) compare the aggregate tolerance levels
of those countries where surveys using the least-liked methodology were conducted.
They report that Russia and South Africa are the least tolerant amongst the handful of
countries surveyed in this manner. Similarly, Sullivan et al (1993) show that Israel is the
least tolerant of the four countries examined in their study (also see Shamir 1991). The
common element between these states is that each faced significant objective threats prior
to the time when those surveys were conducted. In the case of Israel and Russia, they
had engaged in a number of international disputes with their neighbors while also having
to deal with terrorist and insurgent groups within their borders. South Africa also faced
serious challenges from paramilitary organizations during the time prior to the surveys.
In short, these states faced serious objective threats that posed a danger to each respective
society. Given that sociotropic threat perception is commonly cited as the most reliable
predictor of political tolerance, threats considered dangers to society are potentially
important macro-level factors affecting tolerance levels, whether originating from within
or outside the state.
One pathway by which objective threat levels may generate a general dampening
effect on overall tolerance levels is by raising the average amount of perceived threat
across individuals in those countries that have recently experienced high levels of
32

Sniderman et al (2000) argue that exogenous shocks to the system increase the overall
hostility among the public towards groups perceived of as ‘outsiders’ in their
comprehensive study of social tolerance in Italy. This aggregate reaction to exogenous
shocks, operationalized in their study as societal or economic changes in their “Right
Shock” model, occurred regardless of the individual characteristics of the respondents.
Their results also indicate that increases in hostility closely correspond with exogenous
shocks to the country and provide demonstrable evidence supporting Sniderman et al‘s
(1996) suggestion that objective threat influences tolerance levels.
33
This dynamic is most strongly demonstrated in Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter’s (2006)
examination of Israeli tolerance in the face of the second Intifada.
33

objective threat. Perhaps threat perception, particularly sociotropic threat perception
which can take on a number of meanings including perceived security of the state, is
moderated in part by environmental factors, such as state threat environment as suggested
in a few recent studies (e.g., Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006; Davis and Silver 2004).
Intuitively, this linkage makes sense. An individual’s environment should have some
effect over their global threat perception, which assesses how dangerous an individual
views the world (see Altemeyer 1988; Marcus et al 1995), as well as their perception of
threat toward certain groups. It is important to recall that previous research has shown
that the more a person views the world as dangerous, the more likely they are to perceive
threats to the societal and political order and the less likely they are to tolerate those
groups (see Marcus et al 1995; Feldman 2003, 2005). It does not take a large stretch of
the imagination to think that individuals living in threatening environments may be more
likely to perceive the world as dangerous if they live in an objectively threatening
environment. This is one process through which an elevated objective threat
environment could produce dampening effects in overall tolerance across countries.
The link between objective threat levels and political tolerance might explain why
Israel exhibited lower political tolerance levels as compared to the geographicallyisolated democracies of the United States, New Zealand, and Great Britain in Sullivan et
al’s (1993) study.34 Both international conflict theories and social psychological theories
would predict that citizens of Israel, surrounded by external enemies and under constant
threat from insurgency and terrorist organizations, would be less politically tolerant than
other democracies facing neither of those problems.
The relationship between state threat environment and political tolerance is also
supported anecdotally. For instance, the United States, one of world’s oldest
democracies, has experienced numerous manifestations of intolerance during or directly
following times of threat. In two cases, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and the
9/11 terrorist attacks, salient external threats not only led to a general environment of
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Sullivan et al (1985) also found lower aggregate tolerance levels in Israel as compared
to the United States and New Zealand in an earlier study using similar measures of
political tolerance.
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intolerance for unpopular groups but also a reduction in civil liberties (e.g. the internment
of Japanese-Americans; The Patriot Act).
I argue that cross-national and over-time variation in political tolerance levels are
tied to patterns in external and internal threat levels. Below, after considering several
theories of international conflict to identify the types of threats considered salient to the
state, I hypothesize about how external and internal threats may lower political tolerance
levels across countries. To provide a more nuance depiction of a state’s overall threat
environment and assess whether the origin of the threat differs in its effect on tolerance, I
distinguish between external and internal threats. I define external threats as those threats
originating from outside the country. Normally, a state is targeted by another country in
hopes of extracting some desired change in the status quo between the actors. On the
other hand, internal threats originate from within the country. In these cases, the state is
targeted in an attempt to alter the status quo between the group(s) and the government.
As I argue below, both external and internal threats represent a danger that is likely to
lower mass levels of tolerance.
External Threat

The assertion that external threats to the state often diminish political tolerance is
not a groundbreaking insight (see Rokeach 1960; Sullivan et al 1982; Feldman and
Stenner 1997). Theoretically, a direct link between political tolerance and external threat
is derived from the social psychology literature, specifically the work of sociologists
Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser.35 Building on Simmel’s (1955) hypothesis that conflict
35

Early studies in the area of social psychology (see Sherif and Sherif 1953; Sherif et al
1955; Sherif et al 1961; Simmel 1955; Coser 1956) form the basis of two leading
perspectives on group dynamics commonly used to explain variation in tolerance:
realistic conflict theory and social identity theory. Although theoretically distinct, both
perspectives share many common elements and are not mutually exclusive. Realistic
conflict theory argues that clashing interests and scarce resources are the cause of
hostility and conflict between groups (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956; LeVine and Campbell
1972; Giles and Evans 1985). Social identity theory argues that an individual’s sense of
self is tied to their group identification. This group identification prompts individuals to
provide positive assessments of their own group and negative assessments of the
‘outgroup’. Social context is the primary factor in the determination of which group
identifications are relevant to the individual and, consequently, affects their level of
attachment or hostility toward groups (Tajfel 1981; Brown 1995, 2000; Brewer and
Brown 1998; Brewer 1999; Capozza and Brown 2000; Huddy 2001).
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is a socialization mechanism, Coser (1956: 38) extended this logic by arguing, “conflict
serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups.”
The central proposition of these theorists is that external threat increases the internal
cohesion of a group (Coser 1956; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Giles and Evans 1985).
Internal cohesion does not necessarily equate with harmony, but rather reflects
conformity enforced through an intra-group dynamic (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956; LeVine
and Campbell 1972). As Simmel (1955: 87) notes, “Groups in any sort of war situations
are not tolerant. They cannot afford individual deviations from the unity of the
coordinating principle beyond a definitely limited degree.” Coser (1956: 103) concurs
with this assessment of group tolerance in the face of an external threat and adds,
“Groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside tend to be intolerant within.
They are unlikely to tolerate more than limited departures from the group unity.” The
intra-group mechanism of enforced conformity engenders widespread beliefs about what
types of political liberties and political rights ought to be extended to unpopular political
groups (Gibson 1992a; Chilton 1988; MacKuen 1990). Thus, the expectation is that as
external threat increases, political tolerance for unpopular or nonconformist groups
decreases. While some social psychology studies show a positive relationship between
external threat and social tolerance (Stein 1976), the type of tolerance that Simmel and
Coser refer to is more akin to political tolerance. Furthermore, it follows that citizens are
likely to value security over the egalitarian value of tolerance during periods of high
threat facing their state (Posner 2001; Peffley et al 2001; Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy
et. al 2005). Thus, we should see lower levels of political tolerance in states facing
higher levels of external threats than in states facing lower levels of external threat.
H1: States facing higher levels of external threat should be less politically tolerant than
states facing lower levels of external threat.
Although external threats to the state come in many different forms, we should
not assume that all external threats are the same in their impact on state behavior or their
domestic consequences. The international conflict literature strongly suggests that some
types of external threats resonate more than others at the elite and domestic levels. In
general, the variation in external threat is, to a large extent, based on three factors: 1) the
issues at stake, 2) the resolve of the participants in the disputes, and 3) the distribution of
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power between the states. While all three components are important, the issues at stake
are the most consequential. Under some circumstances, important contentious issues
become transcendent to states involved in disputes. This changes the dynamic of the
dispute and significantly increases the probability of conflict. The most prominent issuebased explanation of conflict, Vasquez’s (1993) steps-to-war hypothesis, argues that
territorial issues increase the likelihood of leaders relying on power politics (alliances,
arms races and other deterrence strategies) as methods of bargaining or deterring rival
states.36 The resulting power politics behavior serves to escalate the tension rather than
ameliorate it, and this often results in conflict if hostilities between the states are too
great.
The rationale in Vasquez’s (1993) theory is straightforward. Domestically, elites
must mobilize public opinion during the conflict spiral so that they can endure the
associated costs of responding to threats; demonizing external rivals is the easiest way to
accomplish this task.37 The demonization of the enemy by the state has historically taken
the form of propaganda to build the morale of the public, and this has the attendant
effects of both lowering support for nonconformist attitudes and reducing the number of
solutions that would resolve the dyadic conflict because, after all, leaders face extreme
difficulties accepting compromises from demonized enemies (Vasquez 1993). Territorial
issues are more salient to both the leaders and the public, thereby creating situations in
36

The international conflict literature offers considerable empirical evidence supporting
the contention that territorial issues represent the most conflict-prone, difficult-to-resolve
political decisions in international politics (Vasquez 1993, 1995; Gibler 1996, 1997; see
also Kocs 1995; Hensel 1994; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Holsti 1991; Senese and Vasquez
2003, 2005). Indeed, disputes over territory typically result in higher fatality rates
(Senese 1996), are more likely to result in crisis recurrence (Hensel 1998), and
significantly increase the probability that disputes will escalate to war (Hensel 1996;
Vasquez 2004; Senese and Vasquez 2003, 2005). These empirical findings highlighting
the importance of territorial issues at the dyadic level has spawned the creation of more
general theories of conflict that place territorial disputes as an underlying cause of most
wars.
37
When faced with a salient external threat, the most common state response is to
buildup militarily; at a significant cost to the state. As a result, governments bolster their
efforts in extracting public funds to finance the increased militarization of the state. In
order to ‘sell’ the public into bearing the costs of militarization, elites mobilize public
support by demonizing those outside groups or states threatening the state (Vasquez
1993).
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which leaders have less bargaining room amid a domestic environment in which publics
are more willing to endure the costs of conflict (see also Vasquez 1995).
Huth (1996) offers a similar theory but also directly links territorial issues to the
domestic constituencies that leaders must cultivate in order to maintain power (see also
Roy 1997). Huth argues that territorial issues create hard-line domestic constituencies
proximate or within the disputed territory, and leaders often play on territorial issues to
gain power or secure regional support for their regime. These constituencies apply
political pressure on state decision-makers so as to harden their strategy and tactics to try
to force the dispute in their favor. The domestic constituencies also increase the costs to
the leaders in making concessions over territorial issues, thereby reducing the chance for
peaceful compromise. This hardening of state policy leads to escalatory behavior and,
ultimately, significantly increases the probability of militarized conflict. Indeed, the
incentives derived from domestic constituencies are such that leaders must use all means
at their disposal to resolve territorial disputes in their favor.
Both Vasquez (1993) and Huth (1996) posit that leaders are more likely to
exaggerate the danger of an external threat in order to generate strong domestic audience
costs over issues of territory. Consequently, disputes over territory should then be
perceived as more salient external threats to the general public than disputes over nonterritorial issues.
These two theories illustrate how disputes over territorial issues are more likely to
represent a greater threat to polities than other types of issues and, thereby, create an
environment in which individuals are less likely to extend basic civil liberties to
nonconformist groups. In the aggregate, political tolerance levels should be lower in
those states facing salient external threats. In this respect, distinguishing external threats
by issue types is a proxy for the salience of the external issue facing the state. While
some non-territorial disputes are perceived and/or portrayed as acute, these disputes are
generally less salient. As a result, I also expect to find no relationship between nonterritorial threats and tolerance levels.
H2: States involved in disputes over territorial issues should be significantly less

politically tolerant than states involved in disputes over non-territorial issues.
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In addition to issue type, both the tolerance literature exploring threat perception
and the early social psychology literatures suggest that challengers and defenders in these
disputes should also play a significant role in conditioning aggregate tolerance levels.
Davis and Silver (2004) state that sociotropic threat perception is the most important
factor in an individual’s calculus to tolerate groups they oppose, and threat perception is
highly tied to whether those groups threaten the larger group or system (see also Gibson
and Gouws 2003). So when ‘outsiders’ initiate a threat, the group response to enforce
conformity becomes stronger (Coser 1955; Simmel 1956; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Sherif
et al 1955; Sherif et al 1961). These theories imply that we should also see a stronger
effect in aggregate tolerance levels based on whether a state is targeted by an external
threat. Additionally, this impact should be strongest in those instances where the state is
targeted in a territorial dispute as opposed to a non-territorial dispute.
H3: States targeted in disputes over territorial issues should be significantly less
politically tolerant than states targeted in disputes over non-territorial issues.
While issue type and the initiator/target are often indicators of the general salience
of a threat, other characteristics of an international threat may also contribute to an
environment in which nonconformist groups are not tolerated. Keeping in mind that only
threats severe enough to menace the entire domestic system will create the conditions that
make the promotion of mass intolerance likely (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Davis and
Silver 2004; Gibson 2006), the international conflict literature identifies other
characteristics that help determine whether an international event is generally viewed as a
salient external threat by the state. Outside of the issues involved and whether the state is
the target of a dispute, international threats involving the actual use of military force are
strong indicators of salience at both the elite and domestic levels. The deployment of
military force, especially if force results in casualties, signals a stronger threat because it
has escalated beyond just verbal threats.38 Given the heightened escalation of tension,
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Diehl and Goertz (2001) argue that disputes involving no casualties and those where at
least one person died are qualitatively different in terms of the international
consequences. They contend that the first battle death crosses an escalation threshold
and, as a result, the probability of war increases. Disputes involving battle deaths,
therefore, are more likely to result in further militarized conflict and, thus, increase the
security risk to the states. Given that state behavior changes significantly after the first
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disputes involving force, regardless of who initiated the force, are more likely to filter
into the public consciousness. Consequently, disputes involving the use of force further
contribute to an elevated threat environment. Furthermore, the domestic impact of
disputes involving the use of force is further compounded if either the state was targeted
in such a dispute or if the dispute is over territorial issues.
H4: States engaged in disputes involving the use of force should be significantly less
tolerant than states involved in non-force disputes.
Finally, another subset of international threats most likely to carry weight at the
domestic level are disputes involving rival states. International rivalries are characterized
by competitive relationships over single issues of high salience or multiple related issues.
At their core, however, is a history of hostility and frustration between the two states.
One byproduct of these repeated hostile interactions is that international rivals exhibit a
strong negative affect toward their opponent (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Vasquez 1993;
Diehl and Goertz 2001; Thompson 2001).39 As a result, international threats involving
rivals are generally viewed as salient by the state and repeated crises allow hardliners to
gain more influence over policy making (Vasquez 1993). Not surprisingly, the likelihood
of militarized conflict, including interstate war, increases significantly during disputes
between rivals (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Diehl and Goertz 2001; Colaresi and Thompson
2002). While international consequences of disputes between rivals have been repeatedly
demonstrated empirically, the domestic effects of such disputes are less well-known
empirically. Theoretically, however, I expect international disputes involving a state’s

battle death, it is likely that these disputes involving force are deemed salient external
threats by the public.
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Scholars of international conflict have identified dozens of international rivalries
throughout the history of the modern state system. Many of these rivalries still exist
today. Some of the more notable historical rivalries include France-Germany (18161955), Germany-Russia (1890-1945), United States-Soviet Union (1945-1989), and
Russia/Soviet Union-China (1816-1949, 1958-1989). More important to this study are
the many rivalries that continue today and continue to be the source of dozens of
international disputes. Some of the notable ongoing rivalries include India-Pakistan
(1947- ), China-India (1948- ), Columbia-Venezuela (1831- ), Argentina-Britain (1965- ),
Cameroon-Nigeria (1975- ), Bosnia-Croatia (1992- ), Bosnia-Serbia (1992- ), SerbiaCroatia (1991- ), Armenia-Azerbaijan (1991- ), Israel-Syria (1948- ), and Israel-Iran
(1979- ) (Thompson 2001).
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rival to be treated as a salient external threat, similar to threats over territory.40
Consequently, international disputes involving rivals should depress aggregate levels of
mass tolerance in states engaged in the dispute.
H5: Citizens in states involved in disputes with a rival should be significantly less
tolerant than citizens in states engaged in non-rivalry disputes.
Beyond the general effect of certain international threats to lowering tolerance
levels, there are also compelling theoretical reasons to believe that not every individual
will react uniformly to salient external threats. In fact, the public opinion literature offers
a number of reasons why we should NOT expect a uniform response across individuals.
Although I still expect salient external threats to have a general dampening effect on
tolerance levels, I also believe that certain characteristics, such as political awareness,
make some individuals more receptive to elite cues regarding these international events.
This conception fits well with commonly cited diffusion mechanisms found in the
international relations literature, which portray international events as influencing
domestic political processes through elite cues aimed securing public support. Indeed,
the mechanism by which salient external threats affect individual attitudes in both
Vasquez’s (1993) and Huth’s (1996) theories is through elite mobilization strategies. In
short, domestic audiences take their cue from elite messages to not only recognize a
salient threat to the state but also mobilize in response to that threat.
These theories parallel the elite leadership theories of public opinion, particularly
Zaller’s (1992) study of the origin of mass opinions, in which he argues that citizens’
opinions often reflect elite positions on various issues and policies. Zaller contends that
political awareness, partisan predispositions, and elite consensus interact to influence
mass opinions. When elite consensus exists on an issue, more politically aware citizens of
both political parties are exposed to the strong stimulus of bipartisan consensus on the
issue and are thus more likely to follow that consensus in what Zaller terms a
“mainstream” model of opinion leadership. When elites disagree, however, more
politically aware partisans follow different elites, and thus a “polarization” model of
40

Indeed, a main cause of rivalry is disagreements over territorial holdings, particularly
borders. In fact, a sizable number of identified rivalries are between neighboring states
fighting over competing territorial claims (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Vasquez 1993; Diehl
and Goertz 2001; Thompson 2001; Huth and Allee 2003).
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opinion leadership results, where the opinions of more aware partisans are more likely to
reflect the division at the elite level.41
Applying this theory to the question at hand, when external threat is high, elites can
be expected to close ranks in supporting proposals to scale back civil liberties in general
and freedoms of groups associated with the threatening state, in particular. As noted, the
party in power has every incentive to respond to a serious security threat with policies
designed to mobilize the public and to chastise the opposition if it dares to object to the
policy response. Politically aware citizens of both parties are expected to shift in their
opinion toward elite positions, as the mainstream model of opinion formation predicts.
Consequently, we should expect find evidence of the mainstreaming effect on tolerance
levels in states facing higher levels of salient threat. If politically aware individuals are
more receptive to elite cues, then, during times of salient external threat, those individuals
should be less likely to tolerate nonconformist groups as they shift their opinion to
support the scaling back of civil liberties championed by the elites.
H6: In states experiencing higher levels of salient external threat, politically aware
citizens should be significantly less politically tolerant than politically aware individuals
in states experiencing lower levels of salient external threat.
In sum, I expect to find that external threats have a variegated impact on aggregate
political tolerance levels. I predict that political tolerance levels will not only vary in
accordance with the particular characteristics of the external threats facing the states prior
to the survey, but I also expect certain individual characteristics to moderate the impact
of threat environment on attitudes of tolerance.
Internal Threat

As the previous section underscores, high objective threat levels are expected to
be associated with lower tolerance levels. However, threat is not limited to external
sources alone. In many instances, the greatest source of threat to the state resides inside
its borders. To fully explore the relationship between threat and tolerance at the state41

Although the elite diffusion hypothesis has been questioned regarding methodological
concerns over endogeneity (i.e. elite opinions change based on changes in pubic opinion)
Gabel and Scheve (2007) use an instrumental variable approach to overcome this
problem and find that elite cues significantly affect individual attitudes. In fact, they
show that traditional approaches actually underestimate the overall impact of elite
messages on public attitudes.
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level, the impact of internal threat on tolerance levels must be examined as well. And
although the social psychology literature suggests that internal threats should contribute
to general intolerance, the process connecting the former to the latter should be different
depending on the nature of the threat (i.e. whether it is external or internal) and the target
of intolerance. Below I discuss not only how internal threats lower aggregate tolerance
levels, but also how such threats are likely to influence individual tolerance judgments.
To reiterate, I distinguish between external and internal threats based on how they
are conceptualized in the international relations literature. The primary distinction is
based on the principal location of the threat. If the threat originates from outside the
territorial confines of the state, then I regard it as an external threat. If the threat is
principally located within the borders of the state, then I treat it as an internal threat.
Under these criteria, disputes with other countries are considered external threats and
insurgency, civil war, domestic terrorism, and other low level strife, such as riots, are
considered internal threats.
Although I believe that this distinction between external and internal threats is
valid in most cases, there are always exceptions to the rule, particularly when applied to
specific contexts.42 For instance, Israeli public opinion data shows that most citizens
view Palestinian groups as external threats despite the fact that these groups reside within
the territorial confines of Israel (see Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). However, under
my criteria, Palestinian groups are considered internal threats to Israel. Although
cognizant of these important perceptual differences, for the purpose of this dissertation, I
rely on this relatively simple criterion to differentiate between external and internal
threats.
As discussed earlier, I expect high levels of internal threat to be negatively
correlated with aggregate tolerance levels. Early social psychologists argued that groups
respond hostilely to internal “renegadism,” particularly those threatening to group unity.
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To further obfuscate the conceptual differences between the external and internal
threats, both are sometimes indirectly linked together as a result of unstable borders. For
example, one type of internal threat, insurgency, occasionally represents an external
threat to a state because their primary base of operations is located in a neighboring state
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). In this respect, unstable borders are conducive for insurgency
groups to simultaneously pose as an internal threat to the host state and an external threat
to the neighboring state.
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In some instances, internal threats are perceived as more threatening than external threats
from outgroups (Simmel 1955). Coser (1956: 103) describes the group reaction to
internal threats, “the perception of this inside ‘danger’ on the part of the remaining group
members makes for their ‘pulling together,’ for an increase in their awareness of the
issues at stake, and for an increase in participation; in short, the danger signal brings
about the mobilization of all group defenses.” In short, both Coser and Simmel predict
lower tolerance in those groups facing serious internal threats.
Although external and internal threats are conceptually distinct, the process by
which objective threat levels are translated into general intolerance is almost identical in
both cases. That is, internal threats, particularly those posing a danger to the social order,
foster internal cohesion among? the larger group (in this case, the state), resulting in more
individuals valuing conformity and security over civil liberties and the rights of
nonconformist groups, regardless of whether those freedoms are institutionalized.43 This
process underlies my proposition for the general relationship between internal threat
levels and political tolerance.
H7: Citizens in states facing higher levels of internal threat should be less politically
tolerant than citizens in states facing lower levels of internal threat.
However, similar to external threat, the challenge lies in identifying which types
of (internal) threats are considered salient by both state elites and domestic polities and
are, therefore, more likely to be associated with political intolerance. Relative salience is
again the critical feature that determines whether the threat carries the necessary weight
to influence individual attitudes. Turning again to the international conflict literature, I
categorize several types of internal threat most likely to be perceived as salient and
hypothesize what effects they may have on tolerance levels. Of the wide range of
possible internal societal threats, I identify insurgency, civil war, and low-level violence,
such as assassinations and riots, as the most salient internal threats confronting state elites
43

Another pathway by which internal threats foster intolerance is by creating exogenous
events that prevent individual identities from cross-cutting across other groups. Previous
research on social networks find that individuals whose exposure to other groups is
limited are often less tolerant than those with cross-cutting social networks across
different groups. Without the exposure to fresh ideas stemming from these cross-cutting
networks, these individuals are more susceptible to ferment ‘outgroup’ hostility (Mutz
2002; Mutz and Mondak 2006).
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and the domestic public. Violence or the threat of violence underlies each of the three
types of salient internal threat, and as such is considered a direct threat to the security of
both the state and its population. Although I expect each manifestation of salient internal
threat to be correlated with lower aggregate tolerance levels, as proposed in hypothesis
#8, I also expect insurgencies to have additional attendant effects on specific attitudes,
particularly on who individuals target for intolerance.
Analysts identify insurgency as one of the strongest internal threats facing states
(Fearon and Laitin 2003).44 Indeed, insurgency is often either cause or correlate of other
manifestations of internal violence, such as civil wars and political assassinations (Fearon
and Laitin 2003; Iqbal and Zorn 2006). Aside from their destabilizing impact on the state
and their inherent threat to the existing social order, insurgent groups, particularly those
organized around ethnic divisions, engender such domestic hostility that the idea of a
dialogue or political tolerance among the warring factions is unthinkable (Posen 1993;
Kaufmann 1996). Under these conditions, individual social identities are organized
around those who identify with the state and those who identify with the insurgency
group (Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 1996).45 It is not surprising, perhaps, that group
identities and intolerance are related in deeply fractionalized societies, as individuals
often take on an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality toward nonconformist groups (see Gibson and
Gouws 2003).
The strongest evidence for this contention comes from Shamir and SagivSchifter’s (2006) study in which they show that insurgency-led violence not only
depresses general tolerance levels, but also leads to higher threat perceptions among
respondents. They also provide clear evidence of the group dynamic process described in
44

Insurgency is a broad concept ranging from highly organized guerrilla paramilitary
groups to loosely-affiliated terrorist networks. A common characteristic of insurgency
groups is intent to radically alter the existing domestic political/social order through the
use of violence. I discuss further defining characteristics of insurgencies below in the
data and variables section of the dissertation.
45
The social identity literature argues that although individuals often have multiple group
identifications, social context determines which of them are relevant. Furthermore, social
context also affects the degree of in-group attachment and out-group hostility at the
individual-level (Brewer and Brown 1998; Brewer 1999; Brown 2000). I argue that the
presence of insurgency groups is a major contextual factor moderating the salience of the
competing group identities.
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the social psychology literature as perceived greater threat from Arab-Israelis once the
violence ensued, which ultimately resulted in lower tolerance levels overall.
As result of their split from the established social order, ‘break-away’ groups,
perceived as ‘defectors’ by the members of the original group, should trigger even
stronger hostility than ‘normal’ external threats (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956). In this
sense, insurgencies are the internal threats most likely to contribute to lower tolerance
levels because they not only fit the role of ‘defector’ but also represent a strong
sociotropic threat to the state. Average citizens, under duress from these uncertain
conditions, should be more likely to harbor intolerant views, especially towards those
groups they perceive as a threat to the larger social order.
H8: Citizens in states threatened by insurgency groups should be less politically tolerant
than citizens in states facing little to no threat from insurgency groups.
In addition to expecting lower general tolerance levels in countries dealing with
internal strife, I also posit that individuals are more likely to select groups loosely
associated with the internal threat as their ‘least-liked’ group. I emphasize ‘loose
association’ here because previous studies reveal that citizens in countries dealing with
insurgency (such as Israel) are just as likely to target extreme right-wing groups that
emerge and strengthen in response to a growing insurgency.46 Generally, these extremist
political groups are perceived to represent an even larger sociotropic threat to the
citizenry over fear that the hard-line policies advocated by these groups are a direct threat
to the democratic process itself (Shamir 1991; Gibson and Gouws 2003). This suggests
that differences in internal threat environment may influence group selection patterns
across countries. This argument dovetails with research linking threat with increase
support for punitive action against groups associated with the source of the threat
(Hermann et al. 1999).
Recent evidence from Israel supports this argument; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter
(2006) observed a distinct shift in the public’s selection of targets of intolerance as
internal threat levels increased within the country. Not only did tolerance in Israel
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Both Vasquez (1993) and Huth (1996) argue that political groups dominated by hardliner strategies use threat to gain power and influence over policy-making. The political
platform of these groups often includes an agenda favoring security over civil liberties.
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decrease as objective threat levels increased, but individuals were more likely to deny
civil liberties to Arab-Israelis, who were nominally associated with the insurgent groups,
than other nonconformist groups (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). Taken together,
these expectations suggest that the threat of insurgency may affect tolerance decisions
both directly, by elevating the societal threat levels, and indirectly, by spawning threats
from reactionary groups perceived as willing to dismantle democratic rights and
institutions for the sake of security.
Given these theoretical and empirical justifications, I expect that in states with a
significant insurgent presence, individuals are more likely to target groups even loosely
associated with the source of internal threat facing the country.47
H9: In states under threat from insurgency groups, individuals are more likely to select
target groups loosely associated with the insurgency than other groups with no
reasonable links to the insurgency.
Similar to my expectations regarding external threat, I anticipate multiple
pathways by which internal threats in a country result in lowered levels of political
tolerance among the citizenry. One key difference, however, is the impact that internal
threat is likely to have on the selection of targets of political intolerance—i.e., the
selection individuals’ ‘least-liked’ group. While high levels of external threat are likely
to be associated with “pluralistic intolerance” (i.e., a proliferation rather than a consensus
on target group selection), high internal threat levels are more likely to be associated
focused intolerance (i.e., a relative consensus on one or two target groups).
Problems Relating to Endogeneity
As is the case for most social science research, one must remain cognizant of
potential problems relating to endogeneity (i.e. the values of the independent variables
are a function rather than a cause of the dependent variable). Endogeneity is problematic
on many different levels, not the least of which is the possibility that endogenous factors
47

As a corollary to this hypothesis, I may also determine whether certain internal threats
are more likely to be tolerated than others. I expect that groups associated with a threat to
the general social order would be less tolerated than other groups. Although the
limitations offered by the WVS prevent me from fully testing this corollary, I suspect that
individuals in non-democratic regimes are more likely to tolerate insurgent groups
associated with democracy more than other groups. It is also plausible that postcommunist citizens are more likely to tolerate communist groups out a sense of nostalgia.
47

will lead to biased results (i.e. tolerance and internal threat levels are auto-correlated)
causing me to draw incorrect inferences from the results (King, Keohane, and Verba
1994). Regarding the relationship between tolerance and internal threat, a plausible
argument can be made that intolerant societies beget internal threats, especially
insurgencies, rather than internal threats contributing to intolerance as I describe above.48
In this case, the possibility of reciprocal causation cannot be ignored. Given that the
relationship between tolerance and internal threat most likely contains an endogenous
element, I take steps to minimize it effect in the analyses that follow.49 Although I
provide a more detailed discussion in the analysis chapter, I undertake an instrumental
variables approach to isolating and removing the endogenous component from my
internal threat variable, which, in theory, should allow for unbiased estimates of the effect
of internal threats on tolerance levels. However, as I point out below, this strategy is
often an imperfect solution to problem of endogeneity.
Having discussed my general expectations regarding the general relationship
between objective threat levels and political tolerance, I now turn to the other set of
country-level characteristics likely to influence aggregate tolerance levels: domestic
political institutions. Below I hypothesize about how patterns in tolerance levels across
countries should be associated with different institutional configurations.
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The same claim of endogeneity could be said regarding the relationship between
external threats and political tolerance. However, the face validity of this claim is
relatively weak, particularly when one considers the sample of countries used in this
study. One might think that the possibility that intolerant states are more likely to be the
targets of foreign states controlled by the same groups whose civil liberties would be
denied by the majority of the public. That is, group ties would draw states into conflict
over a focused intolerance of certain minority or nonconformist groups. This argument,
however, neglects a major weakness of the ‘least-liked’ measure of intolerance used in
the World Values Survey (WVS). The international system includes no states dominated
by any of the WVS least-liked groups and, thus, incapable of targeting the politically
intolerant states.
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The reverse causality proposition that intolerant societies beget insurgencies can also
be predicted from an indirect pathway. Put simply, the argument follows that majorities
in intolerant societies create institutions that foster divisions within society and create
conditions that spawn the grievances leading to insurgency formation (see Gurr 1971;
Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000; Regan and Norton 2005 for details on proximate
causes of insurgency formation). Once established, these institutions serve to further
strengthen the divisions in society and cut off the ability of minority groups to use
legitimate methods of resolving their grievances.
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Institutions and Political Tolerance
One potential fallacy underlying most of the previous tolerance literature is the
implicit assumption that democratic systems uniformly facilitate political tolerance across
all democratic polities. Although not usually explicitly operationalized as such,
democracy, for all intents and purposes, is treated as a dichotomous variable in most
empirical analyses. To date, only a handful of studies look beyond this simplistic
conceptualization of regime type and examine the influence of specific institutional
configurations on mass tolerance levels (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Weldon
2006). Ignoring institutional arrangements is problematic because a whole host of factors
that likely influence levels of political tolerance levels is overlooked. Indeed, examples
in other areas of research reveal robust relationships between domestic political
institutions and individual attitudes and behavior. The strong conclusion derived from
the rational-choice institutionalism literature (Norris 2004) is that specific institutional
configurations are associated with particular patterns of political behavior and attitudes.
In short, political institutions matter; in fact, they matter a great deal. Given the
unexplored potential of this approach in the area of political tolerance, I also examine
what impact domestic political institutions have on tolerance levels across countries. In
this way, my study moves beyond the previous tolerance literature by opening the “black
box” of regime type and systematically studying the impact of its constituent rules and
institutions.
Institutions establish the rules and norms of the political system. In some
respects, societies use political institutions to serve as commitment mechanisms to ensure
norms. Once established, institutions have a major influence on political behavior by
structuring the strategic incentives facing decision-makers, political parties, and citizens
(Downs 1957; March and Olsen 1984, 1989). The critical feature is how the institutions
shape the incentives and payoffs for actors in the system. In democracies, electoral rules
shape the strategies of motivated political actors (e.g., parties and candidates) seeking to
maximize votes to win elections and gain political power.50 Different electoral rules,
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Electoral rules are not strictly the province of democracies. The vast majority of
authoritarian regimes also have held elections governed by specific electoral rules (Blais
and Massicotte 1997; Golder 2005; Geddes 2005). In fact, Geddes (2005) reveals that
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therefore, create the incentives that shape the strategy of those actors seeking votes.
These strategies shape party messages and, thereby, exert some influence over individual
attitudes (Przeworski and Sprague 1984; Kitschelt 2000; Norris 2004).
The basic institutional argument applies not only to democracies, but to all
political regimes types. I expect differences in political institutions to have a significant
influence over aggregate levels of tolerance across all countries. Beyond just structuring
incentives and strategies, political institutions also promote and deepen norms over time.
This is the crux of the democratic learning hypothesis, which proposes that the longer
citizens are exposed to and interact with the political process governed by democratic
institutions, the more likely they will tolerate nonconformist groups (Mill 1859; Duch
and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Put simply, this hypothesis contends
that the longer a democracy endures, the more likely citizens will learn to apply abstract
democratic values (e.g., civil liberties) to concrete situations involving individuals and
groups toward which they hold some objection.
The democratic learning hypothesis makes a number of implicit assumptions that
I test in this study. First, it assumes that democratic institutions are more likely to foster
tolerance than authoritarian regimes, a rather uncontroversial assumption. Second, and
more controversially, it assumes that the length of time a country has been democratic
will have a uniform effect on tolerance levels regardless of the types of political
institutions comprising these democratic systems. I believe the second assumption
demands more scrutiny.51
Similarly, the political institutions comprising authoritarian regimes are also not
uniform (Blais and Massicotte 1997; Golder 2005; Geddes 2005). Although authoritarian
regimes are generally treated as homogenous units in the international relations literature
and largely ignored in the political behavior literature, it is perhaps surprising to discover

over three-quarter of post-World War II authoritarian regimes have adopted some type of
electoral formula and held at least one election. Similarly, Blais and Massicotte (1997)
report that, out of the 191, only twenty countries did not have a functioning legislative
body in 1995.
51
The democratic learning hypothesis finds strong empirical support in single-country
studies (see Rohrschneider 1996) and cross-national studies (see Peffley and
Rohrschneider 2003).
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the degree of institutional differences across authoritarian regimes.52 Given the variation
in institutional configurations across these regimes, I suspect that, even under conditions
assumed to be relatively hostile to democratic norms, the relationship between
institutions and tolerance deserves investigation.
As the theoretical case described above illustrates (and handful of political
tolerance studies demonstrate), there is likely to be an association between a country’s
political institutions the level of tolerance among its citizenry. But what types of
institutions can be expected to facilitate or inhibit political tolerance? As I discuss below,
the previous literature on political institutions offer conflicting expectations regarding
what effect certain types of institutions should have on tolerance levels. More
specifically, the conventional wisdom on the differences between ‘consensus’ and
‘majoritarian’ institutions contends that consensus institutions should positively affect
tolerance levels while majoritarian institutions should foster intolerance. Conversely,
hypotheses derived from the theories of electoral rules and political incentives predict
exactly the opposite effects. Below I outline the competing predictions regarding how
differences in electoral systems are likely to affect tolerance levels and generate specific
hypotheses for each perspective.
Regime Type and the Learning Hypothesis
The simplest theoretical account regarding the relationship between domestic
political institutions and political tolerance is that democracies represent the modal
institutional pathway toward increased tolerance levels in a society.53 The notion that
democratic regimes are better at fostering political tolerance than authoritarian regimes is
not at issue, nor is the general notion that increased exposure to democratic political
52

Although the bulk of the quantitative studies examining the effect of regime type on
international interactions tend to treat authoritarian regimes as homogenous units, there
are exceptions. For example, the strategic perspective of international relations examines
the influence of domestic politics on state behavior shaped, largely, by the rules and
institutions governing the system (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
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One must be careful not to equate democracy with tolerance as they are fundamentally
distinct concepts. While the empirical evidence confirming the democratic learning
effect supports the contention that democracy begets tolerance largely through political
socialization, the relationship between democracy and political tolerance is not linear (see
Gibson and Bingham 1985). This suggests that democracy or learning cannot alone
account political tolerance.
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institutions raises overall tolerance levels. Specifically, democracies should be associated
with higher tolerance levels than authoritarian regimes. In this respect, democratic and
authoritarian regimes represent divergent modal pathways; one fostering tolerance, the
other intolerance. The real question, however, is whether certain types of political
institutions affect tolerance levels despite differences in overall regime type.
Intra-Regime Type Differences and Electoral Rules
Obviously, not all political systems are created equally. As a result, cross-national
comparisons should focus on examining how different institutional configurations
influence various political outcomes. The obvious starting point is studying the
differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies, as comparative studies
consistently demonstrate major differences between the two system types over a wide
range of political behavior and outcomes.
The work of Lijphart (1968, 1977, 1984, 1999) is especially relevant to
understanding how the fundamental differences separating majoritarian and consensus
institutions may affect tolerance levels. According to Lijphart (1984: 5), consensus
institutions are formalized rules designed to encourage “broad participation in
government and broad agreement on the policies that the government should pursue.”
Consensus institutions are characterized by their emphasis in promoting proportional
political representation, power-sharing, and protection for minority groups.54
Majoritarian institutions, on the other hand, are formalized rules designed to endorse the
principle of majority rule.
Political intolerance is fueled by hostile evaluations of groups perceived to be
offensive and threatening (Sullivan et al 1982; Marcus et al 1995). Consequently,
intolerance is often lower in countries characterized by ethnically and religiously
homogenous populations (Sniderman et al 2000). Ethnically and religiously
heterogeneous states, on the other hand, not only have a more difficult time engendering
tolerance, they have a harder time democratizing all together (Horowitz 1985). Yet, as
democracies such as the Netherlands and Belgium demonstrate, ethnically divided states
can not only democratize but also can thrive and endure for long periods of time.
54

Examples of countries with consensus institutions include Belgium and Switzerland.
Examples of countries with majoritarian institutions include Great Britain and Australia.
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According to Lijphart (1968, 1977, 1984, 1999), the key to their success can be found in
the basic design of these countries’ political institutions.
Lijphart (1977, 1984, 1999) asserts that democracies based on institutions
designed to promote consensus across longstanding and internally cohesive groups (i.e.
ethnic or religious factions) through promotion of representativeness and power-sharing
are more likely to ameliorate potentially devastating divisions in a highly fractured
society as opposed to those based on institutions designed around simple majoritarian
principles (i.e. plurality voting, single-member districts).55 He further observes that
‘consensus’ democracies do a better job of containing violence between groups stemming
from political discord in highly fractionalized societies. In fact, the incentive for groups
in a ‘winner-take-all’ majoritarian system is to withhold power from the minority
opposition (see Great Britain’s Westminster system), thereby exacerbating perceived
threat and group hostility among minorities. Consequently, instead of promoting
harmony and tolerance throughout society (i.e. democratic learning model), majoritarian
democracies may actually have disastrous effects for culturally diverse societies
(Reynolds 2000).
The general expectation derived from Lijphart’s work is that countries with
‘consensus’-inspired institutions (e.g. Switzerland) are better able to reduce societal
tensions, which diminishes perceived threat between groups and, in turn, should translate
into higher levels of mass political tolerance vis a vis majoritarian systems ceteris
paribus.56
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Of course, one of the problems with this hypothesis is the fact that if Lijphart’s story is
correct, then we should only see consensus institutions in highly divided societies. These
societies would then only represent those countries that actually succeeded in
ameliorating the divisions in the country effectively enough to form a viable political
system. Thus, we could still see high levels of political tolerance in majoritarian systems
because they were mostly homogenous to begin with and those publics would have less
opportunity to perceive threat from developed and cohesive groups divided along ethnic
or religious lines. Given these problems of endogeneity, I expect to find a null
relationship. In a sense, the test is biased against finding results. Although the
endogeneity problems make null results hard to interpret, confidence in the hypotheses
strengthens considerably if the models produce statistically significant results.
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This is a similar argument to the one Duch and Gibson (1992) tested in their crossnational study on political tolerance. Their main premise was that political tolerance
increased as political conflict and ideological diversity increased. They contended that
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H10: Citizens in states with consensus institutions will be more politically tolerant than
citizens in states with majoritarian institutions.
This hypothesis helps to shed further light on Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003)
findings that democratic longevity and federalism contribute to mass tolerance. Although
the authors examined the additive impact of these two factors, they did not consider their
interaction.57 Specifically, they did not assess whether increased exposure to federalist
institutions in a democratic setting in associated with patterns in overall tolerance. Such
an analysis should reveal whether there is a differential impact of democratic longevity
under a federalist versus a unitary system on political tolerance. Given the theoretical
justification provided above supporting the possibility that the longevity of one type of
democracy may affect tolerance levels differently than another, I offer three corollary
hypotheses based on Lijphart’s argument and Peffley and Rohrschneider’s findings:
H11: Citizens in states with more years of experience under consensus institutions should
be more tolerant than individuals in states under other political institutions.
H12: Citizens in states with federalist institutions, a subtype of consensus institutions, are
likely to be more tolerant than citizens in other states.
H13: Citizens in states with more experience under federalist institutions are likely to be
more tolerant than citizens in other states.
In essence, these hypotheses test whether an interaction between democratic
longevity and democracy type (consensus vs. majoritarian) can partially account for
variation in aggregate levels of political tolerance. Overall, these hypotheses compare
whether democracies with consensus institutions or majoritarian institutions are better or
worse in promoting tolerance amongst the mass public.

high levels of political diversity socialized individuals to respect democratic values.
However, they did not find any empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
57
While the authors examined whether federalist institutions made a difference in
elevating mass tolerance, federalism is only one possible indicator of a consensus
democracy (Lijphart 1984, 1999). Other indicators of a consensus democracy include,
but are not limited to, proportional representation electoral formula, multimember
districts, larger cabinets comprised of representatives from multiple parties, higher
number of effective parties, higher cabinet durability, bicameralism, judicial review, and
rigid rules governing constitutional amendments (Lijphart 1999).
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While the general thrust of Lijphart’s story is that consensus democracies should
foster political tolerance, a closer examination of the incentives created by electoral rules
most commonly found in consensus systems suggests that consensus institutions may
actually contribute to intolerance. This counter-intuitive conclusion is derived from the
optimal strategies adopted by vote-maximizing actors based on the incentives created by
specific electoral rules, and the impact those electoral strategies have on individual
behavior and attitudes. The rational-choice institutionalism literature is populated with
an abundance of evidence in support of the proposition that electoral rules have direct
effects on political outcomes and individual behavior. By understanding both the
strategic incentives facing state political elites and how social identity affects tolerance
judgments, one can identify those rules most likely to influence political tolerance levels,
particularly over time.
In this study, I focus on the electoral rules and political institutions that create
incentives for party formation and strategy. In particular, I concentrate on identifying
those electoral rules that determine whether parties adopt “bridging” or “bonding”
strategies to maximize votes.58 Electoral rules that create incentives for parties to secure
votes from narrow constituencies result in parties adopting ‘bonding’ strategies (Cox
1990; Putnam et al 1993; Norris 2004). Parties relying on bonding strategies highlight
group differences and try to promote an ‘us vs. them’ mentality amongst their
constituency. In this way, bonding strategies seek to divide individuals into groups
separated along narrow social and political characteristics. Conversely, parties that adopt
“bridging” strategies to maximize votes are responding to electoral rules that create
“centripetal” incentives. Parties using “bridging” strategies seek to build broad coalitions
across diverse social and political groups (Cox 1990; Putnam et al 1993; Norris 2004).
The link between party strategies and political tolerance comes again from the
social psychology literature. In particular, how social and group identities affect an
individual’s decision to tolerate. As discussed in the section on threat, social identity is a
powerful indicator of whether an individual will perceive threat from other groups as well
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Putnam (1993) was the first to label these distinctive strategies. However, these
strategies are derived to capitalize on what Cox (1990) called, “centripetal” and
“centrifugal” incentives created by electoral rules.
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as the decision to tolerate (Sniderman et al. 2000, 2004; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).
More importantly, social context determines which group identifications are relevant as
well as the salience of those distinctions (Brewer and Brown 1998; Brewer 1999; Brown
2000). Norris (2004: 11) highlights how these parties’ strategies contribute to the
salience of these group identifications:
“Through their bridging or bonding strategies, we assume that parties can
either reinforce or weaken the political salience of social and partisan
identities. The linkages between parties and citizens should, therefore,
differ systematically according to the electoral threshold and, therefore, by
the basic type of majoritarian, combined, or proportional electoral system.
It is not claimed that politicians have the capacity to create social
cleavages. But the account assumes that the initial adoption of certain
electoral rules (for whatever reason) will generate incentives for parties to
maintain, reinforce, and possibly, exacerbate the political salience of oneof-us bonding, or alternatively, to modify, downplay, and, possibly, erode
group consciousness by encouraging catch-all bridging. This is most
important in plural societies divided by deep-rooted ethnic conflict,
exemplified by Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, or Israel/Palestine, if leaders
can heighten sectarian consciousness or, alternatively, moderate
community divisions.”
Norris implies that certain electoral rules, by way of party strategy, help to
strengthen in-group identification and out-group hostility, while others rules serve to
ameliorate those distinctions. Generally, electoral rules associated with majoritarian
systems offer incentives for bridging strategies because they reward parties that build
broad coalitions across diverse social, ethnic, and ideological groups. On the other hand,
consensus institutions, especially proportional representation electoral rules, reward
smaller parties allowing them to focus on securing votes from narrow constituencies.
This theoretical story contradicts the more conventional interpretation of the relationship
between consensus institutions and political tolerance and sets up a critical theory test.
The expectation derived from rational-choice institutionalism theory is that states with
electoral rules that promote “bridging” strategies should be associated with higher
tolerance levels than states governed by electoral rules that promote “bonding” strategies.
Applied more generally, I expect to find that states with majoritarian institutions are more
tolerant than state with consensus institutions. Furthermore, the democratic learning
effect should strengthen these differences over time.
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H14: Citizens in states with majoritarian electoral systems will be more politically
tolerant than states with PR electoral systems.
H15: Individuals in states with more exposure to majoritarian institutions will be more
tolerant than individuals in other states.
H16: States with PR electoral systems will be less politically tolerant than states with
majoritarian electoral systems.
H17: Individuals in states with more exposure to PR electoral systems will be more
tolerant than individuals in other states.
Looking beyond these generalized institutional categories, I also contend that
different electoral rules and political institutions create systematic cross-national
differences in tolerance levels. Based on the theoretical framework described above, I
generate a number of hypotheses on the effects of specific electoral rules and institutional
configurations on tolerance levels.
One of the distinguishing features between majoritarian and consensus
democracies is the rules governing the election of their respective legislatures (Lijphart
1984, 1999). Generally speaking, consensus democracies are characterized by larger
multi-member districts and proportional representation electoral formula in which parties
are represented in proportion to their voter support in the election. Conversely,
majoritarian systems rely on smaller, single-member districts and plural electoral formula
in which the party candidate with the most votes wins a seat. Many countries, however,
adopt mixed electoral systems that combine aspects of both. As a result, there is a great
deal of cross-national differences in the specific rules governing elections even amongst
countries that share similar basic electoral systems. Specific rules governing district size,
district magnitude, minimum thresholds, and a host of arrangements all converge to
produce variation in the number of effective electoral parties across countries. Given the
logic governing party electoral strategies discussed above, countries with rules allowing
for a higher number of effective electoral parties can be expected to be less tolerant than
countries with rules that allow for fewer effective electoral parties. The crux of this
argument, as before, is those systems with higher number of effective parties will favor
smaller parties with narrow constituencies, thereby, creating incentives to employ
bonding strategies to maximize votes and thus decrease tolerance.
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H18: Citizens in states with a higher number of effective electoral parties should be less
tolerant than those in states with fewer parties.
Although this discussion has centered on how electoral systems may affect
aggregate tolerance levels in democracies, these rules also shape incentives in
authoritarian regimes too. Recent studies show that the vast majority of authoritarian
regimes hold some form of elections governed by specific electoral rules (Blais and
Massicotte 1997; Geddes 2005). For the most part, while the results are often
predetermined, these elections hold some costs and risks to the state. As Geddes (2005:
6) comments, “most authoritarian governments that hold elections are not hybrids but
simply successful, well institutionalized authoritarian regimes.” As such, the possibility
exists to not only test the institutional hypotheses across democracies, but also over all
the countries in my sample. While I expect the strength of these effects to be
considerably less in authoritarian regimes, the exercise may yield some surprising
insights.
Overall, I expect to find systematic cross-national differences in tolerance levels
under different threat environments and political institutions. As I allude in a number of
instances above, the two general theoretical frameworks I hypothesize to have significant
effects on aggregate tolerance levels necessitates that I not only use a cross-national
approach but also employ a wide array of empirical tools and methodologies. Therefore,
I move now to my next chapter where I discuss the basic features of my research design,
data, and variables.
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Chapter 4
Research Design, Data, and Methods
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect that contextual factors, such as
the threat environment and political institutions, have on political tolerance levels among
mass publics. Consequently, this dissertation faces several challenges relating to data
availability, general research design, and statistical methods. In the first section of this
chapter, I attempt to address some of these problems and discuss how decisions
pertaining to research design and statistical methodology undoubtedly influences the
inferences I can reasonably make from the available data. In the second section, I not
only describe the survey data, sample, and operationalization of key variables, but also
discuss some of the limitations inherent to the data as well as they may affect the
inferences drawn in later analyses. Finally, after conducting some cursory analyses of the
individual-level predictors, I discuss the statistical method I use in the following
empirical chapters.
Overall Research Design
Cross-national research almost invariably presents its own unique challenges to
scholars hoping to analyze and understand political phenomena across different countries.
These challenges are particularly evident in cross-national research using survey data to
examine individual political behavior and attitudes. Therefore, honesty about the
tradeoffs and benefits associated with the various types of overall designs is important.
However, it is also worth noting that while careful deliberation is necessary when
selecting the best research design and methodological tools, these decisions are shaped, in
large part, by the available data. For example, the previous political tolerance literature
primarily relied on single-country, cross-sectional approaches for reasons that are readily
apparent in most instances. First, the available data was usually limited to single crosssectional surveys in only one country. Second, the research was principally interested in
capturing variation in micro-level predictors of political tolerance. The implicit
assumption in these designs is that political and social contextual factors have a
negligible effect on tolerance levels (Curtice 2002). As a result, most of these studies
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were unable to offer any definitive insight as to how state-level factors influence
tolerance levels across countries.
Since the purpose of this study is to examine the contextual elements affecting
tolerance levels across countries, an approach relying on a single country, cross-sectional
design will simply not suffice. Ideally, the best overall design for a comparative analysis
of the effects of contextual variables on political tolerance levels is a cross-national, timeseries approach that avoids most of the pitfalls associated with the other designs, which
are discussed below. However, the logistical problems associated with this approach
make it hard to achieve in most instances and impossible for the study of political
tolerance. Quite simply, the data are just not available. Instead, only two viable options
are available for achieving some modicum of explanatory leverage.
Given the limitations in types of available survey data, two different approaches
offer the most latitude in making accurate causal inference for this type of study: a
single-country, time-series design or a cross-national, cross-sectional design. If properly
specified, the single-country, time-series design offers an opportunity for the researcher
to conduct a natural experiment by capturing differences in the variable of interest after
changes in key independent variables. The strength of this approach is that it addresses
some of the endogeneity problems that plague social science research (King, Keohane,
and Verba 1994) by offering assurance in the direction of causal arrow. One weakness of
the approach, however, is that researchers have to include a large number of control
variables to account for other changes in context relating to political environment,
leadership, and other exogenous shocks. But perhaps the most important limitation is the
difficulty in isolating changes in key contextual variables. Historically, significant
changes in key contextual variables, such as political institutions and the threat
environment, are relatively rare. So while this approach offers the best opportunity to
derive causal inferences from the data, cross-national surveys that include tolerance
measures and also span a long enough period of time to capture variation in the key
macro-level variables are not available.59
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Although I originally proposed to incorporate a longitudinal study of Israeli tolerance
in this study, due to problems in securing the data in a timely fashion, I am unable to
include the analyses in this dissertation. However, I fully plan to undertake this study in
60

Given the problems in securing data appropriate for longitudinal analysis and the
availability of cross-national, cross-sectional survey data, I am compelled to adopt a
cross-sectional design. While this approach does impose significant limitations in the
type of inferences I can draw from the data, the primary strength of a cross-national,
cross-sectional design lies in the ability to generalize across cases (King, Keohane, and
Verba 1994). An additional benefit is that due to the large number of countries in the
study, this survey offers wide variation in the key macro-level explanatory variables.
This approach is not without its limitations. Unlike studies which incorporate a
longitudinal component, I cannot assess individual-level change or even aggregate
change due to variation in key state-level factors using cross-sectional data. At best, this
approach allows me to assess whether differences in key explanatory variables (i.e. threat
environment and political institutions) are systematically related to patterns of tolerance
levels across the countries in my sample. Thus, while the results of my analyses may be
suggestive of causal patterns, I cannot empirically verify causality with any certainty.
Other problems associated with this type of design are that these studies often do not
have a high number of macro-level observations (countries) to accommodate the number
of control variables required to rule out alternate observations and uncertainty over
whether the results are spurious due to omitted variable bias (Norris 2004). Finally,
cross-national, cross-section designs are also often beset by methodological problems
stemming from measurement error due to response inequivalence across countries (King
et al 2003) – a problem that I discuss in further detail later in the chapter.
Although the design of the study limits the types of inferences that can be drawn
from the data, I remain confident that my approach allows me to adequately test the
hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. Most importantly, I will address some of
the limitations associated with the cross-sectional design throughout the rest of the study.
Data, Sample, and Operationalization of Variables
To test my hypotheses, I use survey data collected from the 1995-1997 World
Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2003). As a single wave survey across dozens of
countries, this survey represents the best source of cross-national data measuring withinthe near future and will use the insights from this dissertation to better inform those
analyses.
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state tolerance levels.60 The survey uses Sullivan et al’s (1982) “content-controlled”
political tolerance battery which first asks respondents to select their least-liked group
from a list of unpopular groups,61 and then asks, in a series of questions whether the
respondent thinks the group should be allowed to publicly demonstrate, hold political
office, and be allowed to teach in schools. Additionally, the WVS serves as the source
for all of the individual-level explanatory and control variables in the later analyses.
The countries surveyed in the study vary widely in economic
development, regime type, institutional configuration, threat environment, and
culture. The main sample ranges from the most developed democracies to the
least developed authoritarian regimes and includes countries from several
different regions, such as Western and Eastern Europe, North America, Latin
America, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa.
The inclusion of authoritarian regimes in the main sample of countries is a
contentious issue, namely over fears of bias caused by an increased chance of
false ‘positive’ answers with regards to tolerance. Put simply, these reservations
center on whether respondents in authoritarian regimes may alter their answers for
reasons relating to the current regime. For example, some respondents may offer
‘tolerant’ responses when they normally would not because they know such
activities (i.e. demonstrating) are not permitted in their country.
While these concerns are certainly valid, I include authoritarian regimes in my
analyses for a number of reasons.62 Most importantly, I am hesitant to simply discount
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The World Values Survey is not without its drawbacks. Critics often point out that the
country sample in these surveys is decidedly non-random. For example, the 1995-1997
wave focused on those newly democratizing countries in Eastern Europe and attitudes
relating to the ‘new’ political and social contexts facing those citizens. As such, I cannot
claim that it is a representative sample of world opinion.
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The respondents are asked to identify the group they like the least from the following
list of unpopular groups. Although the standard list includes immigrants, capitalists,
communists, extreme right-wing groups, Jews, criminals, and homosexuals, some of the
surveys were altered to reflect unpopular groups specifically linked to that state.
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As a precaution, I split the sample between democracies and non-democracies and
conduct additional analyses, which I usually present in the appendix (except in Chapter
Five on political institutions). For the most part, these later analyses reveal that regime
type has little influence on the underlying relationship between many of the key macrolevel variables, particularly objective threat levels, and political tolerance. The
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the information provided by certain countries because they are now deemed authoritarian
regimes. At the time of the survey, many of the 11 authoritarian countries in my sample
were selected due to a desire to assess the attitudes of citizens at a critical stage in what
were thought to be democratizing countries or fledgling democracies. Through the
benefit of hindsight, we now know that some of these countries never fully democratized
or the fledgling democracies were actually autocracies. In this sense, the rather arbitrary
coding decisions often employed by IR scholars become problematic. In some cases, the
countries coded as authoritarian countries would go on to become democracies (e.g.,
Mexico, Croatia), while others remained anocracies, or regimes that contain elements of
both democracy and autocracy (e.g., Peru).
A secondary reason for including such countries is that it allows us to increase our
understanding of the democratization process. The democratization literature is split over
the question of whether political culture fosters democratization or vice versa. Some
scholars (e.g., Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1971; Inglehart 1997) assert
that countries must develop a minimum threshold of certain cultural values and
attitudes—like tolerance— before successful democratization or consolidation can occur.
Gibson and Gouws (2003: 41) summarize the main argument by simply stating that “one
of the most vexing problems facing regimes attempting democratic transformations is
political intolerance . . . without tolerance, it is all too easy for transitional regimes to
devolve, first, into majority tyrannies, and second, into simple, old-fashioned tyrannies.”
Critics of this perspective echo the democratic learning hypothesis and assert that
democratic institutions are needed so citizens can learn tolerate their political and social
opponents (e.g., Muller and Seligson 1994). In this respect, scholars should not ignore
authoritarian regimes. In fact, we should be examining these cases, especially if the goal
is to determine some of the underlying causes of values and attitudes like tolerance that
may influence a country’s prospects for democratization.
relationship remains the same whether I control for regime type or split the samples into
democracies and authoritarian regimes. The only difference is in the magnitude of the
effects. For instance, objective threat appears to have a stronger negative effect in
democracies than in authoritarian regimes. Judging from the individual models for each
country presented below, the differences between respondents in democracies and nondemocracies are not radically different even at the individual-level; where one would
expect the greatest differences due to concerns over response inequivalence.
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Dependent Variable
Obviously, the dependent variable for this analysis is political tolerance, which I
measure using Sullivan et al’s (1982) ‘content-controlled’ measure of political tolerance.
Specifically, I measure political tolerance based on the “allow to demonstrate” and
“allow to hold office” responses directed at the respondents’ choice of ‘least-liked’
group. Both of these measures tap what many consider to be fundamental democratic
values (Dahl 1971, 1991; Gibson and Gouws 2003). By choosing to restrict these rights
for certain groups, the respondent is rejecting the application of core democratic values.
In this respect, my dependent variable represents a willingness to extend basic democratic
rights to groups an individual opposes, consistent with the definition of political
tolerance. Tolerant individuals would allow their least-liked group to hold office and/or
publicly demonstrate. Affirmative responses to either question are coded as 1, while
negative answers are coded as 0. I then combine these scores into an additive index for
each respondent that ranges from 0 (least tolerant) to 2 (most tolerant) creating an ordinal
scale. Although the WVS also asked respondents whether or not the group should be
allowed to “teach in schools,” I do not include this indicator because this response could
possibly represent a source of institutional bias inherent to the state of origin.63
Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) note that a serious problem with the political
tolerance battery in the WVS survey is that respondents were allowed to select
“criminals” from the list of unpopular groups, thereby raising concerns over the validity
of responses for individuals who selected criminals as their least-liked group.. Because
in many countries criminals are legally restricted from holding public office and teaching
in schools and incarcerated criminals are also, by definition, unable to publicly
demonstrate, denying rights to criminals may reflect legal restrictions rather than indicate
political intolerance. Peffley and Rohrschneider therefore eliminated from their sample
all respondents selecting criminals as their least-liked group. However, this solution
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In many countries, the right to teach is not seen as a fundamental political freedom
(Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). In fact, Peffley and Rohrschneider point out that “in
several nations, some groups on the list (communists in Central Europe, for instance)
have denied civil liberties to ordinary citizens for much of the 20th Century. It is thus
conceivable that within a specific historical context, even a democratic citizen would
reach the conclusion that a fascist or communist, for example, should not be permitted to
teach in schools in order to protect democratic institutions” (2003: 248).
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creates another problem within the data by significantly reducing the sample size in most
countries.64 As a result, they chose to eliminate (numerous) countries from their study if:
1) 50% or more of the respondents chose criminals as their least-liked group or 2) if the
survey sample for a country dropped below 500.
I relax these standards by eliminating a country only if 60% or more of the
respondents chose criminals as their least-liked group or if the survey sample dropped
below 400. I do this for two reasons. First, relaxing these standards only slightly
increases the sampling error for individual countries.65 Second, the relaxed standards
substantially increase the number (and representativeness) of the sample of countries
available for analysis (from 17 to 33), allowing for more reliable cross-country inferences
based on the resultant aggregate (pooled) data (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).66
Given advantages of the larger sample size and my interest in state-level explanations of
political tolerance, I believe the lower threshold is justified, despite the potential for small
increases in sampling error for some countries.67
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Although the arguments against the inclusion of criminals are compelling, I explore
alternate solutions in my dissertation involving tests in which the respondents selecting
criminals are included. I also assess what effect the inclusion of respondents selecting
criminals as their least-liked group has on the estimation of key explanatory variables.
65
For example, the sampling error of a sample of 500 respondents is +/-4.4%, while the
sampling error for 400 respondents increases to only +/-4.8%.
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The following countries were dropped from the sample after applying our criteria:
Moldavia, China, Ghana, Montenegro, Taiwan, Tambov, Bangladesh, and the Dominican
Republic. Additionally, I eliminate Puerto Rico and the four Spanish regions of Basque,
Valencia, Galicia, and Andalusia from the sample because they are not independent
countries in the state system. Furthermore, I also pooled data from East Germany with
data from West Germany, since the survey was conducted after unification.
67
The decision to eliminate those respondents selecting criminals as their least-liked
group is not without trepidation as it raises concerns about whether in eliminating one
potential source of bias from my sample, the solution creates another. Indeed, a plausible
argument can be made that the individuals who select criminals as their least-liked group
are systematically different than those who choose another group; both in their
underlying individual-characteristics and propensity to tolerate nonconformist groups.
Furthermore, if the decision to select criminals is influenced by variation in political
institutions and rules across countries, then I should find systematic differences across
countries in aggregate tolerance as well as within-country differences across individuals.
In many of the analyses that follow, I explore this possibility by re-estimating the
baseline models using the unaltered sample. The results are presented in the appendices
of the empirical chapters. For the most part, I do not find that using the unaltered sample
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[TABLE 4-1 ABOUT HERE]
To illustrate the distribution of tolerance across the primary sample of countries
included in the study, Table 4-1 reports the aggregate tolerance score each country. This
score represents the percentage of citizens within each country who provided tolerant
responses for each question (i.e., would allow their least liked group to demonstrate and
hold office). For the countries included in the study, the aggregate tolerance scores range
from a high of 26.6% (New Zealand) to a low of 1.4% (Azerbaijan). A cursory
examination of the tolerance distribution suggests some support for the hypotheses on
external and internal threat, since many of the least tolerant states have experienced high
threat levels previous to the survey. Interestingly, the distribution also reveals that a
significant number of the least tolerant states are democracies (e.g. Switzerland, Spain,
Germany).
Individual-Level Independent Variables
In order to ensure that my estimation of the impact of macro-level variables on
political tolerance levels closely parallels previous micro-level studies, I use common
individual-level measures.68 These variables must be included as controls for in any
study which incorporates individual-level survey data to protect against omitted variable
bias. I use many of the same attitudinal measures included in Peffley and Rohrschneider’s
study to predict political tolerance, including indices for democratic ideals, democratic
activism, political interest, free speech priority, conformity, as well as measures of education,
age, gender, and political ideology. These variables account for an individual’s relevant
political orientations, personality characteristics, political behavior, and socioeconomic
characteristics that, according to the previous literature, best predict political tolerance
levels (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Below, I describe how I operationalize
these variables using data from the WVS.
To guard against problems stemming from missing data, I use the Amelia (King et
al 2001) software to impute missing data. In survey research, missing data can be a
affects the relationship between the macro-level variables and tolerance levels. However,
as I show below, the decision to select criminals is systematically related to how other
individual-level characteristics affect the likelihood of tolerance.
68
All the independent and control variables were created to reflect the conditions in each
state during the exact year of their survey unless noted otherwise.
66

problem if, as is often the practice, a respondent is dropped from the analysis if she fails
to answer a single question among the dozens used to construct measures. List-wise
deletion of missing data, for example, often results in an intolerably large portion of the
sample being ignored in any analysis and consequently a large amount of information on
respondents remains unobserved. Data imputation procedures have been designed to
overcome these problems and maximize the explanatory power of the existing data.
King’s Amelia procedure uses a method of multiple imputation to compute values
for each missing cell in the individual-level data matrix. While the observed values
remain unchanged, Amelia generates several data sets in which the missing data take on
different values mirroring the uncertainty associated with the missing values.
Furthermore, in cross-country analysis, multiple imputation is conducted for each country
separately and then aggregated into the larger sample. Put simply, I do not compute the
values based on uncertainty over the missing data across the entire 33 countries. Rather,
imputed values are based on the uncertainty over the missing data for each country
individually to ensure that the information being used to generate imputations comes
from the within the same country.
Democratic Activism. Previous studies have shown that individuals with higher
levels of democratic activity tend be more politically tolerant (Peffley and Rohrschneider
2003). Democratic Activism is an additive index ranging from 3 (lowest) to 9 (highest)
of responses to three questions in the WVS that ask individuals to indicate whether they
have (3), would consider (2), or would never (1): participate in a boycott, sign a petition,
or attend a demonstration.
Political Interest. This variable measures an individual’s overall assessment of
their own political interest. The additive index is based on two questions. The first
question asks whether respondent are very interested (3), somewhat interested (2), or not
very interested (1) in politics. The second question asks how often the respondent
engages in political discussions: frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1). The
resultant index ranges from 2 (low interest) to 6 (high interest). In keeping with
democratic theorists (e.g., J.S. Mill 1859), the expectation is that individuals more
engaged in politics should be more likely to respect and extend civil liberties to others.
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Democratic Ideals. With this variable I am attempting to measure an individual’s
commitment to democratic values and principles. Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) note
that their democratic ideals index is derived from a measure first employed by Sullivan et
al (1985) that captures one’s commitment to abstract democratic norms. This additive
index is also based on two questions asking the respondent to assess democracy as a
political system in the abstract. Specifically, the first question asks the respondent to rate
whether having a democratic political system is very good (4), fairly good (3), fairly bad
(2), or very bad (1). The second question asks whether the respondent strongly agrees
(4), agrees (3), disagrees (2), or strongly disagrees (1) with the statement that democratic
political systems are better than other forms of government. From these two questions, I
generate an index that ranges from 2 (low commitment) to 8 (high). I expect that
individuals that strongly support democratic ideals are more likely to tolerate their leastliked group.
Conformity. Authoritarian personality traits have often been linked with lower
political and social tolerance levels, a finding that has been replicated from early
behaviorist research to contemporary studies (Adorno et al 1950; Sullivan et al 1982;
Feldman and Stenner 1997). Feldman and Stenner (1997) assert that conformity is a
primary indicator of these personality traits and outline how to create a conformity
measure based on responses to questions regarding desirable qualities in children, where
respondent select important qualities for children to learn at home from a long list of
attributes. In my index, selection of either obedience or good manners are coded as 1,
while imagination is coded as -1. The resultant index ranges from -1 (low) to 2 (high)
(also see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). I expect that conformity is negatively
associated with political tolerance. This expectation not only fits with previous empirical
findings, but also corresponds with the rational conflict literature suggests that
individuals with a strong propensity for conformity are less likely to tolerate
‘renegadism’.
Value Free Speech. This variable is derived, in part, from Sullivan et al’s (1985)
measure of “legalistic norms” (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Whereas, the
democratic ideals index taps an individual’s generalized support for democratic values
and principles, this index measures an individual’s support for civil liberties. The index
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is based on responses to three questions, each of which asks individuals to choose
between free speech and other values. The first question asks whether the government’s
priority should be to foster order in society (0) or protect individual rights (1). The other
two questions ask individuals to rank four value statements as most important, one of
which involves the protection of free speech. For the purposes of this index, ranking free
speech as the most important is coded as 1, while ranking it as second most important is
coded as 0.5. The additive index ranges from 0 (low) to 2 (high). As with the democratic
ideals index, I expect those individuals that attach a higher priority to free speech to be
more likely to tolerate their least-liked group.
Socio-economic Indicators. I include measures of several the standard socioeconomic variables: gender, age, and education levels. I also include a measure of
political ideology based on responses to a question where individuals are asked to place
themselves along an 11-point Left-Right scale, where 10 is associated with the Left and 1
is associated with the Right. I emulate Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) by coding the
missing values as 5.5.
Concerns over Inequivalence
By focusing on individual-level characteristics as key explanatory variables, this
study makes an implicit assumption that responses in different countries or contexts are
actually comparable. As King et al (2003) demonstrate in their study, this is oftentimes a
dubious assumption. They assert that one of the main problems facing cross-national
survey research is nonrandom measurement error stemming from interpersonal
incomparability across countries. In short, most cross-national survey research faces
serious problems of equivalence across different contexts (Marsh 2002; King et al 2003).
Although the severity of this problem varies across different cross-national
studies, the problems are especially serious in research relying on surveys measuring
complex concepts, such as freedom and trust, and individual self-assessments, such as
political ideology. Of course, the researchers that administered the country surveys of the
WVS were sensitive to the issue of non-comparability and took great pains to write
survey questions that have comparable meaning in different cultures. King’s critique is
that even after taking pains to write questions with similar meaning, responses in
different countries may lack comparability because individuals understand the same
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question differently. Given the features common to this problem, my study appears
vulnerable to the difficulties stemming from inequivalence. While I have concerns about
many of the individual-level variables, which serve as control variables in my analysis,
the critical variable in this study is the dependent variable, given that I am most interested
in examining the relationship between state-level factors and tolerance. On the one hand,
the least-liked methodology allows respondents to choose their least-liked group, which
goes some way toward putting individuals in different contexts on similar psychological
footing. On the other hand, as the following example demonstrates, there is still cause for
concern. Consider, for instance, that, for the purposes of this study, ‘allowing [group] to
demonstrate’ is generally assumed to indicate relatively peaceful gatherings and/or
orderly protest against the government. However, for individuals in a different context,
‘allowing [group] to demonstrate’ may take on a completely different meaning,
signifying armed protest and violence against the government. Thus, the tolerance
question could take on different meanings across different countries, raising the
possibility that cross-national variation in tolerance levels is simply an artifact of
measurement error rather than a product of different state-level and individual-level
influences.
One can easily discern how this might pose a problem for research relying on a
heterogeneous sample of countries. While the study suffers no significant bias if the
systematic variation in tolerance levels is unrelated to the survey instrumentation, the
results suffer from a greater degree of uncertainty if it is an artifact of this measurement
error. King et al (2004) offer a number of different solutions to account for such
measurement error within the survey data. Unfortunately, however, neither solution –
statistical corrections based on anchoring vignettes or writing more concrete and
contextually relevant questions – is feasible given my inability to change the original
survey.
At best, I can only offer that since inequivalence increases measurement error, it
often biases against estimating statistically significant results with the net result being
that researchers frequently underestimate the effects of their explanatory variables on
individual attitudes (King et al 2004). Thus, I expect that, if significant, the
inequivalence problem would mostly likely lead to null results. That is, the tests are
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rigged against finding statistically significant results. Therefore, if the following models
find support for my hypotheses, the strength of the actual relationships is most likely
underestimated. At worst, while I acknowledge the implications stemming from these
problems, I must assume some degree of comparability across countries in this study and
that some of the variation contains a systematic component that is subject to theoretical
and empirical evaluation. However, given the added uncertainty inherent in my results, I
can never be entirely sure that the models are capturing the “true” underlying
relationships within the data.
Macro-Level Control Variables
Democratic Longevity. This variable measures the number of years that a state
has experienced continuous democracy. This is the key independent variable for testing
the democratic learning model (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). In their study, Peffley
and Rohrschneider use Inglehart’s (1997) measure of democratic longevity. However, I
use a different indicator of democratic longevity because Inglehart only includes a select
number of democracies, which excludes many of the countries in my sample.
Furthermore, there are concerns over the accuracy of this measure given his coding of
democracy and the fact that the years of continuous democracy only dates back to 1920.
Clearly, the democratic traditions in countries, such as the United States and Switzerland,
date back far before 1920. Therefore, for the bulk of my analysis, I rely on Marshall and
Jaggers’ (2002) Polity IV index. Within the comparative politics and international
relations research fields, Polity IV is generally viewed as the most comprehensive and
standard measure of regime type. Using Polity IV’s democracy/autocracy score, I then
generate the number of years that a state has been a continuous democracy leading up to
the year of the survey. The standard for a democracy in the conflict literature is a
democracy/autocracy score of 6 or above (Oneal and Russett 1997). Using this indicator,
I then sum the total number of continuous years that a state has experienced a democratic
regime leading up to the year of the survey. Additionally, this indicator also captures
regime type within my models, since as any score above 0 indicates the presence of a
democratic regime type.
Economic Development. Although scholars often point out the link between
development and democracy (Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1991), the empirical record on
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confirming the direction of the causal arrow remains inconclusive (Przeworski et al
2000). Thus, to ensure that both democratic longevity and political tolerance are not
purely functions of economic development and modernity, I control for level of economic
development. Furthermore, this variable also controls for the influence of development
on the likelihood of civil conflict (Newman 1991). I use the World Bank’s data on GDP
per capita for each state during the year of the survey as measured in 1995 dollars. I then
take the natural logarithm of this measure to control for disproportionate influence of
outliers in my sample.69
Ethnic Fractionalization. Coser (1956) states that external threat increases
internal cohesion if two conditions are present at the time the threat presents itself. First,
the threat must be salient to the group, which my independent variables try to measure.
Second, a degree of group consensus exists a priori to the emergence of external threat.
Previous psychological studies confirm that prior cohesion serves as an intervening
variable conditioning group response (Stein 1976; Giles and Evans 1985). Similarly, it is
conceivable that a state’s level of fractionalization may condition group responses to both
external and internal threat. Although Horowitz (1985) suggests that the relationship
between diversity and conflict may be curvilinear in which conflict is less likely in both
extremely homogenous and heterogeneous states, I expect that internal fractionalization
is negatively related to tolerance (e.g., Huntington 1996). To control for this, I use an
indicator of ethnic fractionalization to measure the degree of the ethnic division in a
country. I use Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) indicator of ethnic fractionalization, which
measures the percentage share of the largest ethnic or religious group within the state
population during the survey year.
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Models using actual per-capita GDP provide substantively similar results for all of
analyses presented in later empirical chapters.
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The Individual-level Model of Political Tolerance
Although my hypotheses focus exclusively on macro-level explanations of crossnational variation in tolerance levels, political tolerance is still an individual-level
phenomenon. As such, individual-level characteristics commonly cited as important
predictors of political tolerance need to be accounted for to rule out alternate explanations
of the results (i.e., to make sure that macro-level differences are not due to omitted microlevel variables). Therefore, I treat micro-level predictors of tolerance as controls in later
analyses. However, it is important to conduct a broad assessment of how well these
individual-level predict tolerance using the data from the WVS.
To assess how well the individual-level predictors account for the variation in
tolerance levels – both across the sample and within each country - I use ordered logistic
regression because the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 2. Table 4-2 presents the
results of the models evaluating the impact of the individual level predictors using the
survey data pooled across the entire sample of countries. Despite the inclusion of states
in the sample not extensively studied in the previous literature, all of the individual-level
parameter estimates in Model 1 are consistent with earlier findings on political tolerance.
Indeed, the common predictors such as democratic activism, democratic ideals, free
speech priority, and education are strongly and positively associated with political
tolerance, while conformity, age, and being female tend to decrease tolerance. In Model
2, I re-estimate the model, this time including in the analysis those respondents selecting
criminals as their least-liked group. A comparison of results for Models 1 and 2 reveals
similar parameter estimates, in both direction and statistical significance, with two
important exceptions. Model 2 shows that including respondents who choose criminals
alters the impact of democratic ideals and political interest across the entire sample as
both coefficients are no longer statistically significant.
[TABLE 4-2 ABOUT HERE]
I also find consistency in the relationships between the individual-level variables
and political tolerance across regime types as well. In Models 3 and 4, I separate the
democratic respondents from the non-democratic respondents and find little variation in
either the direction or statistical significance for any of the coefficients. Granted, these
predictors perform better in explaining the variance in democracies than in non-
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democracies judging from the higher goodness of fit measure (i.e. pseudo R2), but the
general effect that these variables have on tolerance levels are relatively consistent.
These finding ameliorate some of the concerns over inequivalence in the sample. One
likely cause of systematic measurement error is a difference in regime type. Yet, I find
very similar parameter estimates for the individual-level predictors despite differences in
context. Given the consistency of the findings, these results suggest that even if the data
suffers from systematic measurement error due to inequivalence, at least some of the
variation across countries contains a systematic component that can be subjected to
empirical evaluation.
Ordered logit coefficients are difficult to interpret substantively. In nonlinear
models, such as this one, the coefficient does not represent the estimated change in
probability of the dependent variable due to a one unit change in the explanatory variable
(Kennedy 2003). Therefore, to provide some idea as to substantive effect of the
individual-level predictors on individual tolerance, I generate marginal effects using data
generated from the parameter estimates found in Model 1.70 The results are presented in
Table 4-3. These marginal effects represent the change in probability of the dependent
variable (tolerance) due to unit changes in the explanatory variable (these changes are
described in the table) while holding all of the other individual-level variables at their
mean.71 Democratic activism has the strongest impact on tolerance levels by far: an
increase from the average level of activism to the maximum increases the probability of
tolerance over 16%. The priority given to the value of free speech also has a strong,
positive substantive effect on tolerance as individuals who strongly support free speech
are 7.6% more likely to tolerate their least-liked group. Although these results reveal that
other key tolerance predictors have significant substantive effects, it is clear that an
70

For a graphic representation of the effect of these individual-level predictors on
tolerance levels, please refer to Figures 1a-9a in the appendix. The figures are generated
from the parameter estimates found in Model 1.
71
Interested in gauging the difference in effects of the individual-level predictors on
tolerance between those individuals selecting criminals as their least-liked group and
those selecting other groups, I generate the marginal effects of key explanatory variables
for those selecting criminals and compare them to the results discussed above in Table 43a. While I find that some of the explanatory variables have no statistically significant
relationship with tolerance of those selecting criminals, the remaining predictors still
have similar substantive effects to those in the general sample.
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individual’s level of democratic activism and the value placed on free speech are the
strongest predictors of individual tolerance.
[TABLE 4-3 ABOUT HERE]
In light of previous tolerance research, these findings are not at all surprising. As
positive as these results appear, the real test for the efficacy of the micro-level model is
how it fares in each individual state. By aggregating the responses into a general model, I
cannot assess how well the micro-level model explains the within-country variance for
each state. Therefore, as an additional exercise to evaluate the effectiveness of the microlevel mode, I generate parameter estimates for each separate country in the sample. The
results for the 33 countries are displayed in Table 4-4.
Overall, I find that the individual-level predictors perform relatively well,
especially considering the diverse sample of countries. Of course, similar to Peffley and
Rohrschneider (2003), I find that the micro-level model performs best in those regions
where previous tolerance studies have focused their attention. Yet, even in many
countries not previously studied, the micro-level model does an adequate job in
explaining individual tolerance. Furthermore, I find that the statistically significant
coefficients are in the expected direction, except for a few isolated incidents. As
suggested by Model 1, the democratic activism variable outperforms all of the other
variables in predicting individual level tolerance. The models show that the democratic
activism coefficient is positive and statistically significant in 18 of the countries
surveyed. The free speech priority and education variables also perform relatively well
across the sample.72 Perhaps most importantly, I find only three instances (out of a
possible 264) in which one of the individual-level coefficients is statistically significant,
but not in the expected direction and in all three cases the coefficient is barely
significant.73 So while there is variation in how well the micro-level model predicts
individual tolerance across the different countries in the sample, it is also not producing
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I find that 85 out of a possible 264 coefficients are statistically significant and in the
expected direction across the 33 countries in this sample. Furthermore, 20 countries (or
61%) in the sample had at least two individual-level predictors that were statistically
significant and in the expected direction.
73
I do not include the performance of the political ideology variable here as it is
relatively difficult to substantively interpret those results given the ability for individuals
to select groups from both ends of the political spectrum.
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wildly divergent results in any country. With regards to concerns over DIF, the
similarities in the results suggest that there is at least some systematic component in the
tolerance measure that can be empirically evaluated in later analyses.
[TABLE 4-4 ABOUT HERE]
Statistical Method
Although the analysis of the individual-level model has been instructive,
the purpose of the study is to assess the influence of contextual factors on political
tolerance levels. Given the fact that tolerance is an individual attitude but the
critical inferences that I want to make involve macro-levels variables, multi-level
statistical modeling is most suitable for this study. Luke (2004) states that multilevel modeling is the most appropriate when the observations in the study are not
independent and the errors are likely to be correlated. In this case, the level-one
errors (individuals) are likely to be correlated within the level-two units (states)
because those individuals are being influenced by the same state-level factors
(also see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Kreft and De
Leeuw 1998). Additionally, using traditional estimation techniques, such as
ordered logistical regression, ignores the multi-level nature of the data.
To test my hypotheses, I use Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Model
(HLM) estimation to jointly estimate two models – a micro-level model for
individual-level responses and a macro-level model for state-level factors that
takes into account the nested nature of the data.74 HLM allows me to avoid two
possible biases associated with estimation procedures that ignore the nested nature
of multi-level data. If, on the one hand, the individual-level responses were
simply aggregated to estimate a purely macro-level model, the resulting statelevel estimates may suffer from problems of ecological inference (i.e., deriving
conclusions about individual-level behavior from aggregate data). If, on the other
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HLM is not the only multi-level modeling technique available. Other options include
fixed effects models and clustering the standard errors using a traditional technique.
Although I occasionally use these techniques later in this study for various reasons, such
as generating approximate marginal effects, the bulk of the analysis is estimated with
HLM to produce the most accurate depiction of the underlying relationships. Techniques
such as clustering are not always completely accurate and can lead to false inferences
about the effects of the predictors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
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hand, the individual-level data were simply pooled across countries, again
ignoring the multi-level nature of the observations, the standard errors of the
coefficients for the state-level variables may be seriously underestimated. That is,
such a procedure would likely overestimate the effect of the state-level variables
on tolerance levels (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). HLM corrects for these
potential biases by estimating separate variance structures on each grouping of
nested data (countries, in this case) and then including these as estimates in the
macro-level model so the standard errors are unbiased. Consequently, the macrolevel model that estimates variation across countries also includes unexplained
variation in country-specific aggregation of individual-level responses
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).
Specifically, I use HLM 6.02 to estimate the hierarchical nonlinear models
in the analysis (Raudenbush et al 2004). Because the dependent variable
(political tolerance) is an ordinal measure consisting of three values, the multilevel models are estimated using ordinal logit procedures. One of the benefits of
HLM is the ability to engage in truly comparative analysis by estimating the
disparity in the effects of the individual-level variables across countries.
Therefore, in the analyses that follow, I allow for both a random intercept and a
random slope for each country. By using this specification, I make no
assumptions regarding the direction of the effects of the independent variables on
tolerance and, thus, account for the uniqueness of each country in the sample
(Kreft and Du Leeuw 1998).
Discussion
In this chapter, I discussed the overall design of this study and describe the data,
variables, and the primary statistical method used throughout the empirical analyses that
follow. I also discuss some of the main methodological concerns facing this study. I do
not, however, describe the key macro-level explanatory variables and their
operationalization, which are discussed in the following empirical chapters.
The analyses conducted in this chapter confirm previous findings concerning the
relationship between political tolerance and key individual-level explanatory variables.
While it is important to verify these linkages, the purpose of this study is to examine the
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relationship between state-level factors and political tolerance levels. In the following
empirical chapters, I test my hypotheses regarding the effects of state-level threat
environments and institutional arrangements on political tolerance levels.

Copyright © Marc Lawrence Hutchison 2007
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Table 4-1: Aggregate Citizen Tolerance by Country

Country
Azerbaijan
Macedonia
Serbia
Peru
Philippines
Spain
Switzerland
Estonia
Croatia
Ukraine
Georgia
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Venezuela
Armenia
Poland
Germany
India

Tolerance Index†
1.39%
4.31%
4.43%
4.65%
5.20%
5.68%
6.00%
6.56%
6.90%
7.03%
7.55%
8.14%
8.65%
9.31%
9.57%
9.82%
9.98%
10.02%

Country

(934)
(640)
(766)
(1110)
(726)
(1187)
(1003)
(495)
(853)
(1344)
(1575)
(464)
(666)
(498)
(1154)
(859)
(1835)
(1061)

Lithuania
Bosnia
Uruguay
Belarus
South Africa
Mexico
Nigeria
Chile
Russia
Colombia
Argentina
Brazil
Latvia
Finland
Sweden
Australia
United States
New Zealand

†

Tolerance Index†
10.25%
10.37%
10.90%
10.96%
12.32%
12.87%
13.79%
13.84%
13.90%
14.33%
14.55%
16.52%
16.80%
19.74%
20.94%
22.40%
26.01%
26.60%

(514)
(706)
(625)
(984)
(1907)
(904)
(1167)
(577)
(900)
(6025)
(749)
(628)
(626)
(649)
(938)
(1719)
(967)
(828)

This index represents the percentage of respondents that provided a tolerant response to both the
"allow to demonstrate" and "allow to hold office" questions.
Country names in bold type indicate those used in Peffley and Rohrschneider's (2003) sample
Values within () denote the survey sample size for each individual country.
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 4-2: Individual-level Models of Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries

Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Cutpoint #1
Cutpoint#2

LR-Chi

2
2

Psuedo R

Model 1

Model 2
w/Criminals

Model 3
Democracies

Model 4
Non-Democracies

n=25573

n=29420

n=16541

n=9032

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

0.23***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.34***
(0.03)
-0.21***
(0.02)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.03)
-0.004**
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.28***
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.07
(0.04)
0.40***
(0.07)
-0.22***
(0.05)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.002)
0.06*
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.14***
(0.02)
0.31***
(0.03)
-0.23***
(0.02)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.33***
(0.04)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.10***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.03)
-0.09***
(0.03)
0.33***
(0.05)
-0.12**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.06)
-0.01**
(0.002)
0.05***
(0.01)

3.98
(0.14)
5.41
(0.15)

4.21
(0.46)
5.68
(0.45)

4.22
(0.18)
5.65
(0.18)

2.76
(0.25)
4.27
(0.26)

1494.99

305.91

1227.93

239.68

0.06

0.07

0.07

0.03

The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
The standard errors are clustered by country.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 4-3: Marginal Effects of Individual Characteristics on Political Tolerance
Change in probability of an individual tolerating their least-like group for each of the following characteristics
(measured from the base probability of political tolerance):

Attitudinal variables Individual's democratic activism changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's political interest changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's democratic ideals changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's free speech priority changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's conformity changes from Mean to Maximum:

16.13%
2.10%
2.00%
7.61%
-2.91%

Socio-economic/Demographic Characteristics
Individual's gender changes from male to female:
Individual's age changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's education changes from Mean to Maximum:

Note: All probabilities are calculated using the results presented in Table 4-2, Model 1.
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-3.05%
-2.65%
4.37%

Table 4-4: Individual-level Models of Political Tolerance for Each Sample Country
Country
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Croatia
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Germany
India
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mexico
New Zealand
Nigeria
Peru
Phillipines
Russia
Serbia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela

Democratic Political
Activism
Interest
0.10
0.08

Democratic Value Free
Conformity Political ID Gender
Ideals
Speech
0.21*
-0.17
-0.09
-0.03
-0.64***

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.16)

(0.12)

(0.06)

(0.20)

Age

Education

Cutpoint #1 Cutpoint #2

N

LR-Chi2 (9)* Pseudo R2

0.002

0.25***

4.14

5.90

657

56.43

0.09

(0.01)

(0.06)

(0.87)

(0.88)
932

39.77

0.04

1655

298.13

0.13

842

24.1

0.08

829

60.59

0.07

590

75.95

0.13

538

27.83

0.04

432

28.69

0.06

468

15.36

0.04

789

33.65

0.06

461

20.88

0.05

567

40.65

0.04

1375

29.24

0.02

1725

164.48

0.12

849

68.51

0.08

548

17.95

0.02

0.14**

-0.10

0.17*

0.58***

0.01

-0.02

0.03

0.01

0.10

4.22

5.93

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.14)

(0.13)

(0.05)

(0.19)

(0.01)

(0.06)

(0.81)

(0.83)

0.18***

0.17***

0.15**

0.34***

-0.47***

-0.03

-0.50***

-0.01***

0.15***

3.65

5.22

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.03)

(0.11)

(0.004)

(0.04)

(0.49)

(0.50)

-0.58*

0.24

-0.13

-1.05

0.30

0.27***

0.08

-0.003

-0.08

2.66

5.70

(0.29)

(0.16)

(0.12)

(0.82)

(0.29)

(0.08)

(0.48)

(0.01)

(0.14)

(1.61)

(1.81)

0.26***

-0.08

0.01

0.54***

0.10

0.04

-0.35

-0.02*

0.09

2.90

4.74

(0.06)

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.17)

(0.14)

(0.06)

(0.19)

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.79)

(0.83)

0.25***

0.26**

-0.02

0.52**

0.03

0.05

0.35

-0.00

0.16**

5.63

7.98

(0.08)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.18)

(0.14)

(0.06)

(0.23)

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.94)

(1.05)

0.14*

0.09

0.04

0.04

-0.01

0.09*

-0.00

-0.01

0.14*

3.51

4.95

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.16)

(0.13)

(0.04)

(0.21)

(0.01)

(0.06)

(0.83)

(0.86)

-0.05

0.24

0.38***

0.19

-0.36

-0.07

0.04

-0.02

0.06

4.30

5.69

(0.12)

(0.14)

(0.10)

(0.24)

(0.32)

(0.08)

(0.35)

(0.01)

(0.08)
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Chapter 5
The Domestic Effects of Objective State-level Threats on Individual
Political Tolerance
Key questions:
• What effect does a country’s international threat environment have on
individuals’ decisions to extend basic civil liberties to non-conformist groups?
• What effect does violent internal conflict have on individuals’ decisions to extend
basic civil liberties to non-conformist groups?
• Does a country’s overall threat environment have a stronger effect on individual
tolerance attitudes than other state-level factors?
As discussed in Chapter Two, the literature on public opinion is concerned
primarily with the influence of individual-level characteristics on attitudes toward nonconformist groups. Despite evidence of substantial cross-national variation in tolerance
attitudes, scholars have shown scant interest in determining exactly what, if any, state
and/or international-level factors influence tolerance attitudes that may account for these
differences. Conversely, the international relations literature has paid little attention to
empirically assessing the impact of militarized conflict on individual attitudes and
behavior – despite the existence of clear theoretical linkages between the phenomena. In
Chapter Three, I drew from insights offered by both literatures to bridge this divide and
hypothesize how militarized conflict, whether originating internationally or domestically,
may negatively affect political tolerance at home.
In this chapter, I treat objective threat levels seriously in the examination of
individual attitudes. To this end, I estimate the impact of states’ external and internal
threat environments on individual political tolerance attitudes employing statistical
techniques that account for the multilevel nature of the data. In the analyses that follow, I
also control for the effects of democratic longevity, ethnic fractionalization, and
economic development, in addition to individual-level predictors. With regard to the
macro-level control variables, I am particularly interested in whether democratic
longevity has the same positive effect on tolerance levels once I account for states’ threat
environments. As I note in Chapter Four, by using multilevel estimation procedures,
such as HLM, I minimize the ecological inference problems associated with aggregate-
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level analysis as well as the false confidence in the macro-level variables associated with
pooled individual-level analysis.
Recalling the hypotheses discussed in Chapter Three, my general expectation is
that higher levels of objective threat will be associated with lower aggregate tolerance
levels. The critical contribution that I make in this study, however, is distinguishing
between the types of threat (e.g., territorial vs. non-territorial; targeted vs. non-targeted)
to identify those most likely to trigger intolerance domestically by drawing from the
public opinion, international conflict, and social psychology literatures. In doing so, I
avoid some of the problems found in other literatures, such as second image reversed
conflict theories (e.g., Gourevitch 1978; Tilly 1990), which assume all threats are
generally the same. Given these general parameters, I identify the following international
threats as highly salient, and, thus, more likely to be associated with intolerance:
militarized disputes involving territorial issues, disputes targeting the state, disputes
involving the direct use of force, and disputes involving international rivals. In terms of
internal threats, previous research tells us that insurgency and terrorism are considered
more salient and, therefore, most likely to be associated with intolerance. I expect all of
these forms of threat to have highly negative consequences domestically for mass
political tolerance levels and will differ substantively from other types of international
and internal threats. Before proceeding with the analysis, I begin with a brief overview
of how my key external threat variables are operationalized.
Measuring External Threat
To account for the impact of external threat on political tolerance across states, I
use a series of variables to indicate a state’s external threat environment. By focusing on
international sources of threat, these indicators tap into sociotropic threat (threat posed to
the larger system), which has been shown to be a powerful predictor of tolerance (Davis
and Silver 2004; Gibson 2006). To measure external threat levels, I use the following
indicators:
Militarized Interstate Disputes. This is the primary indicator of external threat in
the analysis. The Correlates of War militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) dataset defines
a MID as a situation involving the threat, show, or use of force between two states
(Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). This dataset identifies all the MIDs in the
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international system from 1816 to 2001. Since militarized interstate disputes indicate
situations that moved beyond mere posturing and verbal threats, I am reasonably
confident that these represent credible external threats to the state. For each country, I
sum the number of militarized disputes in the year prior to the survey.75 As noted in
Chapter Three, there are a number of sound theoretical reasons to believe that the effect
of these external threats at the domestic level also depends on the type of issue contested
and which state is the target. Therefore, I also use information in the MID dataset to
further specify dispute types.
Territorial Disputes. Disputes between states over territory are the most
dangerous because they have the highest probability of escalating to war (Vasquez 1993,
2001, 2004; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2003; Bremer 1992; Holsti
1991). Territorial disputes also represent an elevated external threat to a state because of
the increased risk that vital territory may be lost. Using the same one-year lag described
above, I distinguish the type of issue over which the dispute was contested.76 The MID
dataset provides up to two primary issues over which the dispute occurred for each
participant state. If one of these is territory, I treat it as a territorial dispute. From 18162001, approximately 29% (680 out of 2331 total disputes) of all militarized interstate
disputes involved territorial issues. Within my sample of countries, only 17% (8 out of
46 total disputes) of the disputes experienced prior to the survey year involved territorial
issues. Given this discrepancy, it is important to crosscheck the results using a one-year
lag against those models using the five-year measures, since the longer measure (38% of
the disputes involve territorial issues) better corresponds with the population average
during that time period (32% territorial disputes).

75

I also generate five-year counts for each different specification. I do this to check for
differences resulting from a longer lag between the threat and the diffusion to the
domestic level. These five-year counts capture a more extensive measure each state’s
threat environment as opposed to the more immediate one-year measure.
76
I also generate five-year measures for all of the external threat variables described here.
The five-year measures indicate the number of disputes in the five years preceding the
survey. These variables are also lagged to the year of the survey. Thus, for example, a
five-year measure for a country surveyed in 1995 is actually indicating the number of
disputes experienced by the country from 1989-1994.
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Non-territorial Disputes. Militarized disputes over other issues (i.e., nonterritorial disputes) also represent important external threats to the state and, thus, should
negatively impact political tolerance. Non-Territorial Disputes measures the total
number of militarized disputes a state experienced in the year prior to the survey that did
not involve a territorial issue. This variable serves two purposes in the analysis. First,
because international conflict theory contends that all militarized disputes represent a
credible external threat to the state, excluding this variable introduces omitted variable
bias into the analyses. Second, by categorizing disputes by territorial and non-territorial
issues, I can gauge relative impact of territorial and non-territorial disputes on tolerance.
I code a dispute as ‘non-territorial’ if neither the primary nor the secondary issue type
involves territory. Since 1816, approximately 71% of all militarized interstate disputes
involved non-territorial issues. Within my sample of countries, 83% of the disputes
experienced prior to the survey year and 62% of the disputes in the previous five years
conflicted over non-territorial issues.
Targeted and Non-Targeted Disputes. The social psychology literature suggests
that the inclination towards intolerance is stronger in groups targeted by outside threats.
The revisionist state indicator in the MID dataset distinguishes the initiating state from
the targeted state for each dispute. In those instances in which both states were cited as
initiators, both are coded as targets in the dispute. I use the same method of generating
the event counts as described above for both the one-year and five-year measures. States
within my sample were targeted in 30% of the total number of disputes experienced in
the year prior to the survey and 53% in the five years prior to the survey.
Force Disputes. To construct one of the prior dispute intensity measures, I
identify those disputes in which actual militarized force was employed by one of the
participants. I generate this variable using the 20-point scale in the MID dataset, which
indicates the highest level of action used during the course of the dispute. I code disputes
with a score of 14 (occupation of territory) or above (a score of 20 indicates interstate
war) as a dispute involving the use of force. I then further distinguish these disputes by
issue type and initiator versus target using the same coding criteria as described above.
Within my sample of countries, 35% of the disputes in the year prior to the survey
involved the use of militarized force.
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Rival Disputes. Because MIDs are my primary conflict indicator, I rely on
Thompson’s (2001) dataset to identify those disputes involving a country’s strategic rival
during the time of survey. I use this dataset over other well-known rivalry datasets, such
as Diehl and Goertz (2001) and Bennett (1996, 1998), to avoid bias stemming from using
dispute density as the primary selection criteria of rivalry. In those datasets, two states
are considered rivals if they engage in a minimum number of disputes over a certain
period of time. Thompson’s dataset avoids these problems by using qualitative historical
assessment to determine rivalries. He argues that disputes are only one element of the
underlying competitive relationship between rivals and looks for competitive interactions
between two states other than just militarized disputes. For the purposes of this study, I
identify rival disputes by crosschecking the dispute participants with Thompson’s dataset.
Within my sample of countries, 17% of the disputes in the year prior to the survey
involved a strategic rival.
Control Variables. In the models that follow, I also control for democratic
longevity, economic development, and ethnic fractionalization. Please refer to my
previous discussion in Chapter Four of how these macro-level control variables and
individual-level predictors were operationalized.
Empirical Models and Results: External Threat
To test the relationship between external threat environment and political
tolerance, I estimate several different models, the results of which are presented in Table
5-1. Using the HLM statistical technique, I re-estimate the effect of individual-level
predictors on a respondent’s decision to tolerate non-conformist groups, while controlling
for the multilevel nature of the data structure. The resulting parameter estimates are
similar to those previously reported in the models found in Chapter Four, which use a
more traditional MLE statistical approach for the pooled data. Including only individuallevel predictors of tolerance, I estimate the following equation in Model 1 (in mixedeffects form):
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) +
γ40(VFSINDX) + γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) +
γ90(EDUC) + δ(2) + u0 + u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) +
u4(VFSINDX) + u5(CONFORM) + u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) +
u9(EDUC)
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As expected, Model 1 reveals that conventional individual-level predictors such
as democratic activism, democratic ideals, free speech priority, and education are
strongly and positively associated with political tolerance. Conversely, conformity and
age are negatively associated with tolerance levels.77 More importantly, however, the
chi-square statistic (which provides the goodness of fit for the model to the data) reveals
that there is substantial cross-national variation that remains unexplained. In the analyses
that follow, I try to account for this unexplained variance across my sample of countries.
In Models 2 to 5, I introduce successive macro-level component to the baseline
individual-level model to estimate the effects of contextual factors, particularly external
threat, on political tolerance levels.78 I begin by adding macro-level control variables to
the model with the individual-level predictors, estimating the following equation in
Model 2:
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ10(DEMACT) +
γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) + γ40(VFSINDX) + γ50(CONFORM) +
γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) + γ90(EDUC) + u0 + u1(DEMACT) +
u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX) + u5(CONFORM) +
u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
The results shown in Model 2 reveal some curious findings. First, I find no
relationship between economic development and tolerance despite the expectation of a
positive and significant relationship. This finding challenges some of the propositions
found in the modernization and democratization literature linking modernity to
democratic values and culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997), but does
support previous studies which find many advanced states to be relatively intolerant
(Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Second, I find no evidence of
a state’s level of ethnic fractionalization affecting an individual’s propensity to tolerate
nonconformist groups.

77

Analyses controlling for Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) sample of 17 democracies
do not differ in either direction or statistical significance from the findings reported here.
I list the results of these models in Table 5-9a in the appendix.
78
I include analyses using all of the respondents, including those listing criminals as their
least-liked group in Table 5-10a in the appendix. The results for the external threat
variables in these models are substantively the same as the analyses that follow.
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The most conspicuous result in Model 2 is that I observe no statistically
significant relationship between democratic longevity and political tolerance. This is
notable given the strength of the previous research linking democratic learning to
political tolerance levels. Curious as to the source of this anomalous finding, I test
whether this relationship is sensitive to changes in specification of the democratic
longevity variable. Once I substitute Inglehart’s (1997) measure of democratic longevity
in Models 2-5 - used also in Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) study, I find only modest
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between democratic longevity and
political tolerance. As shown in Figure 5-1, the bivariate relationship reveals that the
likelihood of an individual tolerating their least-liked group increases for every year their
country has experienced democracy. However, once external threat variables are
introduced, the correlation disappears; suggesting that the macro-level relationship
between democratic longevity and political tolerance may be tied to a state’s threat
environment.79 The results of these models using Inglehart’s (1997) measure of
democratic longevity can be found in Table 5-20a in the appendix.
[FIGURE 5-1 ABOUT HERE]
One of the more important statistics generated by the HLM software is the
variance component. This statistic indicates the amount of variance left unexplained by
the estimators included in the model. Using the variance component statistic, I can
compare across analyses and assess changes in the overall goodness-of-fit of the model.
Comparing Models 1 and 2 shows that introducing the macro-level control variables
actually increase the model’s variance component indicating that the unexplained
variance also increased. In fact, the unexplained variance decreases by 3% as compared
to Model 1. This unexpected result presents somewhat of a methodological dilemma.
Although these control variables appear to impair the model statistically, I feel the
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I also conduct the analyses using either all democratic or all non-democratic samples.
Even in the sample of only democracies, neither democratic longevity coefficient is
statistically significant after controlling for external threat environment (Table 5-11a in
the appendix). Since GDP and democratic longevity are strongly correlated in my
sample, I also estimate the models without GDP. However, even excluding GDP,
democratic longevity is not statistically significant after controlling for external threat
environment.
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theoretical justifications for their inclusion are strong enough to continue including them
in subsequent models rather than risk omitted variable bias.80
The first empirical test of the general expectation (hypothesis #1) that increases in
external threat are associated with lower tolerance levels is found in Model 3. In this
model, I introduce the generalized external threat variable, militarized dispute, to the
baseline macro-micro model.
The parameter estimates generated in this initial model raise some doubts about
the validity of my overall argument: they reveal no evidence of a relationship between
generalized militarized interstate disputes and political tolerance levels. Normally, such a
result would be a cause for alarm, but as discussed in Chapter Three, one of the problems
facing empirical studies of second image reversed conflict theories is the tendency to
treat all external threats equally and not distinguish between salient and non-salient
threats.
[TABLE 5-1 ABOUT HERE]
In Models 4 and 5, I incorporate this lesson from the previous literature by
including only those threats previously identified as salient and assessing their effect
domestically. Thus, in these models, I introduce measures of the type and target of the
external threat (i.e., targeted territorial disputes, non-targeted territorial disputes, nontargeted territorial disputes, and non-targeted non-territorial disputes
By identifying and focusing on salient external threats, a clear pattern begins to
emerge.81 In Model 4, I report a strong, negative relationship between disputes involving
80

In Models 42a-44a, I re-estimate Models 3-5 excluding the macro-level control
variables. The results are presented in Table 5-13a in the appendix. Despite the removal
of these variables, my parameter estimates are similar across all of the models with only a
marginal improvement in the unexplained variance (2.28 in Model 3 vs. 2.14 in Model
42a) of those models looking at overall MIDs. However, in those models looking at
differences between territorial/non-territorial and target/initiator disputes, excluding the
macro-level control variables actually decreases the unexplained variance (1.81 in Model
4 vs. 2.11 in Model 43a; 1.73 in Model 5 vs. 2.06 in Model 44a). This discrepancy lends
credence to my contention that excluding these macro-level control variables creates
problems related to omitted variable bias.
81
To ensure that these results are not sensitive to changes in specification of the external
threat variables, I re-estimate all of the models using dispute counts from the five years
prior to the survey. As with the original specification, I lag these counts to the year of the
survey. The five-year event counts provide an extended perspective of the threat
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territorial issues and political tolerance (b = -0.78, p < .001), but find that non-territorial
disputes has no effect.82 Figure 5-2 shows that the number of territorial disputes a state
experiences decreases the likelihood that an individual would extend basic civil liberties
toward their least-liked group. The concave regression line suggests that the impact of
territorial disputes is not necessarily cumulative; rather the first dispute has the strongest
negative effect, while the influence of subsequent disputes on tolerance levels decreases
precipitously. This implies that only the first territorial dispute is the critical trigger
leading toward lower tolerance levels. Thus, the key feature of this relationship is the
experience of at least one territorial dispute, but not necessarily the total number of
territorial disputes.

environment facing the public prior to the survey. The longer temporal period also
allows me to account for disputes that take more time to develop, but still have profound
influence on public attitudes. Using this alternate specification, I find no substantive
difference in the effects of the external threat variables on political tolerance levels. The
results are presented in Table 5-14a in the appendix. Just as in Models 3-5, I find that
territorial and targeted disputes have strong, negative effects on tolerance. These results
lend added confidence in the robustness of the results presented here.
82
The macro-level results reported in these multi-level analyses are relatively robust. I
estimate separate models for individual-level responses and the aggregated macro-level
data to check the robustness of the results presented here. Those models support the
findings reported here as I find roughly similar results in terms of both statistical
significance and direction of the relationships. Given that neither OLS nor ordinal logit
corrects the possible aggregation biases resulting from the multi-level nature of the data, I
include these models for comparison purposes only. For the macro-level models, I
change the specification of the dependent variable by aggregating the tolerance responses
by state. Using ordinary least squares regression, I find strong, negative relationships
between both territorial and targeted territorial disputes and political tolerance (Models
50a & 51a). Furthermore, the macro-level OLS estimates, found in Table 5-15a of the
appendix, also reveal democratic longevity to have a positive and statistically significant
relationship with political tolerance until I control for states’ external threat environment.
In addition, as shown in Table 5-16a of the appendix, these results also hold even after I
substitute the one-year event counts with the five-year external threat variables. This
pattern is not just limited to only the multi-level and macro-level analyses. Using ordered
logit estimation where the standard errors are clustered by country, I examine the
relationship between external threat environment and political tolerance using only an
individual-level data structure in Models 55a-58a (Table 5-17a in the appendix). I find
the same patterns as above – territorial and targeted territorial disputes are correlated with
lower tolerance levels. In observing the same pattern repeated in each test, I am
confident that the relationship between objective external threat levels and political
tolerance is strong and robust.
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[FIGURE 5-2 ABOUT HERE]
These results clearly lend empirical support for hypothesis 2, which states that
disputes over territorial issues are more likely to be associated with intolerance.83 This
finding has important implications for the international conflict literature. Recall that the
argument that disputes over territory are domestically salient (see Vasquez 1993, 2001,
2004; Huth 1996) has only, to date, found support anecdotally or through inference of
issue salience from patterns of conflict.84 I demonstrate a clear, negative consequence of
territorial issues at the domestic level: as external threat over territorial issues increases,
the public becomes increasingly intolerant of non-conformist or unpopular groups.
Model 4 also clearly shows that territorial and non-territorial disputes are qualitatively
different in their substantive impact on political tolerance levels, supporting the claim
made by Vasquez and others that territorial disputes are more salient than non-territorial
disputes. Additionally, these results are consistent with the scenario that the increase in
intolerance is a product of elite-led strategies to mobilize the mass public to stave off
threats to the territorial integrity of the state. Finally, these results are consistent with the
expectation in the social psychology literature of increased conformity in the face of
salient external threats.
Judging from the decrease in the variance component statistic over the previous
models, Model 4 is better at accounting for the unexplained cross-national variance. In
fact, Model 4 represents a 23% improvement in explained variance over the baseline
micro-macro model (Model 2) and a 21% over Model 3. Clearly, further specifying the
external threat variable not only confirms the relationship between particular types of
threat and tolerance, but also increases the explanatory power of my model. One
83

The sharp difference between the effect of territorial and non-territorial disputes may
explain why the generalized dispute variable is not significant in Model 3. Because the
generalized threat variable does not distinguish by issue type, it is capturing both a strong
negative effect from territorial disputes and the null effect associated with non-territorial
disputes.
84
To ensure that my results are not the product of authoritarian governments’ higher
propensity to engage in disputes over territory, I conduct separate analyses using only
democracies and non-democracies. Despite the difference in samples, however, I
continue to find the same substantive effects in both samples. These models, found in
Tables 5-11a & 5-12a in the appendix, show that territorial disputes negatively affect
political tolerance regardless of regime type.
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conclusion that I draw from this improvement in the amount of unexplained variance is
that distinguishing disputes by issue type provides a more complete understanding of the
underlying relationship between a state’s external threat environment and political
tolerance.
It is also worth noting that the ‘least-liked’ measure only asks respondents to
exercise a tolerance judgment toward a general list of unpopular or nonconformist
groups. As a result, I do not have a direct measure of tolerance for groups at the source
of the external threat to each country. This lack of a direct measure should, however,
bias my results against finding a relationship between external threat and political
tolerance. Given these circumstances, the fact that I still observe a relationship between
territorial threat and tolerance of these groups actually strengthens my confidence in the
results I find here.85
In Model 5, I once again alter the specification of the external threat variable and
compare the difference between countries that are targets of militarized disputes and
those that are not. Recall that hypothesis 3 proposes that citizens in states targeted by
disputes are more likely to exhibit intolerance than citizens in other states. The essential
component in this analysis is the number of times each state was targeted by either
territorial or non-territorial disputes. Accounting for both the issue type and the target
versus initiator of the dispute, I find strong support for hypothesis 3: citizens in states
targeted in disputes are much less tolerance than those who are not. The relevant
coefficients shows a strong, negative impact for both targeted territorial disputes (b = 0.78, p < .001) and targeted non-territorial disputes (b = -0.78, p < .001). Figure 5-3
illustrates that the probability of an individual fully tolerating her least-liked group
decreases as the number of disputes in which her state is targeted increases.86 This
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It is also worth noting that aside from a few minor differences, the parameter estimates
generated in models using the non-imputed sample are almost the same in both
coefficient strength and direction as the results shown here. I report these findings in
Table 5-18a in the appendix.
86
To get some idea as to the substantive impact of these results, I provide a rough
approximation of the marginal effects of external threat levels on political tolerance.
Since the HLM software does not generate predicted probabilities from the multi-level
analyses, I use data generated from the ordered logit results found in Table 5-17a of the
appendix. Holding all of the other variables at their mean, I track how on changes in key
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association between targeted external threat and political intolerance suggests that
domestic publics in states targeted in militarized conflict feel more threatened than other
states – as implied in the research linking sociotropic threat to intolerance (Gibson and
Gouws 2003; Davis and Silver 2004) – and this threat manifests itself in individual
attitudes and behavior. These findings are also consistent with Simmel’s (1955) and
Coser’s (1956) expectation that groups resort to intolerance of non-conformists,
particularly under threat from ‘outsiders’.
[FIGURE 5-3 ABOUT HERE]
The results of Model 5 present a number of empirical puzzles. First, as evidenced
by the fact that territorial disputes initiated by the state are not associated with lower
tolerance levels, the findings indicate that the impact of territorial disputes on public
attitudes is not universal after accounting for the target versus the initiator.87 This
discrepancy challenges the notion that militarized disputes over territorial issues is the
only factor influencing the salience of a conflict at the domestic level. The absence of a
statistically significant effect between initiated territorial disputes and political tolerance
suggests that the underlying relationship between territorial conflict and political
macro-level threat variables affect the base probability of individual political tolerance.
These marginal effects are reported in Table 5-19a of the appendix. Obviously, these are
only rough approximations given that I cannot fully account for the multi-level nature of
the data in these analyses. However, I remain cautiously optimistic in these results given
the similarity in the parameter estimates between the multi-level and individual-level
models. As Table 5-19a shows, changes in the number of territorial disputes (minimum
to maximum) that a country experiences decreases the likelihood of an individual
tolerating their least-liked group by 7.55%. Individuals are also less likely to tolerate
when their country experiences an increase in the number of targeted territorial disputes
(by 8.57%), targeted force-level disputes (by 6.74%), territorial force-level disputes (by
8.15%), and targeted territorial force-level disputes (by 8.59%). Taken together, the
results indicate that increases in external threat have a large, substantive dampening
effect on individual tolerance levels. Furthermore, when compared to the marginal
effects of the individual-level predictors (Table 4-3), these results indicate that the
substantive effect of external threat on tolerance is as powerful as the strongest
individual-level predictors.
87
This relationship, however, appears sensitive to alternate specifications of the external
threat variables. When I re-estimate Model 5 using the five-year external threat
measures, none of the coefficients are statistically significant except for targeted
territorial disputes. These results can be found in Table 5-14a in the appendix. Taken
together, these results point to the combination of territorial issues and being the target of
those disputes as the most salient type external threat as it relates to political tolerance.
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behavior is driven, in part, by whether a state initiates or is targeted in the dispute. While
this does not repudiate the contention derived from Vasquez (1993) and Huth (1996) that
territorial conflict has a deleterious impact at the domestic level, it does suggest that the
relationship is more nuanced than described here. Salient external threats, at least as
related to political tolerance, is dependent on a number of factors including issue type and
whether the state is the target or the initiator. Indeed, Vasquez (1993) insinuates that the
domestic reaction – from both elites and the public – may be more pronounced if the state
is the target of such hostilities.
Second, the results of Model 5 show that states initiating non-territorial conflict
are associated with higher tolerance levels. This finding is inconsistent with the general
expectation of hypothesis 1 regarding the relationship between external threat
environment and political tolerance. Exploring the underlying dynamic of this
relationship further, I re-estimate the model, this time controlling for state capability
using a measure derived from the Correlates of War Composite Index of National
Capability or CINC dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). I included this indicator
for several reasons. First, the more powerful states in the international system tend to be
more tolerant, advanced democracies (see Reiter and Stam 2002). Secondly, more
powerful states, such as the United States, tend to initiate more disputes in their role as a
major power in the international system (Bueno de Mesquita 2006).88 After controlling
for state capability, only the coefficient for targeted territorial disputes remains
statistically significant in the model. Taken together with the fact that this relationship
appears sensitive to alternate variable specification (see footnote 7), I believe this
anomaly may be a statistical artifact rather than a direct challenge to hypothesis 1.
In terms of model specification, comparing the variance component statistic of
Model 5 to the previous models indicates that describing both the underlying issue and
initiator versus target of an external threat does the best job of accounting for unexplained
cross-national variance. Not only is Model 5 most consistent with my theory, but a
88

For instance, during the early 1990’s, the United States initiated a number of disputes
over policy issues with Iraq and in the Balkans. These disputes stemmed, in large part,
from their role as the most powerful state in the international system. Other states,
particularly members of large alliance structures like NATO, are coded as dispute
initiators because of the actions of their alliance partners.
95

comparison of the variance components reveals that the explanatory power of Model 5
provides significant improvement over the other models. All in all, Model 5 appears to
be the most appropriate model in accounting for the relationship between external threat
environment and political tolerance.
While Models 3 to 5 examine one aspect of a state’s external threat environment,
recall that the international conflict literature identifies other types of threat as salient,
especially to the state. To test hypothesis 4, which states that disputes involving force
should be associated with lower tolerance levels, I re-estimate the models to include only
those external threats in which military force was employed – not just threatened or
displayed. Using the same features to distinguish disputes (i.e. territorial vs. nonterritorial; initiator vs. target), the results of Models 6 through 9 (displayed in Table 5-2)
reveal a very similar pattern of relationships to those generated from Models 3 through 5.
In Model 6, I once again find no relationship between the generalized dispute variable
and tolerance. I only uncover evidence of strong associations between threat levels and
political tolerance after separating out the different types of disputes. In Model 7, I find a
strong, negative relationship between force-level disputes involving territorial issues and
political tolerance (b = -0.72, p < .001) and no statistically significant correlation with
non-territorial disputes. Furthermore, the more states are targeted in force-level disputes,
the less tolerant their respective domestic publics are toward non-conformist groups (b =
-0.79, p < .001), as shown in Model 8. Both of these patterns are further evidenced in
Model 9, where I once again observe that targeted territorial disputes are negatively
associated (b = -0.79, p < .001) with political tolerance.89
[TABLE 5-2 ABOUT HERE]
Taken together, the results present modest support for hypothesis 4 in that forcelevel disputes have a negative influence on tolerance levels. However, I can hardly claim
that these results fully support hypothesis 4. For instance, Model 6 shows that the use of
force in disputes does not necessarily equate to a salient threat, as evidenced by the
89

Unlike the pattern found in Models 3-5, I find that the model differentiating force-level
disputes by issue type (Model 7) is the best explanation of political tolerance in my
sample of countries. The variance component statistic reveals that Model 7 decreases the
unexplained variance in tolerance levels across countries by 14% as compared to Model
6.
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absence of a statistically significant relationship. That is, force-level disputes, as an
entire subset of disputes, are not sufficient to lower political tolerance levels alone.
Recall that only after I distinguish the disputes based on issue type and the target do
statistically significant relationships begin to emerge (i.e. territorial and targeted forcelevel disputes are associated with lower tolerance levels, while non-territorial and
initiated force-level disputes are not).
Table 5-3 displays the results for the final assessment of the general relationship
between states’ external threat environment and political tolerance levels. In Models 10
to 12, I assess the validity of hypothesis 5, which asserts that disputes with rival states are
more likely to be considered salient threats and, therefore, are more likely to be
associated with lower tolerance levels. Although the previous international conflict
literature suggests that rivalry disputes create negative consequences domestically, the
parameter estimates clearly repudiate the hypothesis that one of these negative
consequences involves attitudes toward civil liberties. Furthermore, as shown in the
results for Models 11 and 12, even differentiating the disputes by issue and target/initiator
fails to uncover any statistically significant relationship between rival disputes and
political tolerance. Given these results, I am forced to reject hypothesis 5 and conclude
that rival disputes have little or effect on tolerance levels across the countries in my
sample.
[TABLE 5-3 ABOUT HERE]
One final puzzle I hope to shed light on is whether certain groups of individuals
are gravitating toward elite positions and driving public attitudes on tolerance. Based on
Zaller’s (1992) argument that diffusion of elite opinion is a primary influence on public
attitudes, I contend in hypothesis 6 that in states experiencing higher levels of external
threat, politically aware citizens are more likely to pick up on elite cues. Consequently,
these citizens, understanding the gravity of the threat facing the state, are less likely to
tolerate non-conformist groups. This expectation is counterintuitive in light of the
previous tolerance literature, which predicts that more politically involved citizens are
both more educated and politically interested and, hence, more tolerant. However, if
elites and elite cues are one of the mechanisms through which the public is mobilized to
face salient external threats, then we should observe some evidence suggestive of a
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mainstream model of opinion formation, where awareness of elite consensus on security
issues should be associated with higher levels of intolerance.
I divide my sample between individuals of high political awareness and lower
political awareness.90 I rely on both education level and political interest to indicate the
level of political awareness. Admittedly, this measure is somewhat crude, but I believe it
is sufficient to provide me with a general idea of whether political awareness affects the
relationship between external threat and political tolerance. If, for instance, external
threat has a strong, negative relationship with political tolerance among more politically
aware individuals but not among those with lower levels of awareness, then it is
suggestive of a mainstreaming effect. If, however, there are no differences between the
groups, then it would indicate that, in instances of high external threat, individuals react
to elite cues regardless of their political awareness.
As shown in Table 5-4, the evidence supporting this contention suggests that the
impact of external threat levels on political tolerance differs slightly across levels of
individual political awareness. Comparing the results of Models 13 and 14, reveals that
while external threat levels are associated with lower tolerance among more politically
aware individuals (b = -0.45, p < .01), the same relationship is not evident among less
politically aware individuals. At first glance, these results appear to confirm hypothesis
5, but a closer examination of the parameter estimates reveal that the coefficient for
territorial disputes in Model 14 (low political awareness) only barely falls short of
statistical significance. Furthermore, the parameter estimates show that the underlying
relationships and the strength of the coefficients are nearly identical across samples.
Given that this is a relatively crude and indirect test of the mainstreaming effect,
caution is in order when interpreting these parameter estimates. While it would appear
that more politically aware individuals are helping to drive this relationship, their effect is
90

The sample is divided into two sub-sets: high political awareness and low political
awareness. Individuals considered highly politically aware are those with at least some
post-secondary education (7 or above on the education scale) and score 5 or above on the
political interest index. I use the political interest benchmark to ensure that the individual
scored the highest on at least one indicator of political interest. Using these criteria, the
high awareness sample includes 5,681 individuals and the low awareness sample includes
19,872 individuals. The proportion between high and low political awareness is
relatively homogenous across all of the countries in the sample.
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minimal at best. Therefore, it may be more prudent to claim that the results are
suggestive, but ultimately inconclusive about whether a mainstreaming effect is observed
in the context of external threat levels and political tolerance. Future research on this
issue is clearly appropriate in this case.
[TABLE 5-4 ABOUT HERE]
Taken together, these models depict a strong and relatively robust relationship
between objective external threat levels and political tolerance. As expected, higher
levels of external threat are correlated with lower political tolerance levels in all of the
models that include specifications to indicate salient threats. This supports the contention
that salient objective threats have an overall dampening effect on political tolerance
levels. However, these models examine only threat from external sources. Overall threat
environments are also shaped by dangers that originate from within the state. Therefore,
I now turn my attention to examining the effects of internal threats on individuals’
propensity to extend civil liberties to nonconformist groups.
Measuring Internal Threat
As discussed in Chapter Three, salient threats are not limited to external sources
alone. Threats originating from within the state often present a significant danger to a
state and its domestic population. In many cases, internals threats represent a more
serious risk to state survival than threats from other states. As Thyne (2006) and others
have noted, the number of civil wars and other serious internal conflicts have increased
over time resulting in the deaths of over 16 million people from 1945 to 1999 (see also
Singer and Small 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Besides the sheer human cost, internal
conflicts often destabilize the state and its population by disrupting economic transactions
and governance (Thyne 2006). In addition to these negative consequences, the social
costs of serious internal conflicts are considerable – as domestic populations, in many
cases, become more divisive and group hostility increases. Needless to say, it is not a
stretch to conclude that internal conflicts epitomize a salient, objective threat to both the
state and its domestic population.
Although different in some very important ways, internal and external conflicts
share a strong sociotropic element. That is, both are perceived to represent a strong threat
to the existing social order. Although internal conflicts oftentimes represent more of an
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egocentric threat to the individual than international threats, they represent a far greater
sociotropic threat given the danger these conflicts pose to the larger social structure
within the state.91 Given this similarity, it is not surprising that some scholars have begun
to look at how internal threats negatively influence individual tolerance attitudes (see
Sniderman et al. 2000, 2004; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).
Because the study of the relationship between internal threat and political
tolerance is still in a nascent stage of development, I am able to improve on previous
efforts in a number of ways. First, through the use of a cross-national design, it is
possible to determine whether this relationship is generalizable across multiple contexts.
Second, by incorporating insights from the international conflict literature, I develop a
more fine-grained measure of internal threat than prior studies. For instance, in Shamir
and Sagiv-Schifter’s (2006) analysis of the impact of internal conflict on Israeli tolerance,
they use only a dummy variable to indicate the level of objective threat facing the
domestic population. As described below, by focusing on incidents of insurgency and
terrorism, I provide a more nuanced assessment of a state’s recent internal threat
environment.
To account for the effect of internal threat on political tolerance across states, I
rely on a series of indicators of a state’s recent internal threat environment. In Chapter
Three, I argued that certain types of internal threat, such as insurgency, are distinct in
their ability to influence individual tolerance attitudes because of the use of violence.
Ideally, I would employ a direct measure of insurgency for each country in my sample,
assessing both the number and the strength of the insurgencies operating in a country for
each given year. Unfortunately, no such data yet exist – at least for the time period of the
survey. Furthermore, such data would be subject to high degree of measurement error
due to the inherent difficulty of accurately distinguishing between insurgent groups and
determining their ‘strength.’ Given these problems, I have decided to rely on three proxy
indicators that measure the ‘danger’ posed by internal threats to the state: civil war,
rebellion, and terrorist attacks. As violent manifestations of unrest within the state, these
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Since the end of World War II, an individual is much more likely to die in an internal
conflict than in an interstate conflict (see Fearon and Laitin 2003).
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indicators are linked to insurgency. The measures indicate both the presence of violent
internal groups - a direct, salient threat to both the state and its domestic population.
Civil War. To measure civil war, I rely on the Correlates of War Intra-state War
dataset, which details internal wars from 1816-1997 (Sarkees 2000). In this dataset, a
civil war is defined as involving at least one non-state group fighting against a state in a
militarized conflict involving at least 1,000 battle deaths.92 To ensure that I capture some
variation in this measure given the relative infrequency of this type of conflict and the
fact that the 1995-1997 WVS only covers a small temporal period, I indicate whether a
civil war occurred within five years prior to the survey for each country. Using this
measure, 8 of the 33 sample countries (24%) experienced a civil war in the five years
prior to the survey.
Rebellion. To measure lower intensity conflicts and violence, I use the rebellion
scale found in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. The rebellion scale indicates
incidents that are intended to destabilize the government in some fashion. As Regan and
Norton (2005: 328) note, “actions on the rebellion scale will be seen as a greater threat to
the regime . . . because the risk to the state is much higher when rebels use violence to
attempt to destabilize or overthrow the state.” I use the MARGene (Bennett and
Davenport 2003) program to create the country-year data on rebellion. This program
generates data on the maximum level of rebellion experienced by a country in every year.
I code a country as having experienced an incident of rebellion if the maximum level of
rebellion in a country is greater than 0. This dichotomous variable is also lagged to the
year of the survey. Within my sample of countries, 12 of the 33 countries experienced at
least one incident of rebellion in the year prior to the survey. Of those 12 countries, at
least six were considered high intensity rebellion.
Terrorist Attacks. The third indicator I use to measure violent internal threat to
the state is terrorism. To measure terrorism, I rely on the ITERATE international
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The number of battle-deaths is calculated based on the number of military personnel
killed as a direct result of militarized combat between the belligerent parties from the
start of the conflict until the end of combat. The start and end dates are often ambiguous
and are determined at the discretion of the data collectors. In the cases of ongoing
conflicts, the number of battle-deaths is the cumulative number of deaths up to 1997 in
the case of this database (Sarkees 2000).
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terrorism dataset, which codes terrorist activities from 1968 to 2002 (Mickolus et al.
2003). In this database, terrorism is defined as “the use, or threat of use, of anxietyinducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group,
whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such
action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the
immediate victims” (Mickolus et al. 2003: 2). To better measure the level of objective
threat, I include only those incidents that involve the actual use of violence and exclude
those incidents in which no violence occurred.93 In my sample, this variable ranges from
0 to 8 terrorist incidents with 50% of the countries (18 out of 36) experiencing at least
one violent terrorist event in the year prior to the survey.94
Control Variables. As with the external threat models, I also control for
democratic longevity, economic development, and ethnic fractionalization. Please refer
to my previous discussion of the operationalization of these macro-level control variables
as well as the micro-level variables in Chapter Four.
Empirical Models and Results: Internal Threat
Theoretically, the influence of internal threat on political tolerance levels is
analogous to the effect of external threat. It would follow then that, methodologically,
the estimation of this relationship should also be similar. That is, the HLM estimation
techniques that were appropriate in assessing the effect of external threat on political
93

To measure violent terrorist incidents, I rely on the ‘type of incident’ coding in the
ITERATE dataset. The ITERATE codebook notes that every “incident is given one
unique event type code. In situations in which an event had characteristics of two event
types, the event is categorized as the type of incident which occurred first” (Mickolus et
al. 2003: 16). The event types that I consider as indicating violence are: kidnapping,
barricade and hostage seizure, occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, letter or
parcel bombing, incendiary bombing or arson, explosive bombing, armed attack
employing missiles, armed attack--other, including mortars, bazookas, aerial hijacking,
takeover of non-aerial means of transportation, assassination or murder, nuclear-related
weapons attack, sniping at buildings or other facilities, shoot-out with law enforcement,
car bombing, suicide car bombing, and suicide bombing. I excluded the following
incident types: sabotage not involving explosives or arson, exotic pollution, including
chemical and biological agents, threat with no subsequent terrorist action, theft, break-in
of facilities, conspiracy to commit terrorist action, hoax (e.g., claiming a nonexistent
bomb), other actions, and arms smuggling.
94
A pairwise correlation analysis reveals no significant correlation (-1.52) between
violent incidents and the occurrence of a civil war in this sample.
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tolerance should be suitable to gauge the relationship between internal threat and
tolerance. Unfortunately, however, as noted in Chapter 3, one of the key differences
between internal and external conflicts – the origin of the threat – adds another layer of
complexity to these analyses due to the likelihood of reciprocal causation between
internal threats and political tolerance. To recap the discussion in Chapter 3, a central
hypothesis is that states experiencing high levels of violent internal threat should be less
tolerant than other states. Although I contend that internal violence largely fosters
intolerance, there is an easy case to be made that the causal logic is backwards. That is,
the reverse causality scenario is that intolerant societies may be more likely to experience
high levels of internal violence and civil war. Therefore, if the reverse causality
proposition is true, then a significant correlation between internal threat levels and
political tolerance would stem from existing political intolerance creating conditions by
which internal conflicts are more likely.95 Thus, to support my contention that internal
threats beget intolerance, it is imperative to purge this endogenous component from the
internal threat measures, particularly civil war.
A common problem in social science research, endogeneity often produces
misleading results in analyses where analysts fail to correct for the problem. In the
present case, it is likely that any estimate of internal threat on political tolerance will be
biased. The two optimal solutions to deal with this problem - time-series analysis and/or
experimental designs - are unavailable because of a lack of appropriate (i.e. panel) crossnational data.
Given these restrictions, I rely on an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Specifically, I estimate the impact of internal threat on political tolerance using the twostage-least-square method with instrumental variables (IV-2SLS). Statistically, the IV-
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Despite the possibility that the internal threat-political tolerance relationship contains a
large endogenous component, previous research suggests that the causal arrow points in
the hypothesized direction. For instance, in their examination of Israeli tolerance over
time, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006) clearly demonstrate that an increase in internal
threat levels was followed by a decrease in tolerance, particularly toward those of Arab
descent. Although their study only covers one country and uses a relatively crude
indicator of objective threat, the pattern in the relationship is demonstrably clear. I fully
expect to find support for this hypothesis at the cross-national level once I purge the
endogenous component from the internal threat variables.
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2SLS approach can address the problem of reverse causality by purging the endogenous
component from the suspect regressors, which in this case are the internal threat
variables. If successful, this statistical technique yields unbiased estimators, resulting in a
more accurate assessment of the relationships being examined.
Of course, this task is relatively difficult, as the IV-2SLS method entails
demanding specification requirements. Most importantly, the technique requires one to
identify a valid instrument for the internal threat variables that is correlated with the
endogenous regressor (internal conflict), but is otherwise uncorrelated with the dependent
variable, political tolerance, except through its effect on internal conflict. By identifying
these instruments, it becomes possible to estimate the model without bias.
To identify instruments for my internal threat indicators, I turn to the literature on
internal conflict, particularly research on civil war. In their influential study of the causes
of civil war and other violent internal conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find a strong
correlation between rugged terrain and the likelihood of violent internal conflict. Using a
country’s percentage of mountainous terrain as a proxy for rugged terrain, they find that
the more mountainous a country, the more likely it experienced violent internal conflict.
The reason for this association is that rugged terrain allows the root cause of civil conflict
– insurgency – to thrive because the ability of the government to deal with these groups is
severely limited. Mountainous terrain significantly curtails maneuverability of organized
armed forces as well as offering numerous places to elude government pursuit.
Afghanistan is a prime example of a country in which rugged terrain has allowed
insurgent and terrorist groups to survive despite such groups being targeted in a number
of concerted campaigns aimed at their destruction, including those directed by foreign
governments (Soviet Union and the United States). To indicate rugged terrain, I use the
natural logarithm of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) measure of rugged terrain, which is
simply a country’s percentage of mountainous terrain.96
As a geographic variable, rugged terrain is truly exogenous, which makes for an
ideal instrument as it is impossible to conceive of any scenario in which a country’s
tolerance level affects the amount of rugged terrain. Thus, there is no chance for reverse
96

In the following tests, models using actual percent mountainous provide substantively
similar results in both direction and significance of the coefficients.
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causation. Furthermore, partial correlation analyses reveal no statistically significant
relationship between rugged terrain and political tolerance levels in sample countries
while controlling for internal conflict measures; thereby, assuring me that its only
correlation with tolerance is through its influence on the endogenous regressor (internal
conflict).97
Regrettably, reliance on the instrumental variables approach prevents me from
accounting for the multi-level nature of the data, since HLM does not have the capability
of conducting such tests. As a result, I am forced to make a number of compromises, the
first of which is that by using OLS, political tolerance, the dependent measure in the
analysis, is treated as a continuous instead of an ordinal measure. Second, the OLS
regression model lacks the ability to take into account the multi-level, or “nested”, nature
of the data, of a multi-level model, which separates individual-level and state-level data.
As Luke (2004: 7) notes, use of OLS regression analysis under these conditions is
problematic, for a couple of reasons: the first problem is that “individuals belonging to
the same context will presumably have correlated errors, which violates one of the basic
assumptions of multiple regression. The second problem is that by ignoring context, the
model assumes that the regression coefficients apply equally to contexts.” One way to
partially account for the multi-level nature of the combined data set is to cluster the
standard errors of the estimators by country. Although this estimation technique does not
account for the multilevel nature of the data as well as HLM, it does avoid creating false
confidence in my state-level indicators. Therefore, in this case, I feel the benefit of the
instrumental variable approach is worth the tradeoff. Furthermore, in the analyses that
follow I do estimate this relationship using HLM to compare results from both
techniques.
As the name implies, IV-2SLS is a two-stage model. In the first stage, the model
conducts a separate regression of the endogenous variable (either civil war or rebellion)
to examine the validity of rugged terrain as an instrument. If significantly correlated with
the primary internal threat variable in model, then the instrument is appropriate for the
analysis. The first-stage regressions will generate instrumental variables used to
97

I also find no statistically significant relationship between rugged terrain and aggregate
political tolerance levels using macro-level bivariate correlation analysis.
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substitute for civil war in the second-stage regressions in which the dependent variable
will be political tolerance. I report the first stage results in Table 5-5. The critical
statistic in determining the statistical validity of the instrument is the F-score, which
indicates whether the instrument is significantly correlated with civil war after controlling
for included exogenous variables. If the instrument is strongly correlated with the
endogenous regressor, the F-statistic will be statistically significant. An F-score of 10 or
above indicates a strong instrumental variable. In Model 15, the F-statistic (1, 32) is
14.46, which is significant at the 0.001 level and well above threshold for a strong
instrument. Furthermore, as expected, the coefficient is positive, indicating that rugged
terrain remains an excellent predictor of internal conflict in my sample of countries. The
impact of the instrument also holds after including the second internal threat variable,
terrorist attacks, in the regression, which I report as Model 15b in the table.98 As before,
the F-statistic remains well above threshold at 13.07 after the inclusion of terrorist attacks
and is also significant at the 0.001 level. In Model 16, I instrument for the rebellion
variable. As with civil war, the instrument is an excellent predictor of rebellion with an
F-statistic of 16.07. Taken together, the strength of the F-score in these analyses, the fact
that the effect of rugged terrain on the endogenous regressors is in the expected direction,
and the inherent exogenous quality of the instrument as a geographic variable, I feel
reasonably confident in my instrument for these analyses.
[TABLE 5-5 ABOUT HERE – 1ST STAGE]
Table 5-6 presents the results of the second stage of the IV estimation, which is
based on the first stage regression. In the second stage, the endogenous component has
been purged from my main variables of interest. Thus, the second stage models estimate
the independent effects of internal conflict on individual tolerance attitudes. As expected,
the impact of internal conflict on individual tolerance attitudes is negative, indicating that
98

Although rugged terrain is an excellent instrument for civil war and armed rebellion,
further analyses reveal no relationship with terrorist incidents. In fact, using rugged
terrain to instrument for terrorist incidents generates an F-statistic that is well below
threshold. Although I include terrorist attacks in some of the subsequent models, I am
only able to purge the endogenous component from the civil war and armed rebellion
variables. Future research on this subject will require a much better instrument variable
for incidents of terrorism to properly examine the relationship between terrorism and
political tolerance.
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high levels of internal threats in a state are associated with lower overall tolerance.
Model 17, I include only civil war. As expected in hypotheses #7 & 8, I find civil war to
have a strong, negative correlation (b = -0.15, p < .05) with political tolerance. As in the
external threat models, the coefficients for the macro-level control variables do not
achieve statistical significance. Given my previous findings with regard to certain types
of external threat, the discovery that violent internal threats have a similar negative
influence on mass tolerance levels is not surprising.99 In short, Model 17 confirms my
general expectation that internal threats tied to insurgency have a negative, independent
effect on tolerance levels; a relationship confirmed across the 33 countries in my sample.
[TABLE 5-6 ABOUT HERE – 2ND STAGE]
In Model 17b, I include the terrorist incidents variable to the model to examine
the degree to which a more immediate internal threat affects mass tolerance across
countries. As indicated by the second column of coefficients in Table 5-6, terrorist
attacks also have a strong, negative impact (b = -0.02, p < .01) on individual tolerance,
providing further confirmation of hypothesis 7. The results indicate that as the number of
terrorist attacks increase, individual tolerance decreases. Furthermore, it is worth noting
that this effect is independent of any influence a civil war may have on overall tolerance
levels, which also retains a strong, negative influence (b = -0.20, p < .05) on these
attitudes.
Consistent with these analyses, I also demonstrate that armed rebellion is
negatively correlated (b = -0.14, p < .10) with political tolerance in Model 18. Since this
variable also measures internal violence within the state in the year prior to the survey,
the model assesses the influence immediate threats have on individual tolerance attitudes.
The model indicates that individuals in states that recently experienced violent rebel
99

Using predicted probabilities generated from these models, I can approximate the
substantive effect of civil war on individual tolerance. As Table 5-19a shows, individuals
in countries that experienced a civil war in the five years prior to the study are 4.67% less
likely to tolerate their least-liked group. Evaluating the effect of terrorism on tolerance
reveals that an increase in the number of terrorist attacks (mean to maximum) a country
experiences in the year prior to the survey decreases the likelihood that an individual will
tolerate their least-liked group by 4.22%, while an incident of violent armed rebellion in
the year prior to the survey decreases individual tolerance by 3.32%. Although generally
weaker than the effect of external threat, internal threats still have a significant
substantive influence on tolerance levels.
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activity are less likely to tolerate nonconformist groups. Overall, these findings bolster
my confidence that certain types of internal threats – in this case, violent conflict – have a
dampening effect on domestic tolerance levels, which is consistent with both my
expectations and previous findings regarding other salient threats to the state (see Shamir
and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).
I must emphasize once again that the WVS tolerance measure used in this study
does not ask respondents to provide their judgments toward groups specifically
responsible for the internal violence in the state. Rather, my study only looks at whether
salient internal threats have a dampening effect on tolerance towards nonconformist
groups in general. As with the external threat models, it is worth noting that the lack of a
direct measure should bias my results against finding a strong impact of internal threat on
political tolerance. Thus, the reported results should be viewed as a conservative
estimate of the relationship between salient internal threat and political tolerance.
Although I am reasonably confident that the IV-2SLS estimations accurately
depict the relationship between internal threats and political tolerance across my sample
of countries, this technique cannot fully deal with the multi-level nature of the data.
Therefore, I conduct a series of tests to check the robustness of these results and reestimate the models using HLM by including internal threat variables purged of the
endogenous component. The results of which are presented in Table 5-7. Certainly, this
is not an optimal solution given that I do not correct the standard errors of the purged
estimators. However, the tradeoff is that I can now appropriately account for the multilevel nature of the data using HLM and evaluate whether the negative association
between internal threat and political tolerance levels holds. Furthermore, by comparing
the variance component statistic, I can evaluate how well these internal threat models
account for unexplained variance in tolerance levels across countries when judged against
my previous HLM models that include states’ external threat environment. In the
following models, I estimate two general equations using a random coefficients, random
slopes model (in mixed-effects form) that includes one or more measures of internal
threat and no measures of external threat:
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(INTERNAL
THREAT) + γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) + γ40(VFSINDX) +
γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) + γ90(EDUC) + u0 +
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u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX) + u5(CONFORM)
+ u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(CIVWAR5 or
REBEL) + γ05(TERRORATT) + γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) +
γ40(VFSINDX) + γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) +
γ90(EDUC) + u0 + u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX)
+ u5(CONFORM) + u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
Despite the change in estimation technique, the civil war variable, sans the
endogenous component, is strongly and negatively associated (b = -1.53, p < .001) with
political tolerance in Model 19. In Model 21, I show rebellion (b = -0.61, p < .01) also
negatively influences tolerance levels. Although the other parameter estimates in the HLM
models are different from those reported in the IV-2SLS estimations, the same
coefficients remain statistically significant and in the expected direction, further
suggesting that these relationships are fairly robust. So despite accounting for the multilevel nature of the data, these findings are consistent with the expectations found in
hypothesis 8 that salient internal threats - particularly violence associated with insurgency
- also have an overall dampening effect on individual tolerance for nonconformist groups.
In terms of accounting for the unexplained variance across countries, however, these
models do not compare favorably to those models that include measures of external
threat. In fact, Models 19 and 21 offer only a slight improvement over the baseline
macro-micro model (Model 2) in accounting for the unexplained variance in tolerance
across countries.
[TABLE 5-7 ABOUT HERE – HLM]
Although HLM models that include civil war and armed rebellion are similar to
previous IV-2SLS estimations in terms of overall results, those HLM results including
terrorist incidents in the analyses are quite different from the previous corresponding IV2SLS results. In Model 20, I find no relationship between terrorist attacks and political
tolerance after accounting for the multi-level nature of the data. In fact, the inclusion of
the terrorist attack variable increases the amount of unexplained variance across the
countries in my sample. And even when controlling for civil war or armed rebellion in
Models 22 and 23 respectively, I still observe no statistically significant relationship
between terrorist attacks and tolerance. When considered in conjunction with the
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previous IV-2SLS analyses, these findings allow me to claim only a weak association
between incidents of terrorism and political tolerance at best.
These mixed results cast some doubt on whether the assumed relationship
between incidents of terrorism and political tolerance is generalizable to a large crosssection of countries. At the very least, the lack of strong cross-national findings is
certainly curious given the number of recent single-country studies which observe strong
associations between terrorism and tolerance (see Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al
2005; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). These results imply that certain domestic
populations may be more forbearing than others when it comes to terrorism. The reason
for these differences in domestic reaction to terrorism is unclear at this point and certainly
worth further investigation.
On the positive side, the strong correlations between civil war and political
intolerance as well as armed rebellion and intolerance lends support for the general
contention that salient internal threats, particularly violence associated with insurgency,
decreases tolerance levels. Certainly, these results are consistent with the overall
expectations of the early social psychology literature on the impact of group conflict. As
expected, this relationship holds at the international level as threats emanating from
within states are associated with lower tolerance toward nonconformist groups.
Empirical Models and Results: Combined Threat
Perhaps the principal benefit of incorporating the altered internal threat variable
(sans endogenous component) into the multi-level model is that I can now also estimate
the effect of both a state’s external and internal threat environment simultaneously.
Estimating a combined threat model, I can assess the separate independent effects of each
type of threat on political tolerance. In Models 24 & 25, I estimate the following
equations using a random coefficients, random slopes model (in mixed-effects form):
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(CIVWAR5) +
γ05(TEMIDL) + γ06(NTEMIDL) + γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL)
+ γ40(VFSINDX) + γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) +
γ90(EDUC) + u0 + u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX)
+ u5(CONFORM) + u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(CIVWAR5) +
γ05(TATEMIDL) + γ06(TANTEMIDL) + γ07(NTATEMIDL) + γ08(NTANTEMIDL) +
γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) + γ40(VFSINDX) +
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γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) + γ90(EDUC) + u0 +
u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX) + u5(CONFORM)
+ u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
Table 5-8 presents the results of the multi-level political tolerance models that
include measures for both states’ external and internal threat environments. In Model 24,
I examine the macro-level effect of civil war, territorial disputes, and non-territorial
disputes on individual tolerance attitudes. I once again find only territorial threats
involving territory to have a strong, negative relationship (b = -0.64, p < .001) with
political tolerance as well as a negative relationship between internal threat (b = -1.37, p
< .001) and tolerance. While these results were expected, I am a bit surprised to find only
slight changes in the parameter estimates of these variables when included in the same
model. Indeed, the coefficients for all of the key macro-level independent variables are
almost identical to the coefficients reported in the previous models. This suggests that
the impacts of external and internal threats are independent of one another when it comes
to political tolerance.
[TABLE 5-8 ABOUT HERE – COMBINED]
More interesting, however, may be the fact that, after controlling for both basic
types of threat, the impact of both democratic longevity I now find both democratic
longevity (b = -0.01, p < .05) and economic development (b = -0.15, p < .05) have a
statistically significant impact on political tolerance. Not only is this the first time that
these coefficients are statistically significant, but the direction of the relationships are not
in the expected direction. This finding is peculiar. I am left without any particularly
compelling theoretical explanation of why this model would generate these particular
results.
In Model 25, I include specification for the target of the external threat along with
the civil war variable and generate similar parameter estimates to those in the previous
model. I once again find that states targeted by disputes are less politically tolerant than
other states even after controlling for internal threat environment. Model 25 clearly
shows that certain types of objective threats are correlated with lower tolerance levels.
Curiously, this model continues to show a negative relationship between economic
development and political tolerance once I account for both external and internal threats;
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although the coefficient for democratic longevity is now no longer statistically
significant.
Judging from the variance components of the models, the combined threat models
significantly outperform both the individual-level and baseline macro-micro models in
accounting for unexplained variance across countries. Overall, the variance components
of these combined threat models are similar to the external threat models. They do,
however, outperform the internal threat models by a sizeable margin, which might
indicate that the external threat variables alone are accounting for most of the
unexplained variance across countries.
All in all, the combined threat models continue to support my overall contention
that higher levels of objective threat should be correlated with lower political tolerance
levels. These findings also suggest that the effects of external and internal threats are
independent of one another and continue to overwhelm any positive influence of
democratic longevity and economic development may have on tolerance. In short, I
conclude that objective threat levels play a large role in shaping individual tolerance
decisions irrespective of other contextual factors and individual-level characteristics.
Discussion
The strong conclusion derived from all of the results presented in this chapter is
that the relationship between objective threat levels and political tolerance is very strong.
Given that I find negative correlations between objective threat levels and tolerance using
a wide array of indicators across such a wide sample of countries, suggests that the
underlying relationship is quite robust. At the very least, researchers interested in
examining other macro-level determinants of political tolerance need to control for the
effect of objective threat levels in their models.
My findings have important implications for a number of disparate literatures.
The contribution to the political tolerance literature is two-fold. First, these findings
suggest that future cross-national research on political tolerance must examine macrolevel effects on political tolerance levels. As I demonstrate above, individual attitudes on
civil liberties, particularly toward non-conformist groups, are clearly shaped by
contextual elements of their country of residence. While individual characteristics are
still the primary determinants of political tolerance, state-level factors have a profound
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effect on these attitudes. Researchers that ignore these influences risk introducing
significant bias into their results. In particular, researchers need to account for the
external threat environment prior to the survey so as to avoid the possibility of omitted
variable bias in either the micro- or macro-level explanations.
Second, these results challenge the propositions linking modernization and
democratic learning to political tolerance levels. For instance, while my baseline micromacro model indicates positive relationship between democratic learning and political
tolerance, it is extremely sensitive to alternate specifications in my sample. Consider that
this relationship disappears once I account for states’ external threat environment
suggesting that, perhaps, salient external threats overpower traditional institutional
safeguards of liberal democracy. I do not conclude that these results are an indictment of
these theories; rather they indicate that better measures of democratic learning and
modernization are needed. This is apparent when considering the insignificant results for
economic development and democratic longevity after controlling for states’ external
threat environment despite the rich theoretical tradition associated with both propositions.
My contribution to the international conflict literature is more straightforward as I
address three empirical puzzles. Although the previous literature on territory and conflict
provide strong theoretical and anecdotal support for the idea that territorial issues are
domestically salient (see Senese and Vasquez 2003, 2005; Vasquez 1993, 2004), the
supporting empirical evidence is limited to examining patterns of conflict and inferring
issue salience. My results confirm these inferences; as territorial threat levels increase,
the state becomes increasingly intolerant of non-conformist groups. Furthermore, these
results clearly show a qualitative difference between territorial and non-territorial issues
in their impact at the domestic level.
In terms of the social psychology literature, I confirm the proposition that being
targeted by threat has profound, negative effects on the group unity and tolerance of nonconformity at the state-level. The magnitude of the negative influence of external threat
on tolerance levels is predicated on whether groups have been targeted in the conflict.
Taken together, both of these observations (issue type and target/initiator) make
significant contribution to the second image reversed conflict theory. These results
provide clear empirical evidence that external threats have profound effects at the
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domestic level. While previous studies provide only modest support for this contention, I
show that these effects readily apparent after identifying salient external threats.
Finally, I highlight another negative social cost of internal threats, particularly
civil war and armed rebellion, on the domestic population. Aside from diminishing the
normative good that higher levels of political tolerance would provide society, internal
threats also indirectly decrease the likelihood of democratization and democratic
consolidation if the cultural theories of democratization are to be believed. Granted,
states experiencing high levels of internal strife are already less likely to democratize or
consolidate democracy, but the increased divisiveness and acrimony toward
nonconformist groups caused by internal threats certainly does not improve its prospects.
Although I focused almost exclusively on the effects of threat environment on
political tolerance levels in this chapter, these analyses did reveal some interesting
findings that I plan to explore in more depth in the next chapter. Results revealing
democratic longevity to have little to no effect on tolerance levels once I control for
objective threat levels is puzzling given the strong theoretical and empirical support for
the democratic learning hypothesis. This raises the possibility that the preceding analyses
were missing key components of this relationship. In the following chapter, I focus
exclusively on what influence political institutions have on political tolerance levels and
how different institutions interact with regime longevity to affect individual attitudes.
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Table 5-1: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93***
(0.31)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.92***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.29)

-4.93***
(0.29)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.06
(0.07)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.78***
(0.18)
0.00
(0.05)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.004
(0.002)
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.23
(0.60)

-0.85***
(0.17)
-0.79*
(0.32)
-0.36
(0.20)
0.35**
(0.12)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.09
(0.08)
0.32
(0.64)

1.81***
27
105.43

1.73***
25
99.30

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity

0.001
(0.002)
0.13
(0.12)
-0.28
(0.68)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.001
(0.003)
0.10
(0.12)
-0.30
(0.69)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.16***
2.33***
2.28***
Df
32
29
28
2
Chi
121.47
129.63
127.02
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-2: The Effects of Force-level Disputes on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries

Intercept

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.94***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.29)

-4.93***
(0.29)

-4.93***
(0.29)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Disputes involving Force (1yr)

-0.16
(0.12)

Territorial Disputes involving Force (1yr)

-0.72***
(0.17)
0.01
(0.09)

Non-Territorial Disputes involving Force (1yr)
Targeted Disputes involving Force (1yr)

-0.79***
(0.15)
0.29**
(0.10)

Non-Targeted Disputes involving Force (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.001
(0.002)
0.08
(0.12)
-0.27
(0.68)

-0.002
(0.002)
-0.05
(0.09)
-0.04
(0.63)

-0.004
(0.002)
-0.05
(0.08)
0.38
(0.55)

-0.83***
(0.17)
-0.47
(0.33)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.15
(0.57)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.36***
2.03***
2.13***
Df
28
27
27
2
Chi
129.58
113.47
114.00
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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2.12***
27
114.57

Table 5-3: The Effects of Rivalry Disputes on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries

Intercept

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.31)

-4.93***
(0.32)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Disputes involving Strategic Rivals (1yr)

0.14
(0.22)

Territorial Disputes involving Strategic Rivals (1yr)

0.11
(0.24)
0.23
(0.13)

Non-Territorial Disputes involving Strategic Rivals (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes involving Strategic Rivals (1yr)
Democratic Longevity

-0.001
(0.002)
0.13
(0.12)
-0.36
(0.67)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.002
(0.002)
0.13
(0.12)
-0.35
(0.67)

0.12
(0.24)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.14
(0.12)
-0.33
(0.66)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.32***
2.27***
2.35***
Df
28
27
28
2
Chi
129.83
127.92
131.10
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-4: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Political Awareness Samples)
Sample
Intercept

Model 13
Hi PolAware

Model 14
Lo PolAware

n=5681 (ind)

n=19892 (ind)

-5.39***
(0.34)

-4.30***
(0.25)

0.18***
(0.03)
0.05
(0.05)
0.35***
(0.06)
-0.13*
(0.06)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.34***
(0.08)
-0.003
(0.003)

0.16***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.21***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
-0.001
(0.02)
-0.21***
(0.06)
-0.01***
(0.001)

-0.45**
(0.16)
0.13
(0.08)
-0.00
(0.002)
0.03
(0.08)
0.45
(0.43)

-0.40
(0.20)
0.13
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.04
(0.10)
-0.06
(0.53)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age

Macro-Level:
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

Random Effect:
Variance Component
1.04***
Df
27
2
Chi
41.04
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

118

1.14***
27
64.93

Table 5-5: First Stage OLS Analyses for Endogenous Variables
Model 15

Model 15b

Model 16

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

Endogenous Variable:
Civil War

Endogenous Variable:
Civil War

Endogenous Variable:
Armed Rebellion

Constant

0.66
(0.68)

0.68
(0.68)

0.30
(0.75)

Rugged Terrain (log)

0.15***
(0.04)

0.15***
(0.04)

0.16***
(0.05)

-0.01
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.001
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.00
(0.001)
-0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.01
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)
0.004
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.004
(0.001)
-0.02
(0.02)

-0.002
(0.002)
-0.07
(0.07)
-0.29
(0.41)

-0.25
(0.15)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.07
(0.07)
-0.30
(0.41)

-0.003
(0.002)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.26
(0.45)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Terrorist Attacks
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

F-statistics of excluded elements
14.46 (1, 32)
13.07 (1, 32)
F p-value
0.0006
0.001
2
Partial R
0.22
0.20
Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors estimated with Stata 9.2
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
The standard errors are clustered by country.
*= significance at 0.10 level; **= significance at 0.05 level; ***= significance at 0.01 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

119

16.07 (1, 32)
0.001
0.21

Table 5-6: Instrumental Variables 2SLS Analysis

Constant

Model 17

Model 17b

Model 18

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

n=25573 (ind),
33 (countries)

0.05
(0.17)

0.05
(0.17)

-0.04
(0.18)

0.03***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.001***
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.005)

0.03***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.001***
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.005)

0.03***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.005)
0.01
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.05***
(0.01)
-0.001***
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.005)

-0.15**
(0.07)

-0.15**
(0.07)
-0.02***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Civil War
Terrorist Attacks
Armed Rebellion
Democratic Longevity

0.001
(0.001)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.10)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.001
(0.001)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.10)

F
9.68 (13, 32)
9.68 (13, 32)
F p-value
0.000
0.000
2
Centered R
0.07
0.07
Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors estimated with Stata 9.2
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
The standard errors are clustered by country.
*= significance at 0.10 level; **= significance at 0.05 level; ***= significance at 0.01 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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-0.14*
(0.01)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.09)
11.82 (13, 32)
0.000
0.07

Table 5-7: The Effects of Internal Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (HLM Models)

Intercept

Model 19

Model 20

Model 21

Model 22

Model 23

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.32)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.25***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.25***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Civil War

-1.53***
(0.35)

-1.52***
(0.35)

Armed Rebellion

-0.61**
(0.22)

Terrorist Attacks
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.01
(0.03)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.13
(0.12)
-0.27
(0.68)

-0.004
(0.002)
-0.04
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.50)

-0.004
(0.002)
0.08
(0.09)
-0.11
(0.62)

-0.002
(0.03)
-0.004
(0.002)
-0.03
(0.09)
-0.05
(0.49)

-0.61**
(0.22)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.09
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.62)

2.33***
27
126.95

2.32***
27
126.7

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.32***
2.34***
2.28***
Df
28
28
28
2
Chi
126.75
129.47
126.08
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-8: The Overall Impact of State Threat Environment on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries

Intercept

Model 24

Model 25

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.92***
(0.30)

-4.92***
(0.29)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.25***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.64***
(0.13)
0.04
(0.06)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

Civil War (corrected)

-1.37***
(0.31)

-0.68***
(0.12)
-0.73**
(0.24)
-0.49*
(0.18)
0.41***
(0.10)
-1.35***
(0.31)

Democratic Longevity

-0.01*
(0.002)
-0.15*
(0.06)
0.01
(0.42)

0.004
(0.002)
-0.14*
(0.05)
0.60
(0.50)

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

Random Effect:
Variance Component
1.97***
Df
26
2
Chi
109.53
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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1.83***
24
102.35

Figure 5-1: Democratic Longevity and Political Tolerance
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Figure 5-2: Territorial Disputes and Political Tolerance
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Figure 5-3: Targeted Territorial Disputes and Political Tolerance
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Chapter 6
The Influence of Domestic Political Institutions on Individual Political Tolerance
Key questions:
• What is the influence of a country’s political institutions on individuals’ decisions
to extend basic civil liberties to non-conformist groups?
• Are the effects of democratic learning the same across different electoral
institutions?
As I demonstrate in the previous chapter, several macro-level factors significantly
influence tolerance attitudes and account for some of the cross-national variation found in
other studies. The most notable of these factors is a country’s threat environment, as the
previous analyses observe that higher levels of objective threat are associated with lower
tolerance levels. Curiously absent in these analyses, however, is empirical support for the
‘democratic learning’ hypothesis. Although only considered a macro-level control
variable in the previous models, I find little evidence indicating democratic longevity as
having any significant effect on individual tolerance. Certainly, the lack of evidence
supporting the role of democratic longevity is puzzling, particularly because several
earlier studies have linked differences in political institutions to the cross-national
variance in political tolerance levels. For instance, Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003)
study supports the democratic learning hypothesis. They show that democratic longevity
and federalism are positively correlated with political tolerance, while Weldon (2006)
observes that certain political institutions governing citizenship rights for minority groups
are negatively associated with political tolerance levels. Taken together, these studies not
only observe strong linkages between political institutions and tolerance, but also suggest
that the relationship is relatively complex. Therefore, given the strong theoretical and
empirical connection between political institutions and other individual-level attitudes
and behavior, the failure to observe a relationship between democratic longevity and
tolerance may indicate some form of model misspecification that requires further
examination.
This non-finding also raises questions about whether political institutions
substantively influence individual attitudes of tolerance after controlling for the threat
environment. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to examine further the
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relationship between domestic political institutions and individuals’ willingness to extend
civil liberties to unpopular groups. As operationalized in the previous chapter and in
other studies, estimating the unconditional effect of democratic longevity on political
tolerance assumes that all democracies are the same and therefore influence individual
tolerance attitudes homogenously over time. Yet, quite obviously, all political systems
are not the same and citizen experiences with different institutions over time should
differentially affect political tolerance. Thus, cross-national comparisons of tolerance
levels not only need to examine different institutional configuration, but also the
interaction with institutional longevity to provide a general approximation of the
institutional environment influencing citizen behavior and attitudes. By testing the
theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter Three, I attempt to determine what impact, if
any, political institutions have on these attitudes in the following analyses.
The expectations regarding the effect of political institutions on political tolerance
levels vary. These differences are the result of competing logic over how these
institutions should influence individuals and their respective attitudes. For instance, one
school of thought states that PR electoral systems should be associated with higher levels
of tolerance since these rules foster power sharing and cooperation between diverse
groups. Alternatively, others contend that because electoral rules ultimately shape the
incentives facing the political parties seeking to maximize votes and their respective
platforms, parties operating in a PR system will turn to ‘bonding’ strategies to maximize
votes. Because ‘bonding’ strategies are typically divisive, eventually the domestic
population is less willing to extend civil liberties toward nonconformist groups. Given
these expectations, the following analyses can be considered a comparative theory test.
Additionally, these models may also uncover some of the trends driving the relationship
between democratic longevity and political tolerance levels.
In this chapter, I not only attempt to discern the influence of domestic political
institutions, particularly differences in electoral systems, on individual tolerance, but also
attempt to determine why the previous analyses find little support for the democratic
longevity as a key predictor of political tolerance levels across countries. To this end, I
estimate the conditional effects of state political institutions on individual political
tolerance attitudes using statistical techniques to account for multilevel data. Given the
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findings in the previous chapters, I also take steps to control for the effects of threat
environment, ethnic fractionalization, and economic development. Before proceeding
with the analyses, I begin with a brief overview of how the institutional variables are
operationalized.
Measuring Political Institutions
To examine the influence of political institutions on political tolerance levels, I
use a series of indicators measuring states’ institutional configuration. In particular, I use
these indicators to denote rules governing a state’s general electoral system, the effective
number of parties for that system, and the degree of political centralization in the state for
all of the states in my sample - democracies and non-democracies. Previous research has
shown that electoral rules significantly affect political outcomes in all regime types and
that most countries, regardless of their adherence to democratic ideals, have some system
in place for representative elections (Blais and Massicotte 1997; Golder 2005; Geddes
2001).
In this chapter, I continue to rely on the democratic longevity (described in
Chapter Four) indicator used in the previous analyses. This variable continues to be one
of the main institutional indicators and also controls for regime type in the following
analyses. To measure specific domestic political institutions, I rely on the following
indicators:
Electoral System. This is the main indicator for the domestic political
institutional configuration of each country in the sample. Lijphart (1994: 13) defines an
electoral system as a set of “election rules under which one or more successive elections
are conducted.” In this paper, I focus on identifying general electoral system types as
described by Lijphart (1984; 1999) and others, namely proportional representation (PR),
majoritarian, and mixed systems. Relying primarily on data compiled by Golder (2005),
I code each country’s electoral system in my sample during the year of the survey using
electoral system type indicator. Both PR and majoritarian systems are coded as such in
my sample, but I code both ‘multi’ and ‘mixed’ as mixed systems. These distinctions are
organized into three dummy variables: PR, Majoritarian, and Mixed. Golder’s (2005)
data provides electoral system information for all of the democracies as well as some of
the countries coded as authoritarian regimes under Polity IV specifications. In the cases
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of Mexico, Peru, Serbia, Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, I rely on the electoral system
coding by Blais and Massicotte (1997). For Bosnia, I use Election Results Archive
(2007) data describing their 1996 election. Nigeria is coded as having no electoral
system due to the fact that the country was under strict military rule at the time.
For the most part, the electoral systems are relatively evenly distributed across my
sample of countries. Across the entire sample, there are twelve PR systems (36%), eight
majoritarian systems (24%), and twelve mixed systems (36%).100 Across the
democracies, the distribution is also relatively even there are nine PR systems (41%),
seven majoritarian systems (32%), and six mixed systems (27%).
Effective Number of Parties (ENP). This measure indicates the effective number
of electoral parties under each electoral system in my sample of countries. Golder (2005)
is the primary source for the data on ENP. Although based on Laakso and Taagerpera’s
(1979) formula for determining each country’s ENP, he uses the modified formula to
correct for the ‘other’ category as suggested by Taagepera (1997).101 As with the
electoral system indicator, I use Golder’s (2005) data for most of the countries in my
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The specific countries coded as having a PR system (D denotes democracy) are: Peru,
Brazil (D), Chile (D), Argentina (D), Uruguay (D), Switzerland (D), Spain (D), Bosnia,
Serbia, Bulgaria (D), Latvia (D), and Finland (D). The majoritarian countries are:
United States (D), Macedonia (D), Ukraine (D), Belarus, India (D), Philippines (D),
Australia (D), and New Zealand (D). The mixed countries are: Mexico, Venezuela (D),
Germany (D), Croatia, Slovenia (D), Russia, Estonia (D), Lithuania (D), Armenia,
Georgia, Sweden (D), and Azerbaijan. Nigeria is coded as having no electoral system
nor is it considered a democracy. I distinguish the democracies and non-democracies
here because I test my hypotheses against both the entire sample and democracies only in
the analyses that follow.
101
Laakso and Thompson’s (1979) original formula for effective number of electoral
parties is:
1
∑ vi2
in which νi is the percentage of the vote received the ith party. Golder (2005) corrects for
the ‘other’ category, which treats independents and other parties as a single party by
using Taagepera’s (1997) least component method of bounds. In the codebook
describing the data, Golder (2004: 4) describes this method as “calculating the effective
number of parties treating the ‘other’ category as a single party (smallest effective
number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties as if every vote in
the ‘other’ category belonged to a different party (largest effective number of parties) and
taking the mean.”
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sample. However, for those countries in which there is no data on I rely on alternate
sources. The ENP values for Mexico and Bosnia are taken from Colomer (2005), Peru
from the Political Database for the Americas (2007), Georgia from Dawisha and Deets
(2006), and use the Election Results Archive (2007) ENP data for Serbia, Belarus, and
Azerbaijan. In the case of Nigeria, the ENP is coded as 1 given the military dictatorship
in place at the time. Within my sample of countries, the ENP measure ranges from 1
(Nigeria) to 46.1 (Ukraine).102
Federalism. To indicate whether a country delegates some authority to subnational political units, I rely on centralization data from the Polity III dataset for the year
1995 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). This data measures whether each country incorporates
federalist political institutions within the larger governmental framework. For this
variable, I transform the three-point centralization scale into a dichotomous variable.
Countries scoring a 2 or above are coded as having federalist institutions. The Polity III
dataset contains information for all of the countries in the sample (including authoritarian
regimes), except Bosnia and Serbia. Rather than exclude them from these analyses, I
code them both using the score given for Yugoslavia in the dataset. Within my sample of
countries, a little over half (17 of 33) have some form of federalism in place at the time of
the survey.
Democratic Longevity (Inglehart). In addition to the Polity IV indicator of
democratic longevity, I also estimate the following analyses using Inglehart’s (1990,
1997) measure of democratic stability. As with the democratic longevity variable,
Inglehart’s democratic stability variable measures the number of years of uninterrupted
democracy. I use this measure in the analyses that follow as an additional robustness
check. Although closely related, Inglehart’s measure differs from Polity IV in two ways.
First, the main criteria in determining a democratic system is whether political leadership
was “chosen by free and competitive elections” (Inglehart 1997: 165). As Inglehart
(1997: 165) himself notes, this determination is left to the coder, “but in most instances
there is almost universal agreement whether or not given elections were free and
102

In the analyses that follow, I also estimate the models using the natural logarithm of
the ENP variable to control for the effects of outliers on the data. Analyses using this
modified ENP variable do not differ in either direction or statistical significance from the
findings reported below.
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competitive.” Second, Inglehart’s longevity measure is ‘capped’ at 1920. That is, this
indicator limits the impact of outliers, notably the United States and Switzerland - both of
which, according to Polity IV, have been democracies for over 145 years. Unfortunately,
his data only has information for 15 of the 22 democracies in my sample.103 Therefore, I
used the Polity IV scores capped at 1920 for the other seven democracies in the
sample.104 The eleven countries considered non-democracies are coded as zero.105
Furthermore, the variable is adjusted to the year of the survey for each country in the
sample and ranges from 0 to 76 years.
Control Variables. In the following analyses, I continue to rely on macro-level
control variables – democratic longevity (Polity), ethnic fractionalization, and economic
development – that were used in the previous chapters.
Full Sample vs. Democracies-only Sample
In the following analyses, I estimate the relationship between political institutions
and political tolerance across both the full sample of countries and a democratic sample.
While I rely on the results generated from the democratic sample for the bulk of the
analysis here, I also estimate these relationships across the full sample (which includes 11
non-democracies) to have comparable point of reference to those results found in Chapter
Five, especially the models which control for state-level threats. Recall that one of the
goals in this chapter is to understand why I fail to find a significant correlation between
democratic longevity and political tolerance once the models account for objective threat
levels. Therefore, I test my hypotheses across the full sample so as to best compare these
results with those in the previous chapter.
The second reason I choose to include them is more complex. As I discussed in
Chapter Three, almost every country, regardless of regime type, have some formalized
rules governing elections. Certainly, authoritarian regimes are not homogenous,
especially in the repressiveness of their policies. Therefore, I do not just assume that
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Inglehart (1997) has democratic longevity measures for the following countries in my
sample: United States, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, and India.
104
The seven democracies are: Venezuela, Uruguay, Macedonia, Ukraine, Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand.
105
The eleven non-democracies are: Mexico, Peru, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Russia,
Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria.
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electoral rules and systems have absolutely no influence in shaping the incentives and
behavior of the political parties and their respective platforms. As Geddes (2001) notes,
whether a complete sham or not, elections and their rules have some influence on
government behavior even some of the most authoritarian of regimes. Please refer back
to the discussion in Chapter Four for additional reasons why the inclusion of the 11
authoritarian countries is important for this study.
Empirical Models and Results: Political Institutions
In the following analyses, I examine whether different political institutions are
strongly associated with political tolerance levels across the countries in my sample. In
Chapter Three, I note the competing hypotheses regarding the effect of political
institutions, specifically PR vs. majoritarian systems, on political tolerance levels. Put
simply, the conventional wisdom – as stated in hypotheses 12, 13, and 14 - expects PR
systems to positively influence tolerance levels, while ‘winner-take-all’ majoritarian
systems are expected to foster intolerance. Conversely, the hypotheses derived from the
logic of party incentives predict PR systems to negatively influence tolerance levels.
This logic further suggests that majoritarian systems should have a positive effect on
tolerance levels. In short, both sets of hypotheses suggest that the effect of democracy on
political tolerance is conditional based on the type of electoral rules in place. While this
general observation is readily apparent to other scholars comparing democracies, this
logic also pertains to learning under these systems but has yet to be empirically
demonstrated in studies on tolerance.
Table 6-1 presents the results testing the hypotheses regarding the effects of basic
electoral systems and longevity on political tolerance levels across of the entire sample of
countries. In Models 1-3, I examine the baseline effect of general electoral system type
and political tolerance levels (mixed-effects form equation):106
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(ELS) +
γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) + γ40(VFSINDX) +
γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) + γ90(EDUC) + u0 +
u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX) + u5(CONFORM)
+ u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
106

To avoid redundancy in presenting these equations, I use ELS to represent each of the
different electoral system indicators used in successive models. For example, ELS stands
for the Majoritarian indicator in Model 1, PR in Model 2, and Mixed in Model 3.
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The analyses reveal that, across the entire sample, basic electoral systems appear
to have no influence over political tolerance levels. Indeed, the parameter estimates
reveal that none of the coefficients for electoral system or the macro-level control
variables are statistically significant. Although these results appear to cast doubt on the
general expectation that differences in political institutions are associated with variation
in tolerance levels, it is important to note that these models only reveal the unconditional
effects of electoral system and democratic longevity.
[TABLE 6-1 ABOUT HERE]
As I argue in Chapter Three, the assumption of unconditional effects may be
overlook important factors shaping political tolerance levels. That is, the effect of
electoral system on political tolerance may depend on democratic longevity.
Alternatively, this can be restated as the effect of democratic longevity on political
tolerance depends on the type of electoral system. Therefore, in Models 4-6, I introduce
an interaction term to represent the conditional effects of electoral systems and
democratic longevity and estimate the following equation (in mixed-effects form):
TOLSCALE = γ00 + γ01(CONTDEM) + γ02(EF) + γ03(LOGGDP) + γ04(ELS) +
γ04(ELS*CONTDEM) + γ10(DEMACT) + γ20(POLINTIN) + γ30(DEMIDEAL) +
γ40(VFSINDX) + γ50(CONFORM) + γ60(SELFPOLD) + γ70(GENDER) + γ80(AGE) +
γ90(EDUC) + u0 + u1(DEMACT) + u2(POLINTIN) + u3 (DEMIDEAL) + u4(VFSINDX)
+ u5(CONFORM) + u6(SELFPOLID) + u7(GENDER) + u8(AGE) + u9(EDUC) + r
Models 4 to 6 represent the interactive model and provide modest empirical
support for the contention that the impact of democratic longevity on political tolerance is
provisional, based on the type of electoral system citizens are experiencing in their
country. Model 5 shows that the coefficient for the PR*Democratic Longevity interaction
term is negative (b = -0.01, p < .05) and statistically significant, while both of the
constituent terms are not statistically significant. This result suggests that ‘learning’
under PR systems actually negatively influences individual political tolerance. Most
importantly, however, this finding calls into question the widely held perception that PR
electoral systems, with the emphasis on accurate representation, protection of minority
rights, and power sharing, should increase political tolerance in a state (Lijphart 1977,
1984, 1999).
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Furthermore, the results of Model 5 are consistent with the expectations laid out
in hypotheses 15 and 17; and, more importantly, is the type of evidence I expect to find if
PR systems do create incentives for political parties to engage in ‘bonding’ strategies (i.e.
divisive strategies designed to build or reinforce exclusive group identities) to secure
votes. As I explained in Chapter Three, I expect this negative impact on tolerance to
strengthen as citizens become increasingly exposed to these party strategies over time.
Although suggestive, the results generated in Models 4-6 do not fully support the
general theoretical expectations derived from the logic of how electoral rules shape party
incentives and strategies. For instance, I find that learning under majoritarian systems
appears to have no discernible effect on political tolerance levels despite expectations of
a positive relationship based party incentives to engage in ‘bridging’ strategies. More
troubling, however, is that the parameter estimates in Model 6 indicate that ‘learning’
under mixed systems has a positive effect on individual political tolerance. Given that I
do not identify the constituent elements to differentiate among mixed systems, this result
is hard to interpret. That is, I am unable to determine which of the constituent elements is
driving this positive effect.
Yet another cause for caution in placing too much emphasis in these results is the
fact that once I control for states’ objective threat environments in Models 7-9, the
negative relationship between learning under a PR electoral system and political
tolerance disappears. Although these results suggest the relationship is not particularly
robust, they offer further support for my hypotheses on the relationship between threat
environment and political tolerance as territorial disputes are negatively correlated with
tolerance levels.107
Although several studies on political institutions suggests that electoral rules in
authoritarian systems have some discernible influence on political behavior, the fact
remains that these effects are most likely minimal given a lack of truly free and
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In almost every instance, analyses using Inglehart’s (1997) measure of democratic
longevity do not differ in either direction or statistical significance from the findings
reported here. However, in Model 1a, I find a negative relationship between majoritarian
electoral systems (b=-0.49, p<0.05) and political tolerance levels, which is consistent
with the expectations of the conventional wisdom (i.e. Lijphart). I list these results in
Table 6-1a in the appendix.
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competitive elections. Therefore, I re-estimate the models across only the democracies in
my sample as I expect that the effects of electoral systems and democratic longevity
suggested in the previous analyses to be more pronounced among countries known to
have free and competitive elections.
Table 6-2 presents the results testing the hypotheses regarding the effects of basic
electoral systems and longevity on political tolerance levels in democracies only. By
focusing only on democracies, clear patterns regarding the relationship between
institutions, longevity, and political tolerance come to light. In Models 10-12, I once
again focus simply on the general relationship between electoral system and political
tolerance. Here I find some empirical support for the conventional wisdom in that the
results of Model 10 shows that majoritarian systems are negatively associated (b = -0.69,
p < .05) with political tolerance levels. This finding fits with the expectation that
electoral rules based on a ‘winner-take-all’ philosophy are more divisive than those
centered on power sharing and the protection of minority rights. However, in Model 11, I
do not find any statistically significant relationship between PR systems and political
tolerance despite the strong expectation that these types of electoral rules should have
positive effects. In short, while Models 10-12 provide modest evidence in support of the
conventional wisdom, they reveal no substantiation in backing the alternative
hypotheses.108
[TABLE 6-2 ABOUT HERE]
Although the models estimating the unconditional effects of electoral systems and
democratic longevity on political tolerance levels provide some confirmation for the
conventional wisdom, the interactive models clearly support the alternative hypotheses.
Furthermore, the interactive models, specifically Models 13 and 14, undermine the
conventional wisdom as they clearly demonstrate a direct contrast between the predicted
effect and the actual effects of electoral systems on political tolerance levels.
In Model 13, the interaction term indicates a strong, positive relationship between
democratic longevity under majoritarian systems (b = 0.01, p < .05) and political
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It is also worth noting that unlike the previous analyses, many of the models presented
in Table 6-2 find evidence that increased ethnic fractionalization is negatively associated
with individual tolerance.
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tolerance. These results also show that majoritarian electoral systems have a negative
influence (b = -0.85, p < .05) on political tolerance levels when democratic longevity is
zero. This is an interesting finding on a number of different levels. It suggests that while
majoritarian electoral rules and the emphasis on ‘winner-take-all’ may hurt tolerance
levels in the short-term; the long-term effects of these rules positively impact individual
tolerance. This evidence corroborates nicely with the expectation that political parties
under majoritarian electoral rules employ ‘bridging’ strategies as they are forced to
centrist positions in order to maximize votes.
In direct contrast to the influence of majoritarian systems over time, I find a
strong, negative relationship between democratic longevity with PR electoral rules (b = 0.01, p < .001) and political tolerance in Model 14. Furthermore, similar to the results
shown in Model 13, the interactive model shows a statistically significant relationship
between the electoral system – in this case, PR – and political tolerance (b = 0.89, p <
.001) when democratic longevity is zero. Additionally, Model 14 also indicates that
democratic longevity has a positive influence (b = 0.01, p < .01) on political tolerance
levels in majoritarian and mixed electoral systems (i.e. when PR is zero). Substantively,
this suggests that, unlike majoritarian electoral systems, PR electoral rules, which are
designed to promote equal representation, the protection of minority rights, and powersharing across diverse groups, positively influence tolerance levels in the short-term.
However, over time, these systems negatively affect individual tolerance as political
parties rely on divisive ‘bonding’ strategies to maximize votes. In short, PR systems
create incentives for political parties to accentuate in-group solidarity and out-group
hostility to as a viable political strategy and, over time, these strategies ‘freeze’ group
divisions and intolerance.
Taken together, the findings from Models 13 and 14 indicate that the effect of
democratic longevity on political tolerance is dependent on whether citizens learn under
majoritarian or PR electoral rules.109 In Figures 6-1 and 6-2, I show how differences in
electoral institutions shape how democratic learning affects tolerance levels. Figure 6-1
illustrates that in lesser experienced democracies; citizens in PR systems are more likely
109

These relationships hold even when I estimate the models using the natural logarithm
of democratic longevity to control the influence of outliers on my sample.
136

to tolerate unpopular groups than those in majoritarian systems. However, amongst more
experienced democracies, the effect of electoral systems on tolerance levels is
juxtaposed. As the age of the democracies increase, countries with majoritarian systems
appear to foster tolerance while PR systems are associated with increasing intolerance.
Figure 6-2 shows how the effects compare with the unconditional effect of democratic
longevity on political tolerance levels.110 Perhaps the most interesting observation from
these figures is that they offer some support for the conventional wisdom that PR systems
ameliorate social divisions while majoritarian systems appear exacerbate them, at least in
the short-term. In the more experienced democracies, the effects of these electoral
systems on tolerance levels reverse course.
[FIGURES 6-1 & 6-2 ABOUT HERE]
These findings may explain, in part, why the previous analyses found little
evidence supporting the democratic learning hypothesis. Given the results of these
interactive models, the reason for the previous non-findings is relatively easy to discern.
The previous analyses assessed only the unconditional effect of democratic longevity on
political tolerance. Because the overall influence of democratic longevity is dependent
on the basic electoral rules in place, the previous coefficients for the democratic longevity
variable were the weighted average of the conditional effects of both PR and majoritarian
systems. Thus, as Brambor et al (2006: 73) point out, the effect of democratic longevity
in the unconditional model “is sensitive to the distribution of the conditioning variable in
the sample.” Given that the sample is a relatively equal distribution of electoral systems,
it is not surprising that differing effects of majoritarian and PR systems are canceling out
the other, thereby, producing a null result.
These findings are also relatively robust to changes in model specification. In
Models 16-17, I find that the effects actually strengthen once I control for objective threat
levels. However, the underlying relationships remain unchanged in both direction and
statistical significance lending confidence to the overall findings across this sample of
countries. Finally, it is also worth noting that I find no evidence of mixed electoral

110

The unconditional effect of democratic longevity on political tolerance levels reflects
that conditional effects of not only PR and majoritarian systems, but also mixed systems
too.
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systems as having any unconditional or conditional effects on political tolerance levels in
this sample. Again, this result is expected given that mixed systems contain elements of
both consensus and majoritarian rules, thereby, generating effects that serve to negate the
other.111
Basic electoral systems are not the only political institutions expected to influence
political tolerance levels. Recall that in Chapter Three, I hypothesize that the degree of
state political centralization may influence political tolerance levels. The general
expectation is that, similar to Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) findings, federalist
institutions promote tolerance by helping to protect minority rights.
Looking again at only the democratic countries in my sample, Table 6-3 presents
the results testing the relationships between federalism and political tolerance. Model 19
reveals that both the presence of federalist institutions in a country and democratic
longevity has no discernible impact on political tolerance levels. Once again, the results
generated by my models are inconsistent with previous research. However, Model 19
only examines the unconditional effects of federalism and democratic longevity on
tolerance levels. Therefore, given the earlier findings in this chapter, I am not surprised
that the interactive model, Model 20, reveals conditional effects. In Model 20, I show
that democratic longevity negatively affects political tolerance levels (b = -0.01, p < .01)
in countries with federalist political institutions. Additionally, the parameter estimates
reveal that increases democratic longevity is associated with higher tolerance levels (b =
0.01, p < .001) in more politically centralized countries. Furthermore, as Model 21
shows, these results even after controlling for objective threat levels.112 Although these
results do not match with other findings in the literature, those studies only estimated the
unconditional effects of longevity and federalism on political tolerance. Given that
federalism, as a consensus institution, provides political autonomy to different factions in
society, it is not unreasonable to think that federalism could serve to reinforce divisions
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In those models using Inglehart’s (1997) measure of democratic longevity, the results
do not differ in either direction or statistical significance from the findings reported here.
These models can be found in Table 6-2a in the appendix
112
Analyses using the sample of 33 countries do not differ in either direction or statistical
significance from the findings reported here. I list the results of these models in Table 63a in the appendix.
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within society over time, especially if political actors have incentives to foster divisions
as strategy for gaining further political autonomy.113
The final analyses concern the relationship between the effective number of
electoral parties (ENP) in a democracy and political tolerance levels. So far, the
empirical evidence supports the notion that the more experience states have with electoral
rules providing party incentives to engage in ‘bonding’ strategies, the lower the expected
tolerance levels. According to this logic, while the key independent variable is the state’s
general electoral rules, the intervening variable is political parties. Understanding, of
course, that the behavior and strategies of the political parties are driven by those
incentives stemming from the electoral rules, I estimate the unconditional effect of (ENP)
on political tolerance levels. The expectation is that states with a higher ENP are less
tolerant than those with lower ENP because a higher number of parties indicate
incentives favoring ‘bonding’ strategies.
Table 6-4 presents the results for the analyses estimating the relationship across
both the democratic and the full samples. Models 23-24 reveal that a state’s ENP has no
effect in shaping political tolerance levels across both samples. On the surface, these
findings appear to cast doubt on the unifying logic linking electoral rules and tolerance
attitudes. However, some caution is in order when interpreting these findings given the
earlier findings regarding the conditional relationship between electoral systems and
political tolerance. Just as PR systems appeared to have no unconditional influence over
tolerance levels, perhaps the effect of variation in states’ ENP on tolerance levels is
dependent on some other factor. In Models 25-26, I interact each state’s ENP with
another longevity variable that measures the number of years that each state’s ENP has
remained unchanged (Party System Longevity).114 In other words, this variable indicates
the stability of the current ENP. Unlike electoral systems, the results show that increased
exposure to high numbers of political parties has no significant effect tolerance attitudes
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In Table 6-3b of the appendix, I report the results of these models using Inglehart’s
(1997) measure of democratic longevity. The results do not differ considerably in either
direction or statistical significance than those reported here.
114
I rely on Golder’s (2005) data on electoral systems to calculate the number of years
that a country’s ENP has remained unchanged. This continuous measure ranges from 0
to 49 in the democratic sample and 0 to 50 in the full sample of countries.
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in either sample. Therefore, I find no evidence supporting hypothesis 18 as the results
reveal that ENP has no influence on tolerance levels.
The lack of empirical support for this hypothesis raises questions regarding the
validity of the unifying logic between electoral systems and tolerance levels. If we
assume that a high number of electoral parties indicate incentives for ‘bonding’ strategies
to maximize votes, then there is a strong expectation that countries with more electoral
parties will tend to be less tolerant as citizens react to the divisive messages offered by
political parties. Yet, I find no evidence that political tolerance levels are related to
variation in the number of effective parties across countries.115 Obviously, the link
between electoral systems and variation in political tolerance levels requires more indepth analysis in future studies. However, the cross-sectional data limits my ability to
fully examine this relationship in this study.
[TABLE 6-4 ABOUT HERE]
Concerns over endogeneity
Although the findings here appear to have profound implications for a number of
different literatures, I must first address major concerns over the possibility of
endogeneity before proceeding to a discussion of these results. Problems of endogeneity
are especially germane in research examining the effects of political institutions in using
cross-sectional data (Weingast 1997). In particular, it is important to acknowledge and
discuss the risk of reverse causality biasing the estimates in these analyses. Certainly, in
this instance, concerns over reverse causality are warranted and center on whether preexisting political tolerance levels help determine the choice in electoral system and,
therefore, would explain a correlation between them.116 Similarly, the relationship
115

I only find support for this hypothesis in the model estimating the unconditional effect
of ENP using Inglehart’s measure of democratic longevity. In Model 24a, I find evidence
that higher levels of ENP are negatively associated (b=-0.02, p<0.05) with political
tolerance levels. However, I find no conditional effect of ENP on tolerance levels in
Model 26a. These results are presented in Table 6-4a in the appendix.
116
In fact, this argument fits well with the hypothesis associated with the work of
Lijphart (1968, 1999). He argues that only highly divided societies would adopt
consensus institutions. As a result of the division in society, it is likely that tolerance
levels are also low. Consequently, countries with consensus institutions, such as PR
electoral systems and federalism, only represent those countries that actually succeeded
in ameliorating the divisions in the country enough to form a viable political system.
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between democratic longevity and political tolerance levels also risks biased estimates
due to reverse causality. That is, high political tolerance levels make it easier for
democracies to consolidate and survive; hence, a positive relationship between tolerance
and democratic longevity.117 However, as I reason below, despite these concerns, the
data does not appear to support either reverse causality argument. Rather, the results
better fit with hypothesized direction of causality that I assert throughout this chapter.
If these reverse causality arguments are correct, then I would expect to observe
the following relationships in the unconditional models. First, if pre-existing tolerance
levels condition the choice of political institutions, then I would expect to find that the
unconditional models show a significant negative relationship between PR electoral
systems and political tolerance (also predicted in hypothesis 16). Conversely, this same
logic predicts that majoritarian electoral systems would have a positive correlation with
tolerance levels in the unconditional models. In short, the bias stemming from
endogeneity would cause the models to overestimate that strength of these relationship
and, thereby, favor finding strong relationships between political tolerance levels and
both PR systems (negative) and majoritarian systems (positive). Similarly, endogeneity
bias would cause me to overestimate the positive effect of increased democratic longevity
on tolerance levels. Yet, in each instance, models estimating the unconditional
relationships between these variables and political tolerance reveal little empirical
evidence supporting these expectations.
In fact, the analyses show that these institutional variables only significantly
affect tolerance levels under certain conditions. The unconditional models reveal no
relationship between basic electoral systems or federalist institutions and political
tolerance. Furthermore, I control for the degree of societal fractionalization which would
explain both tolerance levels and adoption of consensus institutions according to Lijphart
(1968, 1977, 1999). I also find that democratic longevity has no significant unconditional
Conversely, majoritarian systems should be correlated with elevated political tolerance
levels because these countries were less divided to begin with and adopted ‘winner-takeall’ political institutions.
117
Certainly, political tolerance has been identified as particularly helpful in the
democratic consolidation process by a number of scholars. Gibson (2007) especially
suggests this relationship when he labels political tolerance as “the endorphin of
democracy.”
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impact on tolerance levels. In short, these analyses find no patterns between variation in
tolerance levels and differences in political institutions. These results or lack thereof,
damage claims of reverse causality because, in these cases, the endogeneity bias would
favor estimating strong associations with tolerance levels in the unconditional models.
Although these analyses do not appear to sustain the reverse causality arguments,
they suggest that the direction of the causal arrow offered in my hypotheses is correct.
Consider, for instance, that while I observe no unconditional effects of political
institutions on tolerance levels, I find strong relationships between these institutional
configurations and political tolerance levels once I account for the relative age of the
system. This suggests that political institutions are influencing attitudes and those effects
only manifest after increased exposure to them. If the relationship between institutions
and political tolerance were completely endogenous, then I would not expect longevity to
have any significant effect at all. Yet, the empirical evidence clearly shows this to be the
case. Furthermore, if democratic longevity and political tolerance are completely
endogenous, then why is effect of longevity dependent on the type of electoral
institutions? So while I understand that some degree of endogeneity bias exists in these
analyses, I do not believe the bias is pervasive enough to invalidate these results.
Discussion
Differences in electoral systems influence political tolerance levels across states,
but this effect depends, in large part, on the age of those political institutions.
Specifically, I demonstrate that greater exposure to PR electoral systems and federalist
arrangements is associated with lower aggregate tolerance levels, while increased
experience with majoritarian systems are correlated with higher levels of tolerance.
These findings are unexpected given that they directly contrast the conventional wisdom
regarding electoral systems, which predicts that PR systems would serve to promote
tolerance and majoritarian systems would exacerbate intolerance over time. Perhaps even
more surprising, however, is the fact I observe no discernible differences in the
unconditional effects between these electoral systems. In fact, only the interactive
models examining the conditional effects of longevity and electoral system type suggest
any evidence supporting the conventional thinking on institutions and political tolerance.
Those results show that differences in political institutions have the expected effects on
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tolerance levels, but only when democratic longevity is zero. In other words, the results
do lend support to the conventional wisdom, but only under specific conditions.
These findings are noteworthy for a number of different reasons, namely the
potentially significant implications for both the political institutions and public opinion
literatures. As I mention above, one obvious contribution is the challenge these results
present to the conventional wisdom regarding consensus vs. majoritarian institutions and
their influence in ameliorating social divisions. Recall that Lijphart (1977, 1984, 1999)
asserts that democracies based upon political institutions designed to promote consensus
across highly cohesive and developed groups (i.e. ethnic or religious factions) are more
likely to lessen potentially devastating divisions in society as opposed to those based on
institutions designed around simple majoritarian principles. He asserts that ‘consensus’
democracies better curtail violence between groups stemming from political discord in
highly fractionalized societies. Conversely, the incentive for groups in a ‘winner-takeall’ majoritarian system is to withhold power with the minority opposition, thereby,
exacerbating perceived threat and group hostility to the other major groups within that
society. As a result, majoritarian democracies may actually have disastrous effects in a
divided society instead of reducing societal conflict (Reynolds 2000). These arguments
also imply that the influence of institutional learning in a PR system on political tolerance
should, at minimum, outperform majoritarian systems and its emphasis on a ‘winnertake-all’ mentality, particularly in heterogeneous states (Lijphart 1999; Reynolds 2000).
Yet, despite these expectations, these analyses indicate that the opposite effect is in fact
occurring. Increased experience with PR systems is associated with lower tolerance
levels, while older majoritarian systems are correlated with higher tolerance levels.
Despite the challenge to the conventional wisdom, however, these results do fit
with one aspect of Lijphart’s (1968, 1977) story about consensus democracies; if not the
overall conclusion of his work. He argues that in fractured societies defined by a small
number of cohesive and homogenous groups, the elites select those institutions that
promote power sharing and minority rights out of fear that majoritarian institutions will
result in the suppression of their group. Thus, the original groups become
institutionalized and calcified into the democratic framework. As time goes on, the
institutions help identify group distinctions, rather than commonalties, similar to
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Rokkan’s (1968) ‘freezing’ hypothesis. The net effect in regimes characterized by group
distinctions is lower aggregate tolerance levels, which may also indicate increasing levels
of societal conflict.
As unfavorable as these findings are for the conventional wisdom, they are
consistent with the general expectations of those hypotheses based on political party
behavior and electoral strategies. This study is not the first to question the efficacy of
consensus institutions in ameliorating social divisions (see Tsebelis 1990; Taagepera
1998), but it does move beyond individual behavior by applying the logic to tolerance
attitudes. While these findings are suggestive, caution in interpreting these results is in
order as further analysis of this phenomenon, particularly longitudinal studies, is
required.
In terms of the democratic learning hypothesis, this study represents a significant
advancement in understanding this phenomenon. The fact that the effect of political
institutions on tolerance attitudes manifests and strengthens with increasing citizen
exposure offers powerful evidence in support of the ‘learning’ hypothesis. Observing
that the ‘learning’ effect is not homogenous across different electoral systems is perhaps
the most important finding of this chapter. This undoubtedly explains why I was unable
to find any relationship between democratic learning and political tolerance levels in
previous analysis.
These findings also have significant normative consequences in how we view
democratic learning. Indeed, one of the underlying assumptions of this hypothesis is that
democratic learning produces social goods, such as higher levels of tolerance. Yet, I
show here that democratic learning actually produces harmful effects for society under
certain conditions. Clearly, future researchers will now need to account for the fact that
the effect of democratic learning is conditioned by the type of electoral rules present in
the system. This makes the underlying distribution of electoral systems critical in
predicting what type of influence democratic longevity will have on political behavior
and attitudes.
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Table 6-1: The Effects of Domestic Political Institutions on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93*** (0.31)

-4.94*** (0.32)

-4.94*** (0.32)

-4.93*** (0.31)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.93*** (0.29)

-4.94*** (0.30)

-4.94*** (0.30)

0.14***
0.07**
0.06*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.23***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Majoritarian System
Mixed System
PR System

-0.30

(0.26)

-0.31

(0.27)

-0.43

(0.32)

-0.14

(0.17)

-0.30

(0.19)

-0.36

(0.20)

0.35

(0.25)

Democratic Longevity
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.001
-0.44
0.06

-0.001
-0.35
-0.14
-0.82***
0.01

(0.002)
(0.65)
(0.10)
(0.20)
(0.05)

-0.004
-0.46
-0.11
-0.80***
0.05

(0.003)
(0.52)
(0.09)
(0.19)
(0.06)

0.01*

(0.004)

-0.01

(0.003)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Macro-Level:
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(0.004)
(0.71)
(0.15)

0.14

(0.23)

-0.001
-0.43
0.10

(0.003)
(0.74)
(0.12)

-0.002
-0.40
0.14

(0.003)
(0.65)
(0.12)

Majoritarian*Democratic Longevity
Mixed*Democratic Longevity
PR*Democratic Longevity

-0.003
-0.40
0.08

(0.005)
(0.71)
(0.15)

0.003

(0.004)

0.39

(0.22)

0.003
-0.37
0.13

(0.002)
(0.75)
(0.12)

-0.01*

-0.002
-0.45
0.11

(0.002)
(0.63)
(0.12)

0.01*

(0.004)

-0.004
-0.33
-0.13
-0.81***
-0.05

(0.004)
(0.62)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.07)

0.003

(0.004)

(0.004)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.22***
2.36***
2.43***
Df
28
28
28
2
Chi
122.15
128.2
133.0
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

2.22***
27

2.56***
27

2.52***
27

1.74***
25

1.93***
25

1.98***
25

122.98

143.75

138.61

103.18

110.28

111.81

Table 6-2: The Effects of Domestic Political Institutions on Political Tolerance Across 22 Democracies
Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

-5.12*** (0.39)

-5.13*** (0.43)

-5.14*** (0.44)

-5.12*** (0.40)

-5.14*** (0.44)

-5.14*** (0.45)

-5.11*** (0.41)

-5.12*** (0.45)

-5.14*** (0.43)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.001
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.004
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.31***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.19***
-0.002
-0.31***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.31***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

Majoritarian System
Mixed System
PR System

-0.69*

(0.31)

-0.85*

(0.35)

-1.02**

(0.31)

-0.18

(0.24)

-0.62

(0.32)

-0.52

(0.29)

Democratic Longevity
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.005
-1.52*
-0.25

-0.004
-0.97
-0.15
-0.89**
-0.03

(0.003)
(0.55)
(0.10)
(0.26)
(0.12)

0.01

(0.006)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

Macro-Level:
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(0.004)
(0.70)
(0.16)

0.45

(0.23)

0.002
-1.64*
0.03

(0.003)
(0.71)
(0.13)

0.89*** (0.22)
0.001
-1.34
0.12

(0.003)
(0.67)
(0.13)

Majoritarian*Democratic Longevity
Mixed*Democratic Longevity
PR*Democratic Longevity

-0.000
-1.45*
-0.15

(0.004)
(0.66)
(0.15)

0.01*

(0.004)

0.008** (0.003)
-1.23*
(0.59)
0.07
(0.11)

0.92*** (0.17)
-0.002
-1.02
0.21

(0.003)
(0.64)
(0.12)

0.01

(0.007)

-0.001
-1.13*
-0.14
-0.62**
-0.46**

(0.003)
(0.50)
(0.12)
(0.21)
(0.12)

0.01***
-0.84
0.06
-0.50*
-0.46***

(0.003)
(0.47)
(0.08)
(0.19)
(0.10)

0.02*** (0.003)
-0.014*** (0.003)

-0.02*** (0.003)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.51***
3.28***
3.43***
Df
17
17
17
2
Chi
87.12
106.3
114.93
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

2.78***
16

3.49***
16

3.68***
16

2.91***
14

3.73***
14

3.32***
14

100.01

119.99

117.67

107.31

127.81

105.76

Table 6-3: The Impact of Federalism on Political Tolerance Across 22 Democracies
Model 19

Model 20

Model 21

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

-5.13*** (0.42)

-5.13*** (0.42)

-5.15***

(0.44)

0.13***
0.08**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

Federalist System

-0.33

(0.19)

0.16

(0.21)

0.27

(0.19)

Democratic Longevity
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.003
-0.93
-0.05

(0.002)
(0.61)
(0.11)

0.013*** (0.003)
-0.78
(0.52)
0.02
(0.10)

0.007*
-0.76
0.05
-0.83**
0.17

(0.003)
(0.44)
(0.08)
(0.22)
(0.10)

-0.012** (0.003)

-0.013*** (0.003)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:

Federalist*Democratic Longevity

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.99***
3.65***
3.39***
Df
17
16
14
2
Chi
98.24
114.21
107.16
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

147

Table 6-4: The Influence of the Effective Number of Parties on Political Tolerance
Model 23
Democracies

Model 24
All

Model 25
Democracies

Model 26

n=16541 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-5.13*** (0.43)

-4.93*** (0.31)

-5.14*** (0.40)

-4.93***

(0.32)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.13***
0.08**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.23***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Effective Number of Parties (ENP)
Party System Longevity

-0.01

(0.01)

0.001

(0.008)

-0.01
-0.03*

(0.02)
(0.02)

0.01
0.01

(0.01)
(0.01)

Democratic Longevity
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.002
-1.28
0.06

(0.003)
(0.67)
(0.13)

-0.001
-0.28
0.12

(0.002)
(0.69)
(0.13)

0.01
-1.09
-0.08

(0.005)
(0.72)
(0.13)

-0.002
-0.14
0.16

(0.003)
(0.73)
(0.13)

0.002

(0.003)

-0.002

(0.002)

Intercept

All

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:

ENP*Party System Longevity

Random Effect:
Variance Component
3.30***
2.30***
2.68***
Df
17
28
15
2
Chi
112.92
128.14
88.82
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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2.38***
26
133.69

Figure 6-1: Democratic Longevity and Political Tolerance (PR vs. Majoritarian
Systems)
Conditional Effect of Democratic Longevity on Tolerance Levels
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Figure 6-2: Democratic Longevity and Political Tolerance (All Systems)
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Implications
Political tolerance is one of the most widely studied political attitudes in the broad
public opinion literature. Obviously, there are compelling reasons for its continued study
as tolerance is a fundamental democratic value and a societal good. Since Stouffer’s
(1955) classic study, researchers have grappled with uncovering the roots of tolerance
using a variety of surveys across an increasing number of countries. Yet, despite the
plethora of research conducted on this subject, there is still much we do not know about
this complex attitude. In this dissertation, I attempt to advance our understanding by
incorporating insights from several different research traditions not normally considered
for this kind of study into generalized model of political tolerance; which takes seriously
both individual and contextual factors affecting a citizen’s decision to extend civil
liberties to unpopular groups.
Aside from linking together several disparate literatures to help inform our
understanding of political tolerance, this study is unique for another reason. In terms of
the number of countries examined, this is one of the largest cross-national studies on
political tolerance ever conducted. This has not only allowed me to assess the role that
contextual factors play in shaping tolerance levels, but also bolsters confidence in my
ability to generalize the findings reported here to a larger population. The large sample
has also provided enough macro-level observations to conduct multi-level analysis,
which allows for a more accurate assessment of how these individual- and state-level
factors work in conjunction to influence overall tolerance levels across countries.
All of the unique features would be rendered unimportant if I was unable to
generate any interesting findings. Fortunately, that is not the case here. As I discussed at
the conclusion of each chapter, this study offers a number of important findings which
make worthy contributions to a wide array of literatures.
Findings and Implications
In terms of our understanding of political tolerance, the most important finding is
demonstrating the contextual factors significantly impact overall tolerance levels.
Specifically, I hypothesize and find that state threat environment negatively affects
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overall tolerance, while certain political institutions have variegated effects on tolerance.
While previous research had shown that political institutions influenced tolerance levels
(e.g. Duch and Gibson; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Weldon 2006), none of those
studies examined the effects of electoral rules nor did they reveal that international
factors (i.e. external threats) can shape tolerance. Certainly, I am the first attempt to
model the effects of exogenous threat on tolerance levels across multiple countries. The
analyses also suggest that the substantive impact of these contextual factors on tolerance
compare favorably to important individual-level characteristics. Overall, this study
shows that disparity in tolerance levels across countries is not just attributable to
combined differences in individual characteristics. In short, this dissertation finds that
context matters in explaining differences across countries.
One obvious implication of this study is that future cross-national research on
political tolerance need to account for contextual factors affecting political tolerance
levels. Individual attitudes on civil liberties, particularly toward non-conformist groups,
are clearly being shaped by state-level factors. Although individual characteristics are
still the primary determinants of political tolerance, researchers conducting cross-national
research on political tolerance should, at the very least, try to control for these factors in
their models. Otherwise, they run risk of introducing bias into their analyses.
Aside from these generalities, this dissertation generates a number of specific findings
that are not only relevant to the political tolerance literature, but have implications that
extend to other fields of research.
As I report above, differences in threat environments shape political tolerance
levels across states as citizens are forced to choose between security and egalitarian
values and exhibit tendencies to enforce conformity against “renegadism”. Although
conventional wisdom suggests that any external threat should negatively affect political
tolerance levels, I demonstrate that this effect is dependent on the type of issue
threatening the state. Drawing on the international conflict literature, I identify one
subset of issue type, territory, expected to be more salient to both elites and their
domestic audiences, and our empirical results confirm these expectations. External
threats involving territorial issues have a strong negative effect on individual tolerance
levels in our analyses, especially when the state is targeted by the threat, and these
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findings are robust against numerous changes to both sample and model specification.
Threats to other issue types have no statistically significant effect on tolerance.
By linking exogenous threat to endogenous domestic processes, my findings fill
an important gap in the international conflict literature. The strong empirical evidence
showing that territorial issues are generally more salient at the domestic level confirms
what was previously an untested assumption made by the territorial conflict literature –
that territorial issues are qualitatively different from other types of issues. In providing
ex ante evidence of the negative domestic-level consequences of territorial issues, I not
only further validate claims made by the territorial conflict theories, but also present a
framework for future research exploring similar diffusion of international events to
domestic-level processes.
While this dissertation contributes to the international conflict and political
tolerance literatures, these results are consistent with important research in other areas.
For instance, my argument regarding external threats and attitudes is consistent with
many of the explanations motivating explanations of the “rally around the flag”
phenomenon. Salient external threats trigger a unifying dynamic at the domestic level,
whether that effect is enforced conformity, support for government institutions, or both.
Certainly, the similarity in public response following the same stimulus warrants further
investigation, and it seems plausible that a focus on territorial issues could piece together
some of the discrepant findings thus far.
My findings also support some of the claims made by “second image reversed”
theories. While this literature offers a rich theoretical tradition linking external threat to
state centralization and domestic tensions, it has found only modest empirical support
thus far. Theoretically, the threat of external conflict should harden the state by
centralizing institutions for the purpose of public mobilization. However, I believe the
empirics have often suffered due to a relative dearth of well-specified tests because most
studies linking external threat to domestic politics focus on conflict broadly and ignore
the likelihood that only certain issues carry the necessary weight to greatly affect
domestic politics. In this sense, by focusing on territorial issues, my study helps answer
which types of external conflict cause significant changes in domestic-level moves
toward centralization.
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This dissertation also demonstrates that violent threats originating within the state
shape individual tolerance decisions as citizens collectively choose restrict the civil
liberties of unpopular and nonconformist groups. The strong conclusion derived from
these analyses is that the relationship between internal levels and political intolerance is
very strong and robust despite changes in statistical estimation and indicators. Although
this relationship is often assumed, it has never been empirically demonstrated in a
systematic fashion using cross-national data. In this study, I not only provide compelling
empirical evidence in support of this contention, but I also resolve some of the
uncertainty regarding the direction of the causality.
These results have important implications for literature on civil conflict. Not only
do they highlight yet another negative social cost of civil conflict on the afflicted
domestic populations, but they also empirically demonstrate that internal conflicts beget
intolerance. Consequently, these findings may valuable policy implications. Aside from
diminishing the normative good political tolerance provides society, internal threats also
indirectly decrease the likelihood of democratization and democratic consolidation if the
cultural theories of democratization are correct. Granted, states experiencing high levels
of internal strife are already less likely to democratize or consolidate democracy, but the
increased divisiveness and acrimony toward nonconformist groups caused by internal
threats certainly does not improve future prospects. As an “endorphin of democracy”,
political tolerance represents not only a normative good, but also facilitates a healthy
civic culture (Gibson and Gouws 2003). Without healthy levels of tolerance, states run
the risk of fostering repression and other abuses. Policymakers interested in healing
divisions and reducing hostility should take steps in educating the public on the role of
tolerance in society.
In the analyses examining the relationship between political institutions and
political tolerance levels, I generate a number of noteworthy findings. Although I find
little evidence indicating of either general electoral systems or democratic longevity
exerting any direct influence on tolerance levels, I show they have considerable impact
after accounting for their conditional relationship. Put simply, I find that differences in
electoral systems are associated patterns in overall tolerance levels, but the effect
depends, in large part, on the age of those political institutions. Specifically, I
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demonstrate that the longer exposure to PR electoral systems and federalist arrangements
is correlated with lower overall tolerance levels. Conversely, majoritarian institutions
appear to promote tolerance over time as I find higher overall tolerance levels are
associated with learning under those institutions. Although these relationships were
predicted in hypotheses derived from logic on party incentives, these results are
unexpected given that they directly contrast the conventional wisdom regarding electoral
systems. These findings are noteworthy because of the challenge they present to the
conventional wisdom regarding the type of influence consensus and majoritarian
institutions each should have in ameliorating social divisions. Lijphart (1977, 1984,
1999) argues that consensus institutions should ameliorate perceived threat and group
hostility between the major groups within society because rules ensuring broad
representation and shared power, whereas majoritarian institutions are more likely to
exacerbate social tensions due to electoral incentives to withhold power with the minority
opposition. Yet, despite these expectations, the evidence clearly does not support the
conventional wisdom. However unfavorable these results are for the conventional
wisdom, they bolster my claim that given the incentives facing political parties under
these rules, we should find the opposite effects occurring over time.
In terms of the democratic learning hypothesis, this study represents a significant
advancement in understanding this phenomenon. Although I find little support for
generalized hypothesis, I observe that the ‘learning’ effect is not homogenous and that the
influence on tolerance is dependent upon the type of electoral system operating in that
country. The normative implications of this finding is significant considering the oftenmade assumption that democratic learning produces social goods, such as higher levels of
tolerance is flawed. In this dissertation, I demonstrate that democratic learning can
actually produce harmful effects for society under certain conditions.
Future Research
Although this dissertation has advanced our understanding of political tolerance
by identifying powerful contextual influence on overall tolerance levels, I view this study
as an initial first step. Throughout the course of developing this project, it became
abundantly clear that further research on this subject is required. One area with a glaring
need of further research is examining the cross-level interactions between individual-
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level and macro-level predictors of tolerance. The previous literature on situational
triggers and perceived threat suggest that maybe objective threat serves as a type of
contemporary information that moderates both individual predispositions and threat
perception (e.g., Marcus et al 1995).
Another obvious avenue for future studies is in replicating these findings using
longitudinal data. One of the primary limitations in using a cross-national, crosssectional design is that questions of causality cannot be fully assessed. Indeed, while I
can report patterns of political tolerance being systematically associated with differences
in contextual factors, I can only offer mere hints at causal inference. To make those types
of inferences, one needs to collect tolerance data over time to assess whether changes in
contextual factors are associated with changes in individual tolerance attitudes. Even
then there is still a good deal of uncertainty over whether these changes modified
attitudes, but those types of inferences are easier to justify. Taking this idea forward, a
longitudinal study on Israeli tolerance offers the most promise for future research in this
area for a number of reasons. First, a number of tolerance surveys have been conducted
in Israel over the last 25 years. This would give researchers the temporal leverage needed
to conduct this type of study. Second, Israel offers wide variation in the key contextual
factors discussed in this dissertation, particularly objective threat levels.
It is important to note that I have identified only one subset of threats generally
considered more ‘salient’ within the international conflict literature. I do not dismiss the
possibility that other types of threat could be considered salient as well; and thus
influence attitudes and behavior. So while my focus on territorial disputes and
insurgency-based violence provides a consistent identifier of threats likely to be salient to
domestic audiences, future research should not stop here. Instead, the next step forward
rests with unpacking the thresholds of threat that make other issue types salient to the
public at large. Further examinations of these linkages will provide a much clearer
portrait of the contextual elements that shape individual tolerance judgments.
In terms of political institutions, it is apparent that other types of electoral rules and laws
governing power distribution amongst groups may change the incentives facing political
actors. In this study, I use relatively crude measures to differential across political
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systems leaving open the opportunity for future researchers to examine these
relationships in more depth.
The type of analyses that I suggest above would build upon the contributions
made by this dissertation in enhancing our understanding the complex nature of political
tolerance. By continuing to integrate the insights from other related fields of study,
researchers can provide a much clearer portrait of the contextual elements that shape
individual tolerance judgments.
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Appendix: Additional Statistical Analyses and Figures
Figure 4-1a: The Effect of Democratic Activism on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-2a: The Effect of Democratic Ideals on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-3a: The Effect of Political Interest on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-4a: The Effect of Free Speech Priority on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-5a: The Effect of Conformity on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-6a: The Effect of Political Ideology on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-7a: The Effect of Gender on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-8a: The Effect of Age on Individual Political Tolerance
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Figure 4-9a: The Effect of Education on Individual Political Tolerance
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Table 4-3a: Marginal Effects of Individual Characteristics (Non-Criminals vs. Criminals Respondents)
Change in probability of an individual tolerating their least-like group for each of the following characteristics
(measured from the base probability of political tolerance):
Non-Criminals

Criminals

Attitudinal variables Individual's democratic activism changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's political interest changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's democratic ideals changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's free speech priority changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's conformity changes from Mean to Maximum:

16.13%
2.10%
2.00%
7.61%
-2.91%

10.38%
n/a*
n/a*
3.60%
n/a*

-3.05%
-2.65%
4.37%

-1.00%
-2.03%
n/a*

Socio-economic/Demographic Characteristics
Individual's gender changes from male to female:
Individual's age changes from Mean to Maximum:
Individual's education changes from Mean to Maximum:

* denotes that the variable was not statistically significant
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Table 5-9a: External Threat Model Controlling for Peffley and Rohrschneider Sample Countries
Model 26a
Model 27a
Model 28a
Intercept

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.89***
(0.30)

-4.89***
(0.28)

-4.89***
(0.28)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.07
(0.06)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.76***
(0.18)
0.01
(0.04)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity

-0.002
(0.002)
0.11
(0.12)
-0.28
(0.69)
-0.34
(0.17)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization
Peffley & Rohrschneider Sample Country

-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.05
(0.09)
-0.19
(0.59)
-0.38*
(0.17)

-0.84***
(0.17)
-0.71*
(0.29)
-0.22
(0.20)
0.30*
(0.12)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.05
(0.07)
0.29
(0.65)
-0.30
(0.16)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
1.91***
1.83***
1.54***
Df
27
26
24
2
Chi
112.24
110.97
92.43
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-10a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Criminals Sample)
Model 30a

Model 31a

Model 32a

Model 33a

n=29420

n=29420

n=29420

n=29420

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Democratic Activism

0.16***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.01)

Political Interest

0.08**
(0.03)

0.08**
(0.03)

0.08**
(0.03)

0.08***
(0.02)

Conformity

-0.22***
(0.04)

-0.21***
(0.04)

-0.21***
(0.04)

-0.21***
(0.02)

Democratic Ideals

0.08*
(0.03)

0.08*
(0.03)

0.08*
(0.03)

0.08***
(0.02)

Free Speech Priority

0.31***
(0.03)

0.31***
(0.03)

0.31***
(0.03)

0.31***
(0.03)

Gender (0=male)

-0.30***
(0.05)

-0.30***
(0.05)

-0.30***
(0.05)

-0.30***
(0.04)

Age

-0.01***
(0.001)

-0.01***
(0.001)

-0.01***
(0.001)

-0.01***
(0.001)

Education

0.09***
(0.02)

0.09***
(0.02)

0.09***
(0.02)

0.09***
(0.01)

Ideology (high=left)

0.002
(0.02)

0.002
(0.02)

0.002
(0.02)

0.002
(0.01)

Individual-Level:

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1 yr)

-0.007
(0.10)

Territorial Disputes (1 yr)

-0.45*
(0.22)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1 yr)

0.09
(0.09)

Targeted Territorial Disputes (1 yr)

-0.51*
(0.24)

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.15
(0.41)

Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1 yr)

0.16
(0.69)

Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.002
(0.24)

Democratic Duration

0.005
(0.005)

0.003
(0.005)

0.003
(0.004)

Economic Development (log)

0.27
(0.18)

0.26
(0.15)

0.26*
(0.12)

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.09
(0.98)

0.20
(0.89)

0.08
(0.69)

Random Effect:
Variance Component

0.74

0.48

0.39

0.37

Df

32

28

27

25

2351.4

997.4

932.8

888.8

Prob
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses in models 18-20.
Normal standard errors are listed in model 21.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

0.000

Chi

2
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Table 5-11a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 22 Countries (Democracies only)

Intercept

Model 34a

Model 35a

Model 36a

Model 37a

Model 38a

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

-5.14***
(0.39)

-5.13***
(0.42)

-5.12***
(0.42)

-5.13***
(0.40)

-5.13***
(0.40)

0.13***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.003
(0.02)
-0.31***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.11***
(0.02)

0.13***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.002
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.11***
(0.02)

0.13***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.0002
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.11***
(0.02)

0.13***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.002
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.12***
(0.02)

0.13***
(0.02)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.001
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.12***
(0.02)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.29*
(0.012)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.89***
(0.17)
0.08
(0.12)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.002
(0.003)
-0.04
(0.07)
-1.05
(0.53)

-0.90***
(0.17)
-0.03
(0.22)
-0.11
(0.08)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.04
(0.08)
-1.06
(0.54)

2.96***
16
98.68

2.95***
15
98.77

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity

0.002
(0.003)
0.07
(0.12)
-1.26
(0.71)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.004
(0.003)
0.05
(0.10)
-1.11
(0.69)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.71***
3.28***
3.29***
Df
21
18
17
2
Chi
91.74
111.94
108.80
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-12a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 11 Countries (Non-democracies only)
Model 39a
Model 40a
Model 41a
Intercept

n=9032 (ind)

n=9032 (ind)

n=9032 (ind)

-4.55***
(0.42)

-4.59***
(0.43)

-4.66***
(0.44)

0.15***
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.05)
0.20
(0.12)
-0.13*
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.08)
-0.01*
(0.003)
0.05
(0.03)

0.15***
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.05)
0.20
(0.12)
-0.13*
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.08
(0.08)
-0.01*
(0.003)
0.05
(0.03)

0.16***
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.19
(0.12)
-0.12*
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.01*
(0.003)
0.05
(0.03)

-0.07
(0.18)
-0.32
(0.83)

-0.89**
(0.23)
0.20
(0.28)
-0.19
(0.14)
0.49
(0.64)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

Random Effect:
Variance Component
1.09**
1.19**
1.24***
Df
10
8
6
2
Chi
23.32
24.66
26.46
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-13a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (No Macro-level Controls)
Model 42a
Model 43a
Model 44a
Intercept

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.92***
(0.31)

-4.93***
(0.31)

-4.94***
(0.31)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.09
(0.06)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.58**
(0.18)
0.01
(0.04)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.63**
(0.20)
-0.73***
(0.13)
0.05
(0.08)
0.29***
(0.07)

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.14***
2.11***
2.06***
Df
31
30
28
Chi2
120.11
123.41
116.87
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-14a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Five-year Event Counts)
Model 45a
Model 46a
Model 47a
Intercept

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.92***
(0.32)

-4.94***
(0.30)

-4.94***
(0.31)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.22***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (5yr)

-0.01
(0.02)

Territorial Disputes (5yr)

-0.29***
(0.07)
0.12**
(0.04)

Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Democratic Longevity

-0.001
(0.003)
0.12
(0.12)
-0.26
(0.69)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.005
(0.003)
0.06
(0.11)
0.04
(0.57)

-0.48**
(0.15)
0.15
(0.10)
-0.10
(0.09)
0.05
(0.07)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.02
(0.11)
0.05
(0.51)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.29***
2.08***
2.06***
Df
28
27
25
2
Chi
127.86
119.49
115.91
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-15a: Macro-Level Models of Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (OLS)

Constant

Model 48a

Model 49a

Model 50a

Model 51a

n=33

n=33

n=33

n=33

5.68
(8.79)

4.97
(8.73)

5.66
(7.08)

4.73
(6.06)

External Threat Variables
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

0.29
(0.82)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-2.20*
(1.29)
0.84
(0.82)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-2.48*
(1.37)
-0.82
(4.83)
0.67
(2.93)
1.48

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

Control Variables
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.07**
(0.03)
0.60
(0.93)
-2.64
(5.85)

0.06*
(0.04)
0.68
(0.94)
-2.79
(6.16)

Root MSE
5.23
5.32
Adj R2
0.37
0.38
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.10 level; **= significance at 0.05 level; ***= significance at 0.01 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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0.05
(0.04)
0.65
(0.80)
-2.20
(5.73)

0.06
(0.05)
0.58
(0.81)
-1.30
(7.83)

5.22
0.42

5.38
0.43

Table 5-16a: Macro-Level Models of Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (OLS - Five-year Event Counts)
Model 52a
Model 53a
Model 54a
Constant

n=33

n=33

n=33

4.87
(8.70)

5.88
(7.43)

7.89
(7.71)

External Threat Variables
Militarized Interstate Disputes (5yr)

0.12
(0.27)

Territorial Disputes (5yr)

-1.51**
(0.61)
0.98*
(0.52)

Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (5yr)

-2.04**
(0.87)
1.03
(1.26)
-0.68
(1.26)
0.73
(0.81)

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (5yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (5yr)

Control Variables
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.06*
(0.04)
0.70
(0.94)
-3.01
(6.33)

0.04
(0.04)
0.62
(0.83)
-0.69
(5.41)

Root MSE
5.31
4.98
Adj R2
0.38
0.47
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.10 level; **= significance at 0.05 level; ***= significance at 0.01 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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0.05
(0.05)
0.39
(0.90)
-1.13
(5.80)
5.11
0.48

Table 5-17a: Ordered Logit Models of Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries
Model 55a

Model 56a

Model 57a

Model 58a

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

0.18***
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.06
(0.04)
0.30***
(0.06)
-0.20***
(0.04)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.26***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.06
(0.04)
0.30***
(0.06)
-0.20***
(0.04)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.26***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.30***
(0.06)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.27***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.29***
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.04)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.27***
(0.07)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

0.05
(0.09)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.37*
(0.16)
0.11
(0.08)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.005
(0.002)
0.002
(0.10)
-0.46
(0.61)

0.004
(0.003)
0.01
(0.10)
-0.50
(0.65)

0.002
(0.003)
0.03
(0.09)
-0.38
(0.60)

-0.43**
(0.16)
-0.16
(0.46)
0.17
(0.24)
0.24
(0.16)
0.003
(0.004)
0.03
(0.09)
-0.20
(0.83)

3.57
(0.89)
5.02
(0.89)

3.67
(0.89)
5.12
(0.88)

3.80
(0.76)
5.26
(0.76)

3.88
(0.74)
5.33
(0.74)

205.92

227.34

344.47

385.56

0.07

0.07

0.07

0.07

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

Cutpoint #1
Cutpoint#2

LR-Chi

2
2

Psuedo R

Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
The standard errors are clustered by country.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-18a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Non-imputed sample)

Intercept

Model 59a

Model 60a

Model 61a

Model 62a

Model 63a

n=17977 (ind)

n=17977 (ind)

n=17977 (ind)

n=17977 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.95***
(0.35)

-4.96***
(0.35)

-4.95***
(0.35)

-4.92***
(0.32)

-4.92***
(0.32)

0.15***
(0.02)
0.05*
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.21***
(0.04)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.15***
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.21***
(0.04)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.02)
0.05*
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.21***
(0.04)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.20***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.20***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.23***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.02)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.07
(0.10)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.91***
(0.20)
0.05
(0.07)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.001
(0.003)
-0.12
(0.11)
0.22
(0.70)

-0.95***
(0.21)
-0.34
(0.45)
-0.84**
(0.28)
0.23
(0.17)
-0.0004
(0.004)
-0.12
(0.11)
0.47
(0.82)

2.03***
27
99.04

1.98***
25
93.17

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity

0.003
(0.003)
0.01
(0.18)
-0.18
(0.93)

Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.003
(0.004)
-0.01
(0.17)
-0.21
(0.93)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.57***
2.82***
2.69***
Df
32
29
28
2
Chi
109.64
120.16
115.27
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 5-19a: Marginal Effects of Threat on Political Tolerance
Change in probability of an individual tolerating their least-like group for each of the following contextual factor
(measured from the base probability of political tolerance):

External Threat variables The country experiences . . .
A change in the number of Territorial MIDs from Minimum to Maximum:
A change in the number of Targeted Territorial MIDs from Minimum to Maximum:
A change in the number of Targeted MIDs involving force from Minimum to Maximum:
A change in the number of Territorial MIDs involving force from Minimum to Maximum:
A change in the number of Targeted Territorial MIDs involving force from Minimum to Maximum:

-7.55%
-8.57%
-6.74%
-8.15%
-8.59%

Internal Threat variables The country experiences . . .
A civil war in the five years prior to the survey:
A change in the number of terrorist attacks from Mean to Maximum:
An armed rebellion :
Note: All probabilities for the external threat variables are calculated using the results presented in Table 5-17a, Models 56a-58a.
All probablilities for the internal threat variables are calculated using the results presented in Table 5-6, Models 17-18.
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-4.67%
-4.22%
-3.32%

Table 5-20a: The Effects of External Threat on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Inglehart's Measure of Democratic Longevity)
Model 64a
Model 65a
Model 66a
Model 67a
Intercept

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.93***
(0.32)

-4.94***
(0.30)

-4.93***
(0.30)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.25***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.02)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.16***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.09***
(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1yr)

-0.03
(0.06)

Territorial Disputes (1yr)

-0.71***
(0.19)
-0.01
(0.04)

Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.001
(0.004)
-0.13
(0.09)
-0.37
(0.61)

-0.84***
(0.18)
-0.88**
(0.27)
-0.20
(0.16)
0.35**
(0.12)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.11
(0.08)
0.27
(0.70)

1.99***
27

1.85***
25

117.55

104.41

Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Targeted Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Democratic Longevity (Ingelhart)
Economic Development (log)
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.01*
(0.003)
0.02
(0.12)
-0.37
(0.64)

0.01
(0.003)
0.02
(0.11)
-0.37
(0.69)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.52***
2.46***
Df
29
28
2
Chi
145.68
142.41
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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Table 6-1a: The Effects of Domestic Political Institutions on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries (Inglehart's Measure of Democratic Longevity)
Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 3a

Model 4a

Model 5a

Model 6a

Model 7a

Model 8a

Model 9a

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93*** (0.32)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.93*** (0.31)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.94*** (0.33)

-4.93*** (0.29)

-4.95*** (0.31)

-4.95*** (0.31)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Majoritarian System
Mixed System
PR System

-0.49*

(0.22)

-0.51

(0.29)

-0.48

(0.30)

-0.10

(0.16)

-0.21

(0.21)

-0.30

(0.22)

0.34

(0.28)

Democratic Longevity (Inglehart)
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.01
-0.45
-0.07

0.004
-0.55
-0.19
-0.75***
0.03

(0.004)
(0.62)
(0.11)
(0.20)
(0.04)

-0.001
-0.60
-0.14
-0.74***
0.02

(0.006)
(0.53)
(0.10)
(0.19)
(0.05)

0.01

(0.005)

-0.004

(0.01)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Macro-Level:
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(0.006)
(0.63)
(0.15)

0.23

(0.21)

0.01
-0.50
0.00

(0.005)
(0.66)
(0.13)

0.01
-0.40
0.05

(0.005)
(0.63)
(0.13)

Majoritarian*Democratic Longevity
Mixed*Democratic Longevity
PR*Democratic Longevity

0.01
-0.55
-0.12

(0.006)
(0.63)
(0.14)

-0.002

(0.006)

0.34

(0.23)

0.01*
-0.47
0.01

(0.004)
(0.67)
(0.13)

-0.005

0.005
-0.45
0.05

(0.005)
(0.61)
(0.13)

0.01

(0.005)

0.005
-0.53
-0.23
-0.72***
-0.03

(0.006)
(0.60)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.05)

0.001

(0.006)

(0.01)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.34***
2.59***
2.61***
Df
28
28
28
2
Chi
131.98
143.02
148.13
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

2.26***
27

2.68***
27

2.66***
27

1.86***
25

2.10***
25

2.14***
25

125.18

149.95

150.08

109.68

119.07

123.06

Table 6-2a: The Effects of Domestic Political Institutions on Political Tolerance Across 22 Democracies (Inglehart's Measure of Democratic Longevity)

Intercept

Model 10a

Model 11a

Model 12a

Model 13a

Model 14a

Model 15a

Model 16a

Model 17a

Model 18a

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

-5.11*** (0.38)

-5.13*** (0.43)

-5.14*** (0.44)

-5.09*** (0.39)

-5.13*** (0.45)

-5.14*** (0.44)

-5.09*** (0.38)

-5.13*** (0.44)

-5.14*** (0.43)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.19***
-0.004
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.004
-0.31***
-0.01***
0.11***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.19***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.31***
-0.01***
0.12***

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

-1.26**

(0.33)

-0.12

(0.22)

-0.25

(0.33)

-0.32

(0.30)

-0.000
-1.13
0.07
-0.80**
-0.15

(0.005)
(0.55)
(0.11)
(0.27)
(0.10)

0.01

(0.01)

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

Macro-Level:
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Majoritarian System
Mixed System
PR System

-0.90*** (0.23)

Democratic Longevity (Inglehart)
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.02**
-1.11*
-0.40**

(0.01)
(0.51)
(0.13)

-1.48*** (0.35)
0.54*

(0.24)

0.01*
-1.56**
-0.07

(0.005)
(0.21)
(0.13)

1.14*** (0.24)
0.01
-1.25*
0.02

(0.005)
(0.59)
(0.12)

Majoritarian*Democratic Longevity
Mixed*Democratic Longevity
PR*Democratic Longevity

0.01**
-1.23*
-0.43**

(0.005)
(0.47)
(0.13)

0.02**

(0.01)

0.023*** (0.005)
-1.43** (0.46)
-0.06
(0.11)

1.01*** (0.23)
0.01
-1.23*
0.05

(0.005)
(0.58)
(0.12)

0.04

(0.01)

0.01
-1.18*
-0.34*
-0.56*
-0.11

(0.005)
(0.49)
(0.13)
(0.24)
(0.10)

0.02*

(0.01)

-0.02*** (0.005)

0.018***
-1.27*
-0.03
-0.55*
-0.14

(0.005)
(0.49)
(0.10)
(0.23)
(0.09)

-0.019*** (0.005)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.31***
3.33***
3.45***
Df
17
17
17
Chi2
83.07
110.59
119.57
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

2.49***
16
94.84

3.67***
16
125.5

3.54***
16
120.8

2.43***
14
90.21

3.48***
14
117.99

3.33***
14
108.8

Table 6-3a: The Impact of Federalism on Political Tolerance Across 33 Countries
Model 19a

Model 20a

Model 21a

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-4.93*** (0.32)

-4.94*** (0.32)

-4.93*** (0.29)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.25***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.14***
0.06*
0.07*
0.24***
-0.15***
0.01
-0.24***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Federalist System

-0.36

(0.19)

-0.18

(0.22)

-0.31

(0.19)

Democratic Longevity
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.000
-0.34
0.05

(0.002)
(0.65)
(0.11)

0.005*
-0.21
0.08

(0.002)
(0.65)
(0.11)

0.003
-0.15
-0.13
-0.72***
0.12**

(0.002)
(0.54)
(0.08)
(0.16)
(0.04)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:

Federalist*Democratic Longevity

-0.006** (0.002)

-0.006** (0.002)

Random Effect:
Variance Component
2.35***
2.44***
1.96***
Df
28
27
25
2
Chi
127.5
132.23
110.82
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey

195

Table 6-3b: The Impact of Federalism on Political Tolerance Across 22 Democracies (Inglehart's Measure of Democratic Longevity)
Model 19b
Model 20b
Model 21b
n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

-5.13*** (0.42)

-5.17*** (0.44)

-5.17*** (0.45)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.18***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.00
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.17***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.12***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

Federalist System

-0.34

(0.18)

0.25

(0.24)

0.44*

(0.20)

Democratic Longevity (Inglehart)
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.01*
-0.75
-0.10

(0.004)
(0.52)
(0.11)

0.01**
-0.39
0.04

(0.004)
(0.46)
(0.10)

0.01*
-0.87
0.07
-0.89***
0.09

(0.004)
(0.42)
(0.08)
(0.22)
(0.08)

-0.02**

(0.005)

-0.02*** (0.004)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:

Federalist*Democratic Longevity

Random Effect:
Variance Component
3.04***
3.47***
Df
17
16
2
Chi
102.95
104.91
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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3.55***
14
105.91

Table 6-4a: The Influence of the Effective Number of Parties on Political Tolerance (Inglehart's Measure of Democratic Longevity)
Model 23a
Model 24a
Model 25a
Model 26a
Democracies
All
Democracies
All
n=16541 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

n=16541 (ind)

n=25573 (ind)

-5.13*** (0.43)

-4.93*** (0.33)

-5.14*** (0.39)

-4.95***

(0.33)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.25***
-0.19***
-0.003
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

0.13***
0.09**
0.11**
0.24***
-0.18***
-0.002
-0.32***
-0.01***
0.11***

(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.002)
(0.02)

0.14***
0.07**
0.07*
0.24***
-0.16***
0.01
-0.25***
-0.01***
0.09***

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.001)
(0.01)

Effective Number of Parties (ENP)
System Longevity

-0.02*

(0.01)

-0.001

(0.009)

-0.02
-0.03**

(0.01)
(0.01)

0.01
-0.00

(0.01)
(0.01)

Democratic Longevity (Inglehart)
Ethnic Fractionalization
Economic Development (log)
Territorial Disputes (1yr)
Non-Territorial Disputes (1yr)

0.01*
-1.15
-0.06

(0.004)
(0.58)
(0.12)

0.01
-0.30
0.04

(0.005)
(0.65)
(0.14)

0.02*
-0.30
-0.18

(0.006)
(0.67)
(0.12)

0.01*
0.17
0.01

(0.005)
(0.74)
(0.13)

0.002

(0.002)

-0.003

(0.002)

Intercept

Individual-Level:
Democratic Activism
Political Interest
Democratic Ideals
Free Speech Priority
Conformity
Ideology (high=left)
Gender (0=male)
Age
Education

Macro-Level:

ENP*System Longevity

Random Effect:
Variance Component
3.43***
2.52***
2.57***
Df
17
28
15
2
Chi
121.14
144.82
87.46
Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients and standard errors estimated with HLM 6.02
The robust standard errors are listed under the coefficients in parentheses.
*= significance at 0.05 level; **= significance at 0.01 level; ***= significance at 0.001 level
Source: 1995-1997 World Values Survey
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2.66***
26
150.34
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